The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics

• Date: 01 September 1960
• Author: Theodore Wyckoff
• Published date: 01 September 1960
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296001300313
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS
THEODORE WYCKOFF*
HE
ROLE of the military in contemporary Latin American politics
~ requires the study of a wide variety of states ranging from Costa Rica,
JL half the size of Ohio, with less than a million population, to Brazil, 160
times larger, whose population exceeds 60,000,000. The study encompasses a
tremendously diverse geographical area containing societies ranging from some
of the most cosmopolitan to indigenous ones virtually unchanged since Columbus.
These are states whose social and political institutions draw on a Spanish
or Portuguese cultural heritage rather than any Anglo-Saxon or North American
institutions and experience. Although the written constitutions of many of them
bear a superficial similarity to the Constitution of the United States, actual
forms of political action are much closer to the traditions and practice of the
two nations of Iberia.
While the term &dquo;Latin American Military&dquo; includes everything from an
Argentine battleship in Antarctic waters to an infantry unit on the Mexican bor-
der, the &dquo;military&dquo; with which this study is concerned is more narrowly defined,
consisting only of certain politically conscious and politically oriented individuals
within the armed forces. One of the objectives of the study is to determine
precisely what types of persons fall within this category.
There are three types of Latin American countries in which the military
plays three distinct types of role: first, the country in which the military always
plays a role in politics, year in and year out; second, the country in which the
military never, or almost never, plays a political role (since perhaps 1900, to set
an arbitrary limit); and third, the country in which the military occasionally
plays a political role. The twenty republics of Latin America may be arranged
along a spectrum in which these three types mark the two extremes and an
approximate mid-point. Such a spectrum set up for analytical purposes might
show six countries at the &dquo;always&dquo; end: Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. Only two would appear at the &dquo;never&dquo;
end, Costa Rica and Uruguay. The remaining twelve &dquo;occasionals&dquo; would range
somewhere between the two extremes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.’
In each of the following studies, analysis of the problem hinges on the an-
swers to two questions: first, what non,military conditions characterize the
type of state under discussion -
social structure, geographic factors, economic
conditions, political institutions, and historical traditions -
and second, what
conditions characterize the military in this type of state?
* Major, United States Army.
1
This concept follows the line of Professor Russell H. Fitzgibbon’s interesting statistical conjec-
tures on Latin American democracy. See "How Democratic Is Latin America?" Inter-
American Economic Affairs, IX (Spring, 1956), 65-77, and "Statistical Evaluation of Latin
American Democracy," Western Political Quarterly, IX (September, 1956), 607-19.
745

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746
STATES IN WHICH THE MILITARY Is ALWAYS A FACTOR IN POLITICS
Most states in this category2 are small and relatively isolated from the main
currents of world political action. Being small, they are physically easy to con-
trol by military force, and being isolated, the rest of the world is little concerned
with their internal troubles. Their social structure is generally simple and
clearly stratified. At the base of the social pyramid frequently are unassimilated
Indian or Negro groups which have absorbed very little western culture and
which possess almost no political consciousness. Basically rural populations, such
non-Europeans generally form a group quite apart from the rest of the national
society. A
second major segment is usually the social group of European origin
which considers itself to be the elite of the nation occupying the apex of the
social pyramid. A third group takes a position between the first two, and is
comprised of persons of mixed descent. This last segment finds frequently that
it has lost identity with the Indian (or Negro) culture from which it is in part
descended while at the same time it is not able to feel a complete identity with
its other forebears, the European group. It is often urban rather than rural, and
is frequently characterized by a distinct political consciousness and by a certain
sense of grievance against the European elite group.
Roughly paralleling the racial structure is an economic stratification in
which the poorest are very poor, the wealthiest very wealthy, with a small
middle class between the two extremes. Only a small minority of the Europeans
can properly be considered wealthy, the majority constituting a &dquo;middle class.&dquo;
In such societies inadequate schools result in a high rate of illiteracy and a
general indifference to social welfare aggravates the economic imbalance.
Economic backwardness frequently reflects conditions of chronic political
instability. Large land-holdings characterize the economy, while the agricul-
tural workers live in a state approximating peonage. One-crop agriculture is
normal and a single export commodity - agricultural or mineral -
frequently
dominates the country’s foreign exchange. The few large industries are often
foreign-owned and, since they pay heavy royalties, must be lucrative. The few
small industries -
matches, cigarettes, flour milling, salt -
are often state monop-
olies or the personal property of the chief of state. Urban workers are few,
their wages are low, and among them there is general irritation at the con-
spicuous consumption of the wealthy. The labor union movement is often weak,
underground, or controlled. Rural workers, economically and politically apa-
thetic, are ignorant of any better life than survival at a subsistence level. With
chronic political instability, high risks attend any capital investment; interest rates
are high and dividends are expected to be high. The risks are such as to dis-
courage most capital investments.
Politically, power is concentrated in a small group of influential individuals
drawn from the better educated upper classes. In addition to the wealthy
families, components of this upper class power structure include the Church,
with its strong influence over mass opinion, and the military, representing the
2
The author has in mind one nation with which he is especially familiar. The reader is asked
to make allowances in the generalizations as the example is varied.

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747
power of physical coercion. The general orientation of the power structure is
toward the welfare of the privileged social classes represented in it and on this
goal there is normally general agreement.
Normally there is opposition to the regime actually holding the reins of
government at any particular moment, but this generally comes from within
the better educated politically conscious elite, and is bitterest among individuals
who have been hurt by the regime. Political opposition is certain to exist among
university students who come from disaffected families. Insofar as possible the
regime may be expected to attempt to isolate, silence, or exterminate the opposi-
tion, with the result of driving it underground or into exile.
The lower and middle classes until very recent years have held virtually
no political power except as individuals have risen to power through the Army.
While this was the pattern of the past, these groups are undergoing a process
of rapid political acculturation and are certain to be a force to reckon with
soon. This sector of society has been aptly characterized as the rising &dquo;middle
mass.&dquo; 3 Political acculturation in the less-favored classes, originally a by-product
of this century’s rising standard of economic expectations, has been tremen-
dously accelerated by the feverish activities of Communist as well as non-
Communist political movements, which in the lower classes of society have
found fertile fields to till.
With this exception partisan political action extends generally only to the
educated and elite groups, while the same is true of any rational belief in any
form of political ideology. Elections are a superficial contest only. Nominations
and appointments are made from within the social and political elite groups.
Irregular practices both in elections and between elections are normal and as-
sumed, while the legal system and the courts are set up to keep peace among
the wealthy only.
Police-state methods are frequently used to discover political opposition and
to render it ineffective. The opposition is on occasion brutalized and persecuted;
innocent persons may be hurt. Frequently only Communist-led opposition groups
possess the &dquo;know-how&dquo; to survive such political persecution. The non-Com-
munist opposition is the most likely to die or disappear. The obvious con-
sequence of the use of police-state methods is a feeling of intense hatred for the
regime using them. This hatred may spread over a period of years to a large
enough portion of the politically conscious populace that it may erupt in mob
action, riot, arson, and murder, extending even to civil war and overthrow of
the regime.
Historical traditions are generally authoritarian and/or oligarchic, reflect-
ing social and political conditions which have prevailed generally from the time
3
See...