The Robustness of National Agency Governance in Integrated Administrative Systems: Evidence from a large‐scale study

• Published date: 01 January 2021
• Author: Jarle Trondal,Gjermund Haslerud,Nadja S. Kühn
• Date: 01 January 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13309

Research Article

121

Abstract: This article examines government agencies facing choice architectures that are multiple, overlapping, ambiguous,

and sometimes incompatible—in short: turbulent. It makes two contributions: First, two conceptual images of agency

governance are outlined that derive distinct predictions on how agencies are likely to maneuver when embedded in integrated

multilevel administrative orders. Secondly, benefitting from a large-N dataset on agency officials (N = 1,963) from 47

government agencies, the study suggests that government agencies are primarily biased towards a pragmatist compound

dynamic. Additionally, the analysis probes the robustness of these conceptual images by entering moderator variables into the

analysis. Multiplicative interaction model analysis suggests that the compound dynamic of agency governance is robust because

no moderator variables fundamentally transform relationships from one governance type to another.

Evidence for Practice

• Public governance is characterized by robustness and thus not likely to face fundamental shifts.

• This is the case even when government officials face choice architectures that are turbulent.

• The pragmatic compromises civil servants make when navigating everyday affairs are mediated through, and

conditioned by, preexisting institutions, practices, and traditions.

• How government agencies navigate conflicting concerns is particularly affected by structural factors such

as organizational duplication vis-à-vis ministerial departments and formal rules, but also established trust-

relationships.

Government agencies are a vital component

of the core executive of states (Dunleavy and

Rhodes1990; Orren and Skowronek2017;

Vibert2007). In recent decades, however, agency

governance has sustained significant transformation,

notably through administrative integration across

levels of governance (Egeberg2006; Jacobsson et al.

2015). National agencies are portrayed as being part

of both national and federal (e.g., European) politico-

administrative orders. In consequence, they are faced

with choice architectures that are multiple, overlapping,

ambiguous, and sometimes incompatible—in

short: tur bulent (Ansell et al.2017, 1; Easton1965;

Gunnell2011; Miller1971). Turbulence challe nges

conventional wisdom on the conditions for agency

governance in situations where events, demands,

and support interact and change in highly variable,

inconsistent, unexpected, or unpredictable ways (Ansell

and Trondal2018). Subsequently, turbulence creates novel

dilemmas for public organizations and are likely to push

government agencies to make difficult tradeoffs, pulling

them in contradictory, even paradoxical, directions.

What choices do government agencies make

when subject to contending influences on how to

maneuver? How do government officials choose

when embedded in what Woodrow Wilson(1887,

221) described as “systems within systems” that

provide conflictual premises for choice? Traditionally,

public administration has been seen as based upon a

series of dichotomies: politics versus administration,

coordination versus fragmentation, integration versus

disintegration, trust versus distrust, loose versus

tight coupling, etc. (Egeberg and Trondal2016;

Olsen2008; Orton and Weick1990; Trein et al.

2020). In contrast, this article conceptualizes and

empirically demonstrates how government agencies

are driven by a pragmatist compound dynamic

characterized by the co-existence of multiple

premises and seemingly incompatible dilemmas

(Ansell and Trondal2018). The study makes two key

contributions:

• First, it outlines two complementary conceptual

images of agency governance: a conventional

dyadic approach that offers a “zero-sum”

conjecture that public administration runs

in dichotomous domains, and secondly a

compound approach suggesting that public

governance is “positive-sum” in which agency

The Robustness of National Agency Governance in Integrated

Administrative Systems:

Evidence from a large-scale study

Jarle Trondal

Gjermund Haslerud

Nadja S. Kühn

University of Agder and University of Oslo

University of Agder

Nadja S. Kühn is Assistant Professor in

Political Science at University of Agder,

Department of Political Science and

Management. Her main fields of research

focus on public administration, organization

theory, and multilevel governance. Her work

has appeared in

Journal of European Public

Policy

,

World Political Science

, and

Journal

of International Organization Studies

.

Email: nadja.s.kuhn@uia.no

Gjermund Haslerud is Assistant Professor

in Political Science at University of Agder,

Department of Political Science and

Management. His main fields of research

focus on the politics of tax havens, and

statistical models.

Email: gjermund.haslerud@uia.no

Jarle Trondal is Professor of Political

Science at University of Agder, Department

of Political Science and Management,

and at University of Oslo, ARENA Centre

for European Studies. His main fields of

research focus on public administration,

organization theory, decision-making

behavior, European Union studies, and

international organizations. His work

has appeared in

Governance

,

Public

Administration

,

Perspectives on Public

Management and Governance

,

European

Journal of Political Research

,

European

Political Science Review

, and

Journal of

European Public Policy

.

Email: jarle.trondal@uia.no/jarle.trondal@

arena.uio.no

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 81, Iss. 1, pp. 121–136. © 2020 The

Authors. Public Administration Review

published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. on

behalf of The American Society for Public

Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13309.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited,

the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

122 Public Administration Review • Janua ry | F ebru ary 20 21

officials evoke compound behavior, characterized by the

co-existence of multiple premises and seemingly incompatible

dilemmas. These images, moreover, derive distinct propositions

as to how government agencies are likely to maneuver when

embedded in integrated multilevel administrative orders

such as the European Union (EU). The article also suggests

conditions that may bias these conceptual images.

