The Social Terrain of Rebel Held Territory

• Author: Jori Breslawski
• Published date: 01 February 2021
• Date: 01 February 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720951857
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The Social Terrain

of Rebel Held Territory

Jori Breslawski

1

Abstract

The extent of local order varies widely in rebel held areas, from total chaos to well-

run governing institutions. When these institutions exist, why do some include

civilian input in local affairs, while others exclude civilians from governance? I argue

that rebels choose different governing strategies that maximize their utility of ter-

ritorial control, based on certain characteristics of civilian inhabitants populating the

territory. Rebels’ constituency determines whether rebels seek to govern civilians

or control them solely with coercive violence, and community cohesion (or lack

thereof) then determines the type of institutions that rebels develop. I focus on

three different outcomes for communities under rebel control—no institutions,

exclusive institutions, and inclusive institutions. I test my argument using historical,

statistical, and case evidence, leveraging original cross-national data on local order in

rebel held territory as well as interviews with village heads, ex-combatants, and

community members in Aceh, Indonesia.

Keywords

rebel governance, cohesion, constituency, institutions, civilian agency

In civil wars, rebel groups often capture and control territory, and must consequently

decide how to interact with the resident civilian populatio n. Rebels can control

civilians solely with the use of violence, or rebels can create institutions to govern

civilians under their control. A blossoming rebel governance research agenda

1

The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jori Breslawski, The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Providence,

RI 02912, USA.

Email: mtbreslawski@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(2-3) 453-479

ªThe Author(s) 2020

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sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002720951857

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(e.g. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015) has established that a large number of rebel

groups choose the latter—to govern the civilians with institutions that regulate

daily life.

But what determines who makes decisions over issues like rule-setting, dispute

resolution, and resource distribution at the local level—rebels or civilians? While the

CPN-M in Nepal invited civilian input, creating democratically-elected “people’s

committees” that included women, members of ethnic minorities, and lower caste

groups (Huang 2016, 124), the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka sidelined civilian partic-

ipation in governance, and are widely perceived as one of the more autocratic

rebellions in recent history (Goodhand, Hulme, and Lewer 2000; Gowrinathan and

Mampilly 2011). Some rebel groups, like the NPFL in Liberia, did not build local

institutions at all, instead controlling civilians purely through violent coercion

(Reno 2011).

Scholars have pointed to a number of factors to explain this variation, including

rebel goals, ideology, resources, or civilian institutions.

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However, while existing

literature has shed light on the factors that shape rebels’ desire and ability to build

governing institutions in the first place (e.g. Z. C. Mampilly 2011), we still lack

understanding of civilian input to rebel governing institutions, or why rebels choose

to devolve governing power to civilians under their rule. Scholars have concluded

that civilians are only able to maintain con trol over local affairs when they act

collectively to push back against rebel rule and make demands on rebels (Arjona

2016; Kaplan 2017). Yet, a cursory glance reveals that rebels often choose to

devolve power to civilians, without any demands from civilians to do so.

In fact, many rebel groups strategically rely on civilians to govern local affairs

during war. This strategy appears to be rebels’ preferred method in many cases,

implementing participatory institutions absent of demands from the community. For

instance, the ADFL in the Congo invited former civil servants to return to their

positions, simplifying logistic problems faced by the group (Clapham 1998). The

NRA in Uganda implemented village-level elections of their own volition, in which

civilians voted on matters of local affairs (Kasfir 2005) despite the fact that the

population had never experienced elections before.

In this article, I make the case that rebels do not inherently seek to establish

maximum control over governing activities. Instead, I argue that as resource-poor

actors, rebels prefer to devolve governing tasks to civilians when it is efficient to do

so, challenging our current understanding of rebel governing strategies when it

comes to civilian participation. I highlight three possible institutional outcomes—

inclusive, exclusive, or none at all. To explain differences in governing outcomes,

I focus on two civilian characteristics: rebel constituency and community cohesion.

Rebel constituency defines the segments of the population rebels claim to fight for,

and determines whether rebels control populations with institutions, or rely purely

on violence. The level of community cohesion influences the type of institutions

rebels use, determining whether rebels use exclusive structures, ruling communities

with their own forces, or govern using inclusive structures, building civilians into the

454 Journal of Conflict Resolution 65(2-3)