The Somali model?

• Author: Stevenson, Jonathan
• Position: Africa on My Mind - Peacekeeping in Somalia

IN EARLY 2002, once primarily American forces had overrun and ejected Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters from Afghanistan, the Pentagon began to extol "the Afghan model"; following the precedent of Operation Enduring Freedom, the idea was that small special operations units would combine with allied indigenous forces (in this case, the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance) to acquire local intelligence and a sound operational orientation, guiding U.S. air strikes to maximum effect and setting the table for a relatively easy occupation. The Afghan model thus appeared effective enough in producing a thoroughgoing takedown with minimal casualties and political fallout to warrant institutionalization. Accordingly, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP), both released in early 2006, established Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the United States's principal counter-terrorist instruments, with "an expanded organic ability to locate, tag and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally." Thus, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) became a "supported" as well as a "supporting" combatant command, financially and operationally independent from the regional combatant commands. (1)

One notable example of the rising prominence of SOF in the United States's regional-security posture is the growth--in both strength and activity--of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) stationed at Camp Lemonier, which serves as the United States's main military outpost in sub-Saharan Africa. When the CJTF-HOA moved its headquarters and personnel from the USS Mount Whitney to Camp Lemonier--an erstwhile French Foreign Legion base now owned by the government of Djibouti--in May 2003, it numbered about 400 soldiers, sailor and marines. As of March 2007, it numbered 1,800 with a facility expansion to come. In theory, CJTF-HOA represents the softer side of American hard power. It is building schools in remote parts of Ethiopia, briefing schoolchildren on disease prevention, drilling wells, constructing hospitals and providing clean water and school supplies. Indeed, one of the most important objectives of counter-terrorism is winning "hearts and minds" to forestall radicalization. But it's still the "kinetic" stuff--capturing and killing terrorists--that draws the world's attention.

Last December, the "kinetic" stuff--in the form of Ethiopian troops battling Islamists in Somalia--made headlines.

Somalia's Recent Flip

IN 1991, when strongman Somali President Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown in a civil war, the competing clans that he had once divided and conquered got hold of weapons supplied first by the Soviets and then by the Americans during the Cold War, and Somalia degenerated into something close to a Hobbesian "state of nature" without central authority. An ineffectual United Nations mission fled to relieve drought and famine, so in December 1992, the United States stepped in to forge a "new world order" by leading a multinational intervention. But the United States antagonized Somali clan militias and eventually precipitated the notorious October 1993 "Black Hawk Down" attack in which 18 U.S. Army Rangers and hundreds of Somalis died. A hurried American withdrawal, rising anti-Americanism and greater purchase for radical Islam in East Africa ensued. Between the 1994 U.S. withdrawal and the September 11 attacks Somalia was only a minor terrorism concern among the major powers. Since 9/11, however, the fear has risen that Al-Qaeda holdouts...