The Strategic Configuration, Personal Influence, and Presidential Power in Congress

• DOI: 10.1177/106591299204500303
• Published date: 01 September 1992
• Date: 01 September 1992
• Author: Michael Mackuen,Calvin Mouw
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE

STRATEGIC

CONFIGURATION,

PERSONAL

INFLUENCE,

AND

PRESIDENTIAL

POWER

IN

CONGRESS

CALVIN

MOUW

AND

MICHAEL

MACKUEN

University

of

Missouri-St.

Louis

residential

power

over

congressional

outcomes

depends

not

on

personal

persuasion,

but

on

more

profound,

both

simpler

and

~L.

subtler,

matters

of

electoral

success

and

strategic

agenda-setting.

In

this

article

we

examine

the

politics

of

president

and

Congress

to

understand

more

about

both

presidential

persuasion

and

what

we

shall

call

the

strategic

configuration.

We

demonstrate

that

presidents

exert

only

marginal,

nearly

negligible,

influence

on

congressional

voting.

Then

we

show

the

broad

outlines

of

the

factors

that

actually

constitute

pres-

idential

political

power

in

Congress.

The

idea of

presidential

persuasion

has

received

considerable

atten-

tion.

Counting

as

presidential

victories

those

congressional

votes

that

agree

with

explicit

presidential

positions,

scholars

(Edwards

1979,

1989;

Bond

and

Fleisher

1990,

and

many

others)

have

suggested

that

presi-

dential

influence

is

limited.

We

confirm

and

extend

this

fundamental

conclusion

by

pushing

matters

further.

We

develop

a

theoretical

model

of

persuasion

so

that

we

may

identify

influence

when

it

occurs.

We

establish

a

measure

of

net

influence,

the

number

of

congressional

votes

that

a

president’s

action

elicits

from

wavering

supporters

and

from

possible

opponents.

This

approach

allows

us

to

probe

beyond

a

&dquo;bottom

line&dquo;

of

winning

and

losing;

it

allows

us

to

test

detailed

prop-

ositions

about

how

presidential

influence

might

operate.

For

the

evidence,

we

analyze

the

political

performance

of

Dwight

Eisenhower

(1953-60)

and

Ronald

Reagan

(1981-88)

on

Key

Votes

in

the

House

of

Representatives.

The

two

presidencies

are

comparable.

The

Eisenhower

and

Reagan

administrations

were

essentially

Conser-

vative

in

policy

outlook,

aiming

to

restrict

and

then

reduce

the

New

Deal’s

expansive

role

for

government,

and

both

advocated

an

assertive

foreign

policy

and

dramatic

changes

in

defense

posture.’

Both

presi-

Received :

February

22,

1991

Revision

Received:

August

8,

1991

Accepted

for

Publication:

September

16,

1991

1

We

also

assume

that

the

two

presidencies

were

comparable

in

terms

of

legislative

580

dents

enjoyed

comparatively

high

levels

of

personal

popularity

through-

out

their

tenures,

and

together

they

represent

the

universe

of

two-term

presidencies

in

the

postwar

era.

Most

important,

both

Republican

presidents

faced

an

organized

Democratic

opposition

in

the

House

for

most

or

all

of

their

time.

Because

the

presidents

could

not

simply

rely

on

a

partisan

majority

in

Congress,

we

shall

be

able

to

observe

the

president

in

action

when

the

field

is

also

occupied

by

a

skillful

oppo-

nent.

That

the

president

is

not

the

sole

actor

in

the

game

is

central

to

our

discussion.

The

article

proceeds

as

follows.

First,

we

develop

an

Elementary

Model

of

influence.

It

measures

member

deviations

from

a

baseline

and

attributes

the

net

movement

to

the

actions

of

both

the

president

and

the

party

leaderships.

We

find

that

presidents

wield

personal

influence

only

within

their

own

party,

and

that

this

influence

is

effectively

coun-

tered

by

an

equal

and

contrary

reaction

in

the

opposition

party

lead-

ership.

Second,

we

look

at

evidence

for

four

conventional

models

of

how

a

president

might

influence

House

members.

As

exemplars

of

Bargaining

politics,

we

evaluate

the

power

of

a

Bank

Account

Model - one

that

posits

a

nonrenewable

set

of

presidential

resources

that

are

drawn

down

over

time,

and

a

Political

Investment

Model-one

built

on

Neustadt’s

(1980)

idea

that

presidential

influence

depends

on

Washingtonians’

assessment

of

presidential

power.

Then

we

evaluate

two

of

a

Plebi-

scitary

political

nature:

a

Presidential

Approval

Model-

characterized

by

Neustadt’s

notion

that

a

Washingtonian’s

decision

calculus

is

in

part

determined

by

presidential

Public

&dquo;prestige,&dquo;

and

Kernell’s

(1986)

Going

Public

Model-where

a

president’s

specific

actions

in

the

wider

political

arena

affect

his

ability

to

influence

members.

We

find

only

modest

support

for

the

Investment

view

and

practically

no

support

for

the

rest.

Finally,

we

lay out

the

way

in

which

the

changing

Strategic

Configuration,

a

combination

of

the

tactics

of

agenda

definition

and

the

ideological

composition

of

Congress,

affects

political

outcomes.

This

last

scheme,

rather

than

that

of

direct

political

influence,

accounts

for

presidential

success

and

failure

in

congressional

politics.

activity.

While

common

perceptions

picture

Reagan

as

the

policy

activist

and

Eisenhower

as

the

passivist,

evidence

and

reinterpretations

suggest

this

may

be

inappropriate.

Some

scholars,

specifically

Greenstein

(1982),

picture

Eisenhower

as

being

active

in

coalition-building.

Conversely,

forthcoming

interpretations

of

the

Reagan

legacy

may

deemphasize

his

legislative

prowess.

To

be

sure

however,

dissimilarities

existed

on

foreign

policy

issues,

with

Reagan

taking

a

far

more

conservative

stance

than

Eisenhower.