The squirrel and the state.

AuthorMaloberti, Nicolas
PositionEssay

Robert Nozick maintains that "[t]he fundamental question of political philosophy, one that precedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there should be any state at all" (1974, 4). Perhaps we disagree with Nozick and believe that other questions in political philosophy are more fundamental--for example, whether individuals have the "strong and far-reaching" rights that Nozick himself believes they have. He might reply that the question of the existence or justification of individual rights does not belong to political philosophy, but rather to moral philosophy. In any case, however, this latter issue is a trivial, terminological matter, not something that requires disputation, and we may easily distinguish it from the important, substantive question of whether a state should exist.

In attempts to answer that important question, however, the terminological issues are not usually easily distinguished from what ultimately matters. Nozick himself seems to fail in this regard. This failure is important because it conceals the considerable gap between the substantive moral stance at which he arrives and what one might think that stance is on the basis of his endorsement of the "state." Nozick maintains that one of his main conclusions in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is "that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified" (1974, ix). But even if one accepts that all of his arguments are sound, what he vindicates is something quite short of what the anarchist opposes. Nozick may be right in claiming that, according to certain set of standards, "the protective association dominant in a territory, as described, is a state" (118, emphasis in the original). Yet the worry is that we might base our position with regard to the state's legitimacy on something about which there should be no occasion for dispute, as the campers do in William James's story about the squirrel going around the tree.

I

James begins chapter 2 of Pragmatism as follows:

Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find every one engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel--a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the mango round the squirrel or not? He goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Every one had taken sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. (1907, 43-44, emphasis in the original) At this point, James tells the reader, his companions appealed to him to decide between the two opinions and thereby give one side of the dispute a majority.

"Which party is right," I said, "depends on what you practically mean by 'going round' the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther dispute." (1907, 44)

This story has great philosophical importance, yet its main lesson is usually forgotten. The main lesson is that some philosophical problems are illusionary because they involve merely terminological issues. What exactly did we not know about the squirrel, the human, and the tree before James gave his answer? About the situation, we had all the information that we could possibly have. If we did not know something, it was how the term going round was supposed to be used. But these sorts of terminological issues are of little consequence because they have a beating neither on how things actually are nor on how things should be, and only in those realms can substantive, significant disagreements arise. If we disagree neither about how things are nor about how things should be, but we still disagree, in all likelihood we are disagreeing about something of no significance--that is, only about the names to be given to such things.

Without a doubt, many so-called metaphysical problems turn out to be merely terminological issues. (1) But the lessons to be taken from the squirrel story extend further. Like the campers in the story, political philosophers may also misdirect their efforts and fail to consider what truly matters.

John Rawls claims that "political power is always coercive power backed up by the government's use of sanctions" (1996, 136). Christopher Morris argues, however, that because "states without coercion or force are conceivable.., state and coercion and force cannot be conceptually connected" (2004, 200). Morris asks us to imagine a state that does not need to use force or coercion because its subjects are always motivated to comply with its laws. Is not this possibility, "admittedly fantastic and utopian," perfectly coherent? Morris then concludes that it does not seem to be a conceptual truth that states are coercive (200). Similarly, Gregory Kavka claims that for an organization to be regarded as a state, it "must possess enough power to enforce its rulings with sufficient regularity to discourage self-help among citizens" (1986, 158, see also 245). But "if there were enough cooperation" (Kavka 1986, 170), a purely voluntary arrangement among individuals might count as a state.

Max Weber famously defined the state as a "compulsory association with a territorial basis." In such a territory, "the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it" (1947, 156). But John Hasnas argues that we should not think that exclusive control over coercive power is "logically necessary for an organization to be a state" based on the historical fact that "all existent states claim such exclusive control." He asserts that if the essential features of the state--that is, those that are necessary for it to realize its purposes--can be achieved without monopolizing the legislative, judicial, and enforcement functions, "there can be a state that does not exercise such a...

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