THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR THROUGH THE LENS OF STRATEGIC CULTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA.

• Author: Shaheen, Salma

INTRODUCTION

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there has been much debate on the causes, such as power competition and alliance politics, (1) as well as the impact of war on trade, food security, environment, energy, and health. (2) However, little attention is paid to how Russian strategic culture drives the invasion and war's impact on other states' strategic cultural underpinnings. This research endeavors to fill this gap. In doing so, this study puts forth three main arguments. One, the study carries forward the strategic culturalists' argument (3) and believes in the instrumental nature of ideational factors related to Russian geography, history, national identity of "great power," and autocratic politics; however, it also argues that, to a great extent, it was the West's maneuvers in immediate Russian neighborhood that drove these cultural factors to push Moscow to embrace surprise, escalatory risks and norm-breaking resulting in waging war on its bordering state. Two, the study contends that Russian aggression driven by its strategic culture has cascading effects on others in its neighborhood making Europe a theater of competing strategic cultures. To corroborate this argument, this research asserts that the invasion was an external "shock" that demanded swift change in strategic cultures of the EU and Ukraine, as evident from the unprecedented measures both entities carried out to respond to the invasion. Three, the study argues that this interplay of different European cultures at strategic level in close proximity has some important lessons to heed for other states, especially the nuclear dyad of South Asia: India and Pakistan.

To present its core arguments and key lessons drawn from the on-going war, the paper is divided into four sections. Section one explains the concept of strategic culture to outline key contours of what constitutes strategic culture and conditions for change in strategic culture that are used to lay out the following sections. Section two assesses the instrumental nature of Russian strategic culture and its impact on the EU's and Ukraine's strategic cultures to present a battling interplay of cultural factors in Europe. Section three presents the strategic cultures of India and Pakistan. Section four highlights lessons drawn from the Russian-Ukraine war and shows how they are applicable to the South Asia context: India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed adversaries in close proximity, each with a propensity to surprise, escalate, and break norms, adversely affecting regional conflict prevention and resolution.

STRATEGIC CULTURE

Starting from 1970s, the first generation of strategic culturalists (4) provided an alternative paradigm to prevailing rational models' logic to study state's strategic behavior, (5) with a formal definition provided by Jack Snyder. He defines strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation." (6) For this generation, the culture is a context within which strategy is devised; (7) however, scholars highlight the problems of operationalization of subjective, relatively-static, and tautological concepts such as strategic culture. (8) Second-generation scholars studied superpowers' behavior from a Gramscian perspective and view culture as a rhetorical tool, (9) thereby indicating that elites have power to design discourse. (10) In contrast, the third generation that appeared in the 1990s studied strategic culture as an independent variable consisting of a "system of symbols" (11) that can be falsifiable. (12) An example is Johnston, who argues that strategic culture is relatively static and resistant to change, while examining Chinese strategic behavior. (13) In contrast to the first generation, the third generation includes recent experiences as a source of culture, instead of solely focusing on historical experiences. (14) Overall, the existing scholarship suggests a wide range of sources of strategic culture, including geography, resources, and climate; historical experiences and practice; political culture and institutions; military organizational culture; beliefs, values, myths, and symbols; key texts and documents; elite and public opinion, as well as civil society; the role of technology; and transnational and global norms. (15)

Notwithstanding its relatively static nature, the birth of a new strategic culture or a major change in existing strategic culture can occur. Two conditions cause strategic cultures to transform. (16) First, external shocks that unravel high vulnerability and strategic deficiency as well as challenge existing beliefs, narratives, and practices could drive decision-making elites to consciously and rationally take extreme decisions and implement intense policies, which are then widely propagated through images and symbols to gain public support and legitimacy. Second, when an existing strategic culture fails to respond to external threats or existing foreign policy commitments conflict, the initiation process of re-examination of a nation/entity's past values, beliefs, and worldviews occurs, creating a new or transformed strategic culture. This involves negotiated realities among key stakeholders to avoid any contradiction to existing norms.

Considering the tendency of strategic culture to be broader than independent variables and rhetorical tools, this research argues that the strategic culture of Russia consisting of history, geography, national identity of "great power," status and autocratic politics provided a milieu within which Moscow decided to invade Ukraine in February 2022. This resulted in a "Ukraine shock" that is felt across the globe. The research further argues that the Russian invasion has produced significant changes in the strategic cultures of the European Union (EU) and Ukraine.

EUROPE: A THEATRE OF BATTLING STRATEGIC CULTURES

Strategic Culture of Russia

Russian strategic culture is founded on a long history of wars that simultaneously instilled an enduring sense of insecurity and a glorious past to which Russia continues to cling. This is a narrative based on Russian identity as a "great power" and an autocratic political culture to which Russian leaders continue to belong. Together, these features help Russia define its worldview and set strategic preferences.

The absence of natural barriers such as oceans, mountains, and a long history of foreign invasions have intensified the perception of Russia being a "besieged fortress." (17) At the same time, the induction into NATO of central and eastern European states in the Russian neighborhood, as well as the effort of democratization of surrounding states including Ukraine, is seen to threaten Russian core interests. (18) First, to ensure its security, the rationale for leaders is to expand Russian territory in order to secure its own territory, as "only further expansion could secure the earlier acquisitions... in the name of preempting external attack." (19) Hence, Russia embarked upon expanding its sphere of influence, which includes the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Second, leaders glorify a Russian past that dates back to beyond the Tsarist era (20) and use Russian traditions and values to explain or justify contemporary resurgent Russian strategic behavior. The glorification of the past is so valued that in 2014, Putin enacted a law that criminalizes the "dissemination of deliberately false information on the activities of the Soviet Union during the Second World War" because Soviets played a key role during World War II in defeating Nazi Germany. (21) History defines the Russian role in the international system, as well as its identity.

Third, with the disintegration of the USSR, the belief in the status of "great power," ox derzhavnost, was established when the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept set foreign policy priority to uphold the Russian role and position in the international system as a "great power." (22) This has been reinforced in subsequent strategic documents. However, this belief requires a buffer zone between Russia and its adversaries, a world that recognizes its status and an exemption from rules that regulate interstate relations. (23) The Ukraine invasion can be seen as an attempt to transform Kyiv into a buffer zone. This corroborates Putin's belief that Ukraine is not "really a separate state." (24)

Lastly, Russia has always been an autocracy that developed different forms, resulting in a centralized autocratic state that has become part of Russian tradition. (25) This undercuts the overstated emphasis scholars and journalists have attributed to Putin driving Moscow's strategic behavior. (26) Notwithstanding Putin's anti-liberalism and anti-Western views, (27) bestowing the whole responsibility of Russian behavior on Putin would be preferential. The anti-West worldview (28) and the preference for military means (29) has continued to be part of the post-Cold War Russian strategic culture independent of Putin himself.

Based on these features, Russia is exhibiting strategic behavior based on surprise and norms-defiance. The element of Russian "surprise" is evident from the initial annexation of Crimea in 2014, (30) intervention in the Syrian civil war, (31) interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections through cyber operations, (32)...