The Social Component of Resilience in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Utilizing Wartime Strategies to Solve Current Problems

• Author: Eyal Lewin,Ronen A. Cohen
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19830750
• Published date: 01 October 2020
• Date: 01 October 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The Social Component

of Resilience in the

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Utilizing Wartime

Strategies to Solve

Current Problems

Ronen A. Cohen

1

and Eyal Lewin

1

Abstract

This article examines the social components of national resilience as the source of

the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ability to cope with possibly lethal blows and economic

setbacks through four stages: (I) an account of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War and the

surprising outcome that left Iran undefeated, (II) a review of several theories that can

aid us to analyze Iran’s national resilience ability, (III) an analysis of Iran’s wartime

survival using the abovementioned theoretical infrastructure, (IV) a concise review

of current issues in Iranian society which concludes with an evaluation of the state of

Iran’s resilience regarding attacks on their nuclear program and its ramifications.

Keywords

national resilience, Islamic Republic of Iran, national ethos, Iranian society, Iran–Iraq

War, Shi’a, Sunna

1

Ariel University, Ariel, Israel

Corresponding Author:

Ronen A. Cohen, Ariel University, Ariel 40700, Israel.

Email: ronenco76@gmail.com

Armed Forces & Society

2020, Vol. 46(4) 595-617

ªThe Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19830750

journals.sagepub.com/home/afs

Shirzad was only 12 years old when he found himself in the middle of a fierce battle

into which he had been sent ahead of Iranian troops as a human minesweeper to set

off mines by poking them or jumping on them, so that the adult soldiers behind him

could advance safely. For 24 hr, he managed to carry out his duty and watched how

other boys, who were doing the same thing as him, were being blown to pieces.

Eventually, he also set off a mine that exploded, and luckily, he was not killed but

just blinded in one eye by a mine shard. Having completed his mission wounded and

having no arms to fight with, he surrendered and spent the rest of his childhood as a

POW in an Iraqi prison (The Christian Science Monitor, July 7, 1987).

Shirzad was far from being an exception to the rule since Iran used child soldiers

extensively during its war with Iraq, and estimates are as high as 100,000 for the

number killed. All of the children were ostensibly volunteers, many of whom

reached the battlefields with plastic keys around their necks, which were keys to

open the gates to paradise and had been personally issued by the Ayatollah.

Not all of these Iranian children necessarily served as human mine detectors since

some of them were given hand grenades to charge the enemy with and also had little

chance of survival. The exploitation of the youngsters as a weapon was not partic-

ularly effective, but the psychological effect this tactic had on the Iraqi soldiers was

enormous. The following is an account given by an Iraqi officer who experienced

one of the attacks:

They chant ‘Allahu Akbar’ and they keep coming, and we keep shooting, sweeping our

machine guns around like sickles. My men are eighteen, nineteen, just a few years older

than these kids. I’ve seen them crying, and at times the officers have had to kick them

back to their guns. Once we had Iranian kids on bikes cycling towards us, and my men

all started laughing, and then these kids started lobbing their hand grenades and we

stopped laughing and started shooting. (Karsh, 2002, 2009)

These descriptions are merely the tip of the iceberg for anyone who plunges into

the murky history of the protracted Iran–Iraq War that took place between 1980 and

1988. It was a long, miserable, and hellish 8-year bloody struggle with half a million

and possibly twice as many troops killed on both sides, at least half a million of

whom became permanent invalids. Some 250 billion dollars were directly expended

throughout the years of the bloodshed, and more than 400 billion dollars’ worth of

damage was done to oil facilities and cities, mostly inflicted by artillery barrages.

The military efforts of both Iran and Iraq ended with no significant gains by any of

the sides with Iraq eventually being forced to adopt a strategic defensive stance

while, at the same time, Iran was no longer able to reconstitute effective armored

formations for its air force and could not penetrate Iraq’s borders deeply enough to

achieve any decisive result (Luttwak, 1996).

This war, the longest conventional war in the 20th century, was distinguished by

three major characteristics: (1) It was a prolonged campaign, (2) it was marked by

596 Armed Forces & Society 46(4)