The Soviet Union, the Un and World Trade

Date01 September 1958
DOI10.1177/106591295801100315
Published date01 September 1958
AuthorHarold Karan Jacobson
Subject MatterArticles
673
THE
SOVIET
UNION,
THE
UN
AND
WORLD
TRADE
HAROLD KARAN
JACOBSON
University
of
Michigan
I
INCE
1953
the
Soviet
Union
has
radically
altered
its
policy
concern-
ing
the
United
Nations’
work
in
the
field
of
international
trade.
The
U.S.S.R.
apparently
has
developed
an
increased
interest
in
this
work
and
has
played
a
much
more
active
role
in
it.
Soviet
representatives
now
participate
in
many
United
Nations’
organs
which
they
previously
boy-
cotted,
and
their
speeches
and
actions
lack
the
stridently
propagandistic
tone
which
characterized
those
of
Soviet
delegates
in
an
earlier
period.
The
U.S.S.R.
has
even
attempted
to
seize
the
initiative
in
some
areas
through
the
introduction
of
new,
f ar-reaching
proposals.
These
Soviet
actions
could
offer
opportunities
for
expanding
the
United
Nations’
work
in
international
trade.
They
could
also
threaten
Western
dominance
of
this
work
and
American
leadership
in
it,
which
until
recently
have
been
unchallenged.
Further,
as
these
actions
involve
an
increased
role
for
communist
countries
whose
attitude
toward
international
trade
is
dif-
ferent
from
that
of
noncommunist
countries
-
particularly
from
that
of
the
United
States
-
they
necessarily
will
affect
the
United
Nations’
work,
con-
ceivably
modifying
its
orientation.
Therefore,
they
deserve
careful
examina-
tion
and
consideration.
Perhaps
the
new
Soviet
policy
can
more
easily
be
understood
by
view-
ing
it
in
its
historical
context.
This
might
help
to
clarify
the
policy’s
under-
lying
rationale
and
motivations
and
to
facilitate
evaluation
of
its
possible
impact.
For
analysis,
Soviet
policy
concerning
the
United
Nations’
work
in
international
trade
can
be
divided
into
three
periods.
( 1 )
During
the
world
organization’s
formative
stages
from
1944
through
1947,
the
Soviets
abstained
from
most
of
the
UN’s
activities.
(2)
During
the
height
of
the
cold
war
from
1948
through
1952,
the
Soviets
continued
their
abstention
from
the
actual
work
of
the
UN,
but
also
used
the
organization
as
a
forum
for
violent
criticism
of
Western
policy.
(3)
During
the
period
since
1953,
the
Soviets
have
assumed
a
vastly
increased
role
in
the
UN’s
activities,
al-
though
they
have
not
completely
abandoned
their
earlier
policies
of
absten-
tion
and
criticism.
II
The
United
Nations’
early
activities
in
the
field
of
international
trade
dealt
primarily
with
the
creation
of
specialized
agencies,
which
it
was
antici-
pated
would
conduct
most
of
the
actual
work.
These
activities
were
based
on
the
assumption
that
the
United
Nations’
goal
should
be
the
expansion
of
international
trade
on
as
free
and
as
multilateral
a
basis
as
possible.
674
American
planners
especially
held
this
view,
and,
because
of
the
dominant
position
of
the
United
States,
they
had
little
difficulty
in
gaining
its
accept-
ance.
These
Americans
thought
that
the
achievement
of
this
goal
would
not
only
be
valuable
in
itself,
but
that
it
would
also
be
&dquo;essential
to
the
attainment
of
full
and
effective
employment
in
the
United
States
and
else-
where,
to
the
preservation
of
private
enterprise,
and
to
the
success
of
an
international
system
to
prevent
future
wars
Three
specialized
agencies
were
thought
to
be
necessary
for
the
realization
of
the
United
Nations’
goal:
one
to
aid
in
stabilizing
currencies;
another
to
lend
money
for
reconstruc-
tion
and
development
purposes;
and
a
third
to
regulate
commercial
policy
and
work
toward
the
reduction
of
tariffs
and
other
barriers
to
trade.
Two
of
the
planned
specialized
agencies,
the
International
Monetary
Fund
(IMF)
and
the
International
Bank
for
Reconstruction
and
Develop-
ment
(IBRD),
were
created
even
before
the
United
Nations.
Although
the
Soviet
Union
did
not
join
either,
it
did
participate
in
drafting
their
Charters
at
the
Bretton
Woods
Conference
in
1944
and
in
earlier
informal
discus-
sions
concerning
them.
In
these
negotiations
Soviet
delegates
appear
to
have
had
little
interest in
the
broad
objectives
of
the
Fund
and
the
Bank.2
2
Instead,
they
were
mainly
concerned
with
matters
which
would
directly
affect
the
U.S.S.R.:
the
cost
of
participation;
the
availability
of
credits;
the
extent
of
the
organizations’
control
over
the
Soviet
economy;
and
con-
versely,
the
extent
of
Soviet
control
over
the
organizations’
activities.
Soviet
representatives
raised
these
same
issues
in
later
discussions
of
the
two
agencies
in
the
United
Nations.3
Although
concessions
have
been
made
to
the
Soviet
position,
the
organizations’
fundamental
structures
and
purposes
have
never
been
altered.
An
International
Trade
Organization
(ITO)
was
to
have
been
the
third
specialized
agency
in
this
field.
As
a
result
of
American
initiative
steps
were
taken
toward
its
creation
at
the
first
session
of
the
Economic
and
Social
Council
(ECOSOC)
in
the
spring
of
1946.
The
U.S.S.R.
supported
the
initial
resolution
passed
then,
but
did
not
attend
the
subsequent
confer-
ences
in
London,
Geneva,
and
Havana.
Nor
did
Soviet
delegates
partici-
1
"Summary
of
the
Interim
Report
of
the
Special
Committee
on
Relaxation
of
Trade
Bar-
riers,"
in
Postwar
Foreign
Policy
Preparation,
1939-1945,
Department
of
State
Publica-
tion
3580,
General
Foreign
Policy
Series
15
(1949),
p.
622.
2
See
Raymond
F.
Mikesell,
"Negotiating
at
Bretton
Woods,
1944,"
in
Raymond
Dennett
and
Joseph
E.
Johnson
(eds.),
Negotiating
with
the
Russians
(Boston:
World
Peace
Foundation,
1951),
pp.
101-16.
3
One
instance
of
this
occurred
during
the
discussions
of
the
agreements
between
the
UN
and
the
IMF
and
the
IBRD.
Soviet
delegates
then
strongly
objected
to
the
special
status
given
these
agencies
and
the
lack
of
UN
control
over
them.
See:
United
Nations,
Economic
and
Social
Council,
Official
Records
(5th
session),
pp.
269-70;
United
Nations,
General
Assembly,
Official
Records,
(2nd
session,
Joint
Second
and
Third
Committee),
pp.
12-14,
31-32;
and
United
Nations,
General
Assembly,
Official
Records
(2nd
session,
Plenary
Meetings),
pp.
952-53.

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