The Silence of Gideon's Trumpet: the Court's Inattention to Systemic Inequities Causing Violations of Speedy Trial Rights in Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009)

• Publication year: 2021

89 Nebraska L. Rev.396. The Silence of Gideon's Trumpet: The Court's Inattention to Systemic Inequities Causing Violations of Speedy Trial Rights in Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009)

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Note*

The Silence of Gideon's Trumpet: The Court's Inattention to Systemic Inequities Causing Violations of Speedy Trial Rights in Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction.......................................... 396

II. Background........................................... 399
A.The Sixth Amendment's Rights to Counsel and Speedy Trial ...................................... 399
1.Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)..... 399
2.Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).......... 400
B.Brillon Facts and Holding......................... 402
1.Facts and Procedural History..................402
2.Majority Opinion..............................405
3.Dissenting Opinion............................405
C.Interests Protected by the Right to Speedy Trial ...406

III.Analysis .............................................. 407
A.The Court's Flawed Analysis ...................... 408
B.The Court's Mishandling of Barker ................ 410
C.The Possible Impact of the Decision................ 412
D.Greater Rights in Appellate Courts?............... 416

IV.Conclusion ............................................ 418

I. INTRODUCTION

Assigned counsel has become a vital component of the American legal landscape largely due to the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in

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Gideon v. Wainwright.(fn1) The Supreme Court's decisions regarding Sixth Amendment rights and the indigent defendant's right to counsel created a legal backdrop in which the Court may be petitioned by indigent defendants who have had their constitutional rights substantially affected by the quality of their assigned counsel. Speedy trial rights, in particular, may be vitiated or vindicated based on the quality of assigned counsel and the systems put in place to assign and supervise attorneys who represent indigent defendants. Vermont v. Brillon(fn2) highlights the interplay between the Court's decisions regarding speedy trial rights and indigent defense.

In Vermont v. Brillon, the Supreme Court held that Michael Bril-lon's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights had not been violated because the factors that caused his trial to be delayed for over three years were largely attributable to Brillon and his assigned counsel.(fn3) The ruling reversed the Vermont Supreme Court's decision(fn4) that the prolonged detention violated Brillon's speedy trial rights. Brillon was initially convicted at trial of domestic felony assault and sentenced to between twelve and twenty years in prison.(fn5) The key issue on appeal was whether the periods of delay caused by his assigned counsel should be attributed to Brillon and his assigned counsel or to the State.(fn6) The Vermont Supreme Court attributed much of the delay to the State of Vermont and ordered the charges against Brillon dismissed due to violation of his right to speedy trial.(fn7)

Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court used a four-part balancing test, as first expressed in Barker v. Wingo,(fn8) to structure its inquiry.(fn9) The Supreme Court, finding its decision to be in line with historical precedent, made clear that it viewed assigned counsel as typically not being a state actor.(fn10) Thus, delays caused by either the assigned counsel or the defendant will be attributed to the defendant in a speedy trial analysis.(fn11) Brillon presented an opportunity for the Court to evaluate the relationship between vitiating constitutional rights and the quality of assigned counsel. The Court briefly discussed a contrary rule, one in which assigned counsel and private counsel are treated differently for purposes of a speedy trial analysis,

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and concluded that it would lead to inequities in the legal system(fn12)- such as the granting of possibly greater constitutional protections to indigent defendants than to defendants who retain private counsel.(fn13) Instead, the Court in Brillon concluded that all defendants, indigent or otherwise, are generally responsible for delays caused by assigned counsel, whether assigned or private.(fn14)

In reversing the Vermont Supreme Court, the Court wrote a relatively succinct decision, but the decision is significant because the Court discussed in some detail how periods of pre-trial delay should be attributed to either the state or the defendant. The Court's decision makes clear that indigent defendants must climb a large barrier in order to attribute their assigned counsel's action, or inaction, to the state. The Court's decision displays an approach to speedy trial rights that is not particularly consistent with its Gideon ruling. This discussion focuses on the tension between Brillon and Gideon, along with the possible future impact of the Brillon decision on other courts. In Part II, this Note examines the background of contemporary speedy trial rights analysis and the role of Gideon in granting indigent defendants the right to counsel. This Note also briefly discusses the liberty interests protected by Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. Part III discusses the interplay between Gideon and Brillon and how the four-part Barker analysis can be applied in a way that alleviates some of the inherent tension between speedy trial rights analysis and evaluation of an indigent defendant's right to counsel.

Barker v. Wingo,(fn15) Gideon v. Wainwright,(fn16) and Vermont v. Bril-lon(fn17) discuss principles and declarations of rights that can be used effectively in future cases. However, the foregoing cases and discussion demonstrate the need for a more responsive jurisprudence regarding speedy trial rights and the indigent defendant's right to counsel. As a step towards addressing these issues, this Note proposes that future Supreme Court decisions should acknowledge the effects indigent defense systems have on the quality of legal presentation provided to indigent defendants. By doing so, the Court will help realize the promise of Gideon and ensure the protection of constitutional rights for indigent defendants.(fn18)

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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Sixth Amendment: The Rights to Counsel and Speedy Trial

1. Gideon v. Wainwright

Gideon v. Wainwright(fn19) dealt not with speedy trial rights but with the question of whether the Constitution entitles indigent criminal defendants to state-provided legal representation.(fn20) The petitioner in the case, Clarence Earl Gideon,(fn21) was charged with a felony under Florida law.(fn22) During an exchange in state court, Gideon asked the judge to appoint him counsel since he could not afford to hire an attorney.(fn23) The judge rejected his request, forcing Gideon to conduct his own defense at trial.(fn24)

Gideon conducted his own defense and, based on the record, performed relatively well.(fn25) Nevertheless, he was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison.(fn26) Gideon later filed a habeas corpus petition with the Florida Supreme Court, asserting that the trial court's failure to provide him with counsel violated his constitutional rights.(fn27) The Florida Supreme Court denied all relief without issuing an opinion.(fn28) Given that Gideon could not afford the normal costs of appellate litigation, the Supreme Court appointed counsel and granted certiorari.(fn29)

The Court requested that both parties discuss a particular question on appeal: Should Betts v. Brady(fn30) be overturned?(fn31) Betts involved a prisoner indicted for robbery who sought habeas relief on the basis that he had been unconstitutionally denied access to legal counsel.(fn32) The Betts Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel generally applied only to federal courts and that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate that right to

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the states.(fn33) The Gideon Court noted the similarities between the facts of the two cases, particularly that both involved prisoners seeking habeas relief due to the trial court declining to appoint them counsel upon request.(fn34)

The Supreme Court, finding the guarantee of counsel to be fundamental and essential to a fair trial, rejected the conclusion in Betts that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel could not be incorporated against the states.(fn35) The Court noted, "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."(fn36) In perfunctory fashion, the Court thus overruled Betts and unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment applies against the states to require the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants.(fn37)

The Court's decision in Gideon did not finally determine the fate of Clarence Gideon. Instead, on remand he was to have a new trial with a new lawyer.(fn38) A local Florida attorney, Fred Turner, represented Gideon in this new action.(fn39) After brief deliberation, a jury found Gideon not guilty.(fn40) In the immediate aftermath, the Gideon decision and Gideon's subsequent legal vindication were hailed as a "moving drama" representative of a "compassionate society."(fn41)

2. Barker v. Wingo

Barker v. Wingo(fn42) introduced a four-part balancing test used by courts when determining possible violations of a criminal defendant's speedy trial rights.(fn43) The petitioner in the case, Barker, had been...