• Secondly, the empirical validity and robustness of these

conceptual images are tested on a novel large-N survey dataset

(N = 1,963) on agency officials embedded in two parallel

politico-administrative systems: the central administration of

a unitary state (Norway) and the administrative system of a

quasi-federal order (the EU). The study applies a comprehensive

dataset consisting of 47 government agencies tasked with,

amongst others, regulating and implementing public policy. The

analysis demonstrates that agency officials feature pragmatist

compound behavior characterized by compromises and abilities

to navigate conflicting concerns—such as those of domestic

governments and EU-level institutions. Secondly, the analysis

probes the robustness of these conceptual images by entering

moderator variables. Multiplicative interaction model analysis

suggests that this dilemma is mediated through, and conditioned

by pre-existing institutions, practices, and traditions (e.g., Bauer

and Trondal2015; Olsen2008). However, this analysis suggests

that the compound image of agency governance is robust since

no moderator variables fundamentally transform relationships

from one governance type to another.

Agency governance in integrated administrative systems calls upon

agency officials to choose or balance competing concerns from

different institutions. Integrated administrative systems produce

ambiguity about what problems, solutions, and consequences

to attend to at any time, and what actors are deemed legitimate

and efficient (Ansell, Trondal, and Ogard2017; Schmidt2018).

Agency officials who are engaged in two parallel domains of

executive governance may experience opportunities and constraints

because different institutions send different information, signals,

and mandates (Dehousse2008; Egeberg and Jarle2018). The

article thus contributes to a mounting literature on the changing

role of public governance in an integrated multilevel European

executive order (Bauer and Trondal2015; Goetz and Meyer-

Sahlin2008; Heidbreder2011; Hofmann2008; Trondal2010).

This literature has been preoccupied with understanding emergence

and design of EU-level agencies (Christensen and Nielsen2010;

David2011; Egeberg and Jarle2017; Groenleer2009; Rittberger and

Wonka2011), the interconnected nature of EU-level and national-

level agencies (Bach and Ruffing2018; Curtin and Egeberg2008;

Egeberg and Jarle2018; Maggetti2014; Trein and Maggetti2018),

and implications on agency autonomy in the policy formulation

process (Bach and Ruffing2013; Bach, Ruffing, and Yesilkagit2015)

and policy implementation (Egeberg and Trondal2009). This

literature has so far described how the European administrative

system represents a multilevel and nested network administration

(e.g., Bach and Ruffing2018) where administrative bodies at different

levels of government “are linked together in the performance of tasks

[…]” (Hofmann and Turk2006, 583).

Studying how domestic government agencies adapt to the EU is

important for two reasons. First, domestic public administration is

crucial to the implementation and practicing of EU jurisprudence

(Egeberg and Trondal2009). Because the transposition of EU

law remains an administrative process relatively isolated from

political actors, it is essential to understand the prospects of

uniform implementation of federal (EU) law by agencies. Secondly,

domestic decision-making processes are crucial parts of federal

policy-making since they are intertwined with the multilevel

choice architectures of the EU, notably the European Commission

and EU agencies (e.g., Groenleer2009). However, one challenge

plaguing contemporary scholarship is how to understand the role

of public agencies in the governing of a deeply integrated (yet

differentiated) EU multilevel system. A recent review of EU agency

literature (Egeberg and Jarle2017) argued that few studies have

examined how agencification at one level of governance affects

public governance at another, and thus how shifting features of

the state, such as agencification and subsequent networking of

agencies, influence democratic governance (but see Danielsen

and Yesilkagit2014; Egeberg2006; Egeberg and Trondal2016;

Vantaggiato2019; Verhoest et al.2012). Whereas existing literature

has mapped patterns of agencification, less is known of the actual

role of national agencies in the multilevel policy-making process

in the EU generally, and how they navigate in conflicting choice

architectures—such as those of domestic governments and EU-level

institutions. This study offers a novel contribution to this diverse

literature by examining how domestic agency officials maneuver in a

multilevel European administrative order.

The study proceeds as follows: The next section outlines a

conceptual framework for analysis and propositions for empirical

enquiry. The subsequent sections include data and methodology as

well as an empirical analysis. The concluding discussion summarizes

key findings and reflects on their wider implications to this body of

literature.

A Two-Step Conceptual Framework

This section proceeds in two steps. The first step outlines conceptual

images of agency governance: a dyadic and a compound approach.

The second step suggests how moderator variables might bias agency

governance towards either of the two. Organizationally, government

agencies represent vertical fragmentation of polity and a supply

of administrative capacities to solve regulatory challenges (Bach,

Ruffing, and Yesilkagit2015). They are organizational compromises

that balance the need for political steering, professional autonomy,

and technical regulation (Christensen and Nielsen2010).

Organizing government agencies at arm’s length from their parent

ministries allows them to operate relatively insulated from political

steering, yet it also makes them more exposed to “capture” from

EU-level institutions and processes (Egeberg and Jarle2017). The

latter implies that EU-level institutions employ national agencies

in the policy processes, for example by involving them directly

into policy formulation and policy implementation (“direct”

administration). This section derives two conceptual images of

agency governance that derive distinct predictions on how agencies

are likely to maneuver when embedded in integrated multilevel

administrative orders.

Step I: Conceptual Images of Agency Governance

This section expands on two ideas from public administration

literature that make distinctive forecasts for agency governance.