The Role of Islam in Indonesian Nationalism and Politics

• Date: 01 March 1958
• Published date: 01 March 1958
• Author: Justus M. Van Der Kroef
• DOI: 10.1177/106591295801100103
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN INDONESIAN NATIONALISM
AND POLITICS
JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF
University of Bridgeport
S THE
ANALYSIS of the nationalist upheavals in Southeast Asia
~L.m in our time begins to deepen, it is becoming apparent that be-
hind
the demand for political freedom, complex cultural and
socioeconomic processes are at work, many of which are older than modern
nationalism itself, and which, once independence from colonial control
had been achieved, have continued to shape the structure and policies of
the new nation-states of the area. Illustrations of this are the cultural
changes wrought by the great world religions on the Southeast Asian scene,
and their relationship to the growth of political consciousness and of
modern ideas of national advancement. Frequently, such a religion pro-
vided important impulses of development in the social process and in
economic life, offering an ideological rationale to those who were restive
under alien colonial domination; and thus it acted as a catalyst on other
revolutionary elements in the crucible of change. With national liberty
at last a reality, the religions remained as amplifiers of nationalist doctrines,
making their presence felt in the national political arena as so many rallying
points of public opinion and action.
In the following pages the function of one such religion, Islam, in a
representative country of the Southeast Asian area, Indonesia, will be
examined. First, it seems necessary to describe briefly the historic evolution
of Indonesian Islam and its place in society and culture; secondly, the
reasons for and the manner of its contribution to Indonesian nationalism
need to be analyzed, in order to arrive, thirdly, at an understanding of its
various roles in political life today.
I
The question has long been moot as to whether Indonesia should be
considered an Islamic country. While nearly 90 per cent of its more than
eighty million inhabitants profess themselves to be Muslims, from an ortho-
dox legal point of view Indonesia is not an Islamic state, since implicit in
its constitutional foundations is the doctrine of equality of religions and the
absence of any provision conferring preferred status on the Islamic faith
1
Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta: Pertjetakan Negara,
1953), p. 8 (Article 18). Public legal limitation of Islamic law is also provided for
under Article 7 of the provisional constitution with its stipulations of equality of
treatment under law, positing the supremacy of public law over special religious law.
G. E. von Grünebaum, Islam. Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradi-
tion, American Anthropological Association, Memoir 81 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 127, 135, has pointed out that in the classical Islamic
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While President Sukarno, as head of the state, is an avowed Muslim, he has
on many occasions publicly expressed his opposition to the idea of the
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, thereby focusing attention
on an important rift in public opinion as to the foundations of the free
Indonesian Republic.2
2
To some modern Muslim theorists in Indonesia,
however, freedom of expression for other religions is not incompatible with
the principles of an actual Islamic state.3
3
A more compelling reason to
question the status of Indonesia as a Muslim country is the evidence of an
extensive syncretism in the country, the unique blend of autochthonous
animistic-pantheistic beliefs of the folk religions with Hindu-Indian reli-
gious and cultural traits and with the teachings of Mohammed. The host
of cultures and folk societies in Indonesia, each considered at its own level
tradition the primary purpose of the state is to make possible the service of God and
its moral purpose is evidenced in its acceptance of Muslim Canon Law; the theocratic
notion implicit in these doctrines precludes the principle of public organization
recognizing no preferred status of a religious establishment. C. A. O. van Nieuwen-
huijze, Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesië (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1949),
pp. 55-56, has cogently argued that in the Islamic community in Indonesia, freedom
of religion means freedom for the Muslim to realize the all-Islamic society and state.
It does not mean, as in the Western historic liberal sense, freedom of expression of
different religions. Moreover, van Nieuwenhuijze points out that the non-Muslim
has no positive organic function in the Muslim community, and that there is only
one way to solve the question of religious minorities in Muslim dogmatics, and that
is the absorption, one way or the other, of the nonbeliever into the body of the faith-
ful. From an orthodox legal point of view Indonesia in the colonial period could not
be considered a Muslim state, since its sovereign and source of public authority had
no official connection whatever with the faith and its leadership, a situation which, in
view of the secular structure of the Indonesian Republic and its constitution, essentially
still prevails. See, e.g., W. J. A. Kernkamp, "De Invloed van den Islam," in C. W.
