The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict within the American Electorate

• Author: Mark D. Brewer
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290505800203
• Published date: 01 June 2005
• Date: 01 June 2005
• Subject Matter: Articles

The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of
Partisan Conflict within the American Electorate
MARK D. BREWER, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
Recent research has outlined important changes in partisanship among political elites in the United States.
Specifically, the effect of partisanship on politicians’ vote choice and other political behavior has risen, and the
number of issue areas where partisan conflict is present has increased. This article examines whether similar
changes have taken place among the general electorate. Using data from the NES Cumulative Datafile, the find-
ings presented here do point to changes in partisanship among the mass public. Once thought to be in decline,
mass partisanship has rebounded significantly in recent years. In a related development that is perhaps more
important, partisanship has become more pervasive within the electorate, with partisan conflict now pene-
trating into a greater number of issue areas. Partisanship has become relevant in the areas of racial and cultural
issues while retaining its importance for issues involving economic equality.
By the mid-1990s there was little doubt that, at the opinion. Theoretically then, as political elites become more
elite level, partisanship was resurgent in American
ideological and partisan in their rhetoric, policy proposals,
politics. However, questions remain about the state of
and voting behavior (as they have since the late 1970s), the
the parties in the general public. The parties arguably differ
electorate should become more ideological and partisan as
more on issues now than at any time since the early days of
well.1 As the number of issue areas marked by partisan con-
the New Deal. Politicians (party elites) are more likely to
flict expands among political elites, the same should happen
support their party and oppose the other party today than
among partisans in the general electorate. The key matter is
at any time since the 1950s. If issues are important to the
whether or not these developments have taken place.
contemporary electorate, and most evidence indicates that
This article will show that partisan change within the
they are, then it makes sense that voters will pick up on the
mass electorate has indeed mirrored that which has
issue differences that exist between the parties and react to
occurred among elites. Not only has partisanship increased
these differences. Shouldn’t partisan changes at the elite
at the mass level, it has also become more pervasive and
level somehow affect partisanship in the electorate?
consistent across a wider range of issue areas. The tradi-
According to the major models of mass opinion change,
tional New Deal partisan cleavage on issues of economic
the answer to the above question is “yes.” Although aggre-
equality continues, but is now joined by strong and salient
gate mass opinion change is slow and difficult, it does
partisan divisions on racial issues and cultural issues. Party
indeed occur (Page and Shapiro 1992). And when it does
elites became polarized on these issue areas first, followed
take place, the engine generally thought to be driving mass
over time by the mass public as it perceived and reacted to
opinion change is the behavior of political elites (Carmines,
the cues the elites were providing. It is also crucial to rec-
Renten, and Stimson 1984; Carmines and Stimson 1989;
ognize that this process quite likely feeds off of itself—elites
Hetherington 2001; Key with Cummings 1966; Layman
polarize on issues, causing increased polarization among the
and Carsey 2002a, b; Page 1978; Page and Shapiro 1992;
mass on these same issues, which in turn fuels further elite
Zaller 1992). Public opinion does not change on its own;
polarization as politicians (who are after all elites) react to
elite opinion changes, then elite behavior changes, and then
the views and demands of constituents and voters. This
(in some cases) mass opinion changes. Certainly events also
dynamic assists us in making sense of the highly polarized
play a large role in changing public opinion, but even in
politics that currently exists in the United States.
such instances it is often elite reaction to and interpretation
of the event as much as it is the event itself that affects mass
THE FOUNDATION: PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICAL ELITES
Anyone even remotely familiar with the American parties
1
literature of the past thirty years is well versed in the thesis
King (1997) believes that as elites become more ideological and partisan
in their behavior, the electorate will become increasingly dissatisfied and
of party decline. Yet even while the decline thesis remained
disengaged. This, however, is a minority view. Most scholars working in
dominant with regard to the mass level, scholars began to
this area believe that increased partisanship and ideological salience at
note partisan changes among political elites. Specifically,
the elite level will eventually result in similar increases at the mass level
they observed that partisanship was becoming increasingly
(see Hetherington 2001).
important at the elite level. After declining throughout the
NOTE: The author would like to thank Rich Powell, Jeff Stonecash, and the
1950s and 1960s, partisanship began to reassert itself in
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Congress during the 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, parti-
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 2 (June 2005): pp. 219-229
sanship in Congress had risen dramatically and has
219

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220
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
remained at a high level ever since (Patterson and Caldeira
coherent ideological conflict that reaches across issues areas;
1988; Rohde 1991, 1992a, b; Sinclair 2002). The percent-
a Republican Party that is consistently conservative on mat-
age of party votes—votes where the majority of one party
ters relating to race, cultural concerns, and economic equal-
votes together against the majority of the other party—
ity, and a Democratic Party that is equally liberal on the
increased substantially, as did party unity scores (the per-
same issues (Layman and Carsey 2002a, b). Rather than the
centage of votes in which a member votes with the majority
older economic equality cleavage being pushed aside by the
of his or her fellow party members) (Fleisher and Bond
newer racial and cultural issue cleavages in a process
2000; Jacobson 2000a).
described by Schattschneider (1960) and Sundquist (1983),
At the same time the parties were becoming more inter-
all three issue areas now exist alongside one another and
nally cohesive in their voting behavior, they were also
intermingle in the universe of partisan conflict. As Layman
becoming more ideologically polarized from each other.
and Carsey (2002b) put it, the positions advocated by
Regardless of the measure used (e.g., adjusted or unadjusted
Democratic and Republican elites on these kinds of issues
ADA scores, DW-Nominate scores, etc.), the ideological dis-
are now “packaged together for public consumption.” And
tance between the parties was increasing, while at the same
the parties’ positions on these issues are truly out there for
time the distance between members within each party was
the public to perceive. No longer is partisan agenda-setting
decreasing (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999; Jacobson
and position-taking solely the province of presidents and
2000a, b; Lucas 1999; Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1991;
presidential candidates, or perhaps of the quadrennial
Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; Taylor 1996). In
national nominating conventions. The parties in Congress
other words, the parties were growing farther apart from
now regularly engage in attempts to publicize their issue
each other (with the Democrats becoming more liberal and
positions and set the policy agenda (Sinclair 2002). Increas-
the GOP becoming more conservative), while the individual
ingly the congressional parties are at least participating in
members of each party were becoming more similar to their
the effort to inform the general public about what the par-
fellow partisans. This development was not confined solely
ties stand for and how they differ on important issues
to the legislative branch, as relations between Congress and
(Pomper and Weiner 2002). Party elites in all areas of
the president took on a much more partisan tenor as well
national politics (and state politics as well) are now force-
(Fleisher and Bond 1996; Sinclair 2000).
fully articulating partisan positions and stances on a wide
The final and perhaps most important partisan develop-
variety of issues. Theoretically these developments should
ment among elites is an expansion of the subject areas in
be producing change at the mass level. The remainder of
which partisan conflict takes place. In other words, the
this study will examine how well theory matches up with
number of issue areas on which Democratic and Republican
political reality.
policy makers publicly battle it out has increased. Since the
days of the New Deal, if not before, Democrats and Repub-
PARTISANSHIP IN THE MASS ELECTORATE:
licans have differed dramatically on matters of economic
HAS THE PARTY RESUMED?
equality and social welfare (Gerring 1998). Despite some
assertions to the contrary, this economic division between
Have elite changes affected mass partisanship? At least
the parties remains their most prominent distinguishing
since the publication of David Broder’s 1971 book The
characteristic, a distinction that has...