Wormser (ed.), Wat Indië Ontving En Schonk (Amsterdam: N. V. Wereldbiblio-
theek, 1946), p. 77. To contemporary Muslim theorists in Indonesia freedom of
religion in a Muslim state is, however, possible, but there is by no means unanimity
in the Muslim community on this point. It is noteworthy that Indonesia’s present
Constituent Assembly, now in session, and charged with the drafting of Indonesia’s
constitution, has reached a seemingly hopeless deadlock over the issue of whether
the Indonesian state is to have an Islamic philosophy, or whether it is to be essentially
secular in nature. Cf. Antara Daily News Bulletin (New York), January 24, 1958, p. 4.
2
See Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World (Bandung: Indonesia,
N. V. Masa Baru, 1954-56), II, 211-25, 241.
3
See, e.g., Al-Hadj Wiranatakusumah, Islamietische Democratie in Theorie en Practijk
(Bandung, Penerbit Pusaka, 1948), passim, esp. pp. 18 and 23; Mohammad Natsir,
"Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International
Affairs," Data Paper No. 16 (mimeo.), Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University
(Ithaca, 1954), esp. p. 1 (Mohammed "has not come to abolish all other religions
based on holy or sacred books, but very definitely to establish the freedom of
religion"); Hadji Mohammad Saleh Suaidy in Merdeka (Djakarta), July 3 and 24,
1953. Such pronouncements have not tended to diminish apprehension among fol-
lowers of minority religions (e.g., Hinduism on Bali, Christianity) that a formal
Islamic state in Indonesia would impose harmful restrictions on the practice of other
faiths. Evidence of this supposition is to be found in the reluctance of the Ministry
of Religion to accord official recognition to Balinese Hinduism, refusal to allow the
propagation of the Baha’i faith in the country, or disinclination to pay much heed
to Roman Catholic complaints that the government hampers the sending of priests to
Indonesia. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia,"
Far Eastern Survey, XXII (1953), 121-25, and "Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Dilemma,"
Eastern World (London), VIII (1954), No. 11, p. 18.

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of development, present a picture of incredible religious eclecticism, a
pattern of beliefs and practices drawn from many different sources, in
which Islam is but one, and often not even the most important, element.4
4
Some students, like the renowned Islamic scholar, Snouck Hurgronje, have
argued that just because of this religious eclecticism, there is no reason to
deny Islam paramount importance in Indonesian life, any more than there
would be cause to denigrate status and respect of religious faiths in other
countries on the grounds of imperfections in the practices of their followers.5
It might be countered, however, that largely because of this eclecticism
severe political and cultural disturbances have occurred in Indonesian
societies whenever reform-minded Muslim teachers attempted to purify
folk beliefs or tried to propagate orthodox Islamic concepts of marriage,
family, and inheritance laws -
efforts that brought them into conflict with
hallowed Indonesian folk custom (usually called adat) and its traditional
preservers.6 Such conflicts point up the weaknesses of the claim that
Indonesia should be considered an Islamic nation. Indeed, whatever con-
clusion one may ultimately reach, it is impossible to overlook the fact that
wide differences exist between the regions of the Indonesian archipelago
as to the depth of penetration of Islamic beliefs in indigenous society: as
a result of this, significant social distance and cultural distinctions prevail
between those Indonesians who take Islam seriously and in as undiluted
form as possible (referred to as santri) and those whose Muslim beliefs are
inextricably mixed with autochthonous religious notions and with their
adat (called abangaw).7 As will be shown, this division is of cardinal im-
portance to the understanding of Islam’s contribution to Indonesian nation-
alism and to its role in Indonesian political life today. At the same time,
4
See generally J. de Jong, Het Geestesleven der Volken van Indonesië (Groningen: Batavia,
J. B. Wolters, 1948). Compare C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "Geloven-en doen, over
de Islam in Indonesië," in G. H. van der Kolff (ed.), Sticusa Jaarboek 1951 (Amster-
dam : Sticusa, 1951), p. 85. "Alive are all sorts of...