The Rise and Fall of Japan’s New Far Right: How Anti-Korean Discourses Went Mainstream*

DOI10.1177/00323292211033072
Published date01 September 2021
Date01 September 2021
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292211033072
Politics & Society
2021, Vol. 49(3) 363 –402
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00323292211033072
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Article
The Rise and Fall of Japan’s
New Far Right: How Anti-
Korean Discourses Went
Mainstream*
Sharon J. Yoon
University of Notre Dame
Yuki Asahina
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Abstract
Why has right-wing activism in Japan, despite its persistence throughout the postwar
era, only gained significant traction recently? Focusing on the Zaitokukai, an anti-Korean
movement in Japan, this article demonstrates how the new Far Right were able to
popularize formerly stigmatized right-wing ideas. The Zaitokukai represents a political
group distinct from the traditional right and reflective of new Far Right movements
spreading worldwide. In Japan, concerns about the growing influence of South Korea
and China in the 1980s as well as the decline of left-wing norms opened up a discursive
opportunity for the new Far Right. By framing Korean postcolonial minorities as
undeserving recipients of social welfare benefits, the Zaitokukai mobilized perceptions
of threat that has continued to powerfully influence public perceptions of Koreans even
following the group’s organizational decline. While past research has focused on the new
Far Right’s political influence, this article stresses their roles as ideological entrepreneurs.
Keywords
right wing, netizens, Zaitokukai, Zainichi, anti-Korean, new Far Right, nativism,
xenophobia, ultranationalism, populism, historical revisionism, comfort women,
Asahi Shimbun
Corresponding Author:
Sharon J. Yoon, University of Notre Dame, Keough School of Global Affairs, 2162 Jenkins Nanovic Halls,
Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA.
Email: syoon5@nd.edu
*This is one of four articles and an introduction that form a special issue of Politics & Society titled
“Right-Wing Activism in Asia: Cold War Legacies, Geopolitics, and Democratic Erosion.” The four articles
developed from the earlier versions presented at a symposium titled “Rise of Illiberal Politics in Asia”
organized by Yoonkyung Lee, director of the Centre for the Study of Korea at the University of Toronto,
on November 15, 2019. The authors would like to thank Professors Takashi Fujitani, Sida Liu, Andre Schmid,
and Jack Veugelers, who participated in the symposium as discussants and offered critical comments.
1033072PASXXX10.1177/00323292211033072Politics & SocietyYoon and Asahina
research-article2021
364 Politics & Society 49(3)
In 2005, Kenkanryu (translated as “Hating the Korean Wave”), a comic book featuring
a Japanese teenager’s journey uncovering the “truth” about South Korea, made inter-
national headlines. Because of the book’s controversial interpretations of Japanese war
atrocities and foreign relations, Kenkanryu, which started out as a web comic, was
rejected by major publishers at first. When Kenkanryu was finally picked up by a small
publishing house, the book was largely ignored by mainstream newspapers and large
bookstores. Angry by the lack of media exposure, fans took to the blogosphere and
online forums to propel sales.1 And as a result of their efforts, within just three months
of its release, Kenkanryu sold more than 300,000 copies and Yamano Sharin, the
young cartoonist who penned the comic, was thrust into stardom.
In spite of the comic book’s impressive sales, many scholars initially diminished
Kenkanryu’s influence as “constrained by the limitations of manga as a medium for
serious debate.”2 They pointed to broader signs of harmony and collaboration between
South Korea and Japan such as the 2002 World Cup and the popularity of Korean soap
operas such as the Winter Sonata among Japanese housewives. In addition, the lives of
third- and fourth-generation Korean postcolonial minorities (Zainichi Koreans) in
Japan showed signs of vast improvement following legislative reform in the 1980s and
1990s that outlawed labor market discrimination and opened access to a slew of social
welfare benefits. With increasing rates of intermarriage and naturalization, trends
seemed to indicate that Zainichi Koreans were rapidly assimilating into Japanese
society.
While unknown to the public at the time, however, Kenkanryu quietly helped spawn
an online community of Far Right Japanese “netizens,” whom we loosely define as
citizens who use the Internet for social and political connection. In 2007, Sakurai
Makoto, a relatively unknown irregular worker in his mid-30s, formally established
the group as the Zaitokukai (abbreviated for Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no
Kai, or Citizens against the Special Privileges of Korean Minorities in Japan).
Organized around the mission of revoking social welfare privileges granted to Zainichi
Koreans, the Zaitokukai began to gain notoriety after mobilizing a series of highly
publicized street demonstrations in Tokyo’s Koreatown in 2012. Motivated by their
newfound celebrity, they expanded the scale of their protests, organizing a total of
1,152 hate rallies in Japan between April 2013 and September 2015 according to the
Ministry of Justice.3 Our article focuses on the rise and fall of this anti-Korean
movement.
In spite of the outpouring of scholarship on the Japanese right in recent years, there
continues to be debate on who the Right consist of, what led to their emergence, and
what the extent of their impact has been. Since the end of World War II, right-wing
politics have been primarily characterized by efforts to preserve imperialist ambitions.
Among mainstream Japanese, however, these “old” right-wing views glorifying
Japan’s colonial past largely remained stigmatized and unpopular throughout the post-
war era. Thus, when Japan started showing signs of softened attitudes toward remili-
tarization and historical revisionism following the rise of Prime Minister Abe in 2012,
research on ukeika (or right-wing expansion) focused primarily on the role of elite
Yoon and Asahina 365
state actors, arguing that the rise of the Right in the past decade was symptomatic of
shifts in the institutional infrastructure of political bureaucracy.4
But by placing the onus on the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
many have diminished the impact that the Zaitokukai has had in changing the norma-
tive landscape of Japanese politics. Instead, the emergence of Far Right groups at the
grassroots level is often considered a byproduct of the LDP’s growing influence. And
along these lines, previous studies have by and large distinguished the Zaitokukai
from populist right-wing groups in the West by stressing its “pro-establishment”
nature.
By treating Japan’s new Far Right as exceptional, however, past theorization on the
rise of the Zaitokukai has remained relatively unidimensional. While some have
stressed the decades of low economic growth and job insecurity as key triggers,
describing the Zaitokukai as a fringe extremist group consisting mostly of disenfran-
chised men in low-wage contract jobs,5 others have emphasized ideological continu-
ities between the Zaitokukai and conservative intellectuals, tying the rise of the new
Far Right to Japan’s unresolved colonial legacy.6
Instead of portraying the Zaitokukai as a manifestation of unique historical or
bureaucratic factors, our article aims to examine how nativist movements can emerge
outside the West, even in countries with minimal immigration and foreign influence.7
Specifically, our article advances two points. First, we emphasize the importance of
perceptions in framing group identities by demonstrating how the Japanese Far Right
view themselves as part of the “antiestablishment” vis-à-vis the liberal elite.8 In par-
ticular, we connect the Zaitokukai to nativist groups in Euro-America by highlighting
their similarities—such as their ideological foundations in behavioral racism, the cor-
poreal nature of their tactics, and their heterogeneous membership. Our research
shows that much like the diverse groups of people who join new Far Right movements
in the West, the Zaitokukai represents a new demographic of “ordinary” Japanese who
are motivated not merely by economic interests but by a broad range of factors. For
instance, just as new conservative movements in the United States attract middle-class
women, factions of Japan’s new Far Right also include groups such as the Japan
Women’s Association Soyokaze and Japanese Women for Justice and Peace. In addi-
tion, in contrast to early studies of the Zaitokukai, which portrayed Far Right activists
as isolated bachelors in search of connection and a community, we shed light on new
data demonstrating how many participants include middle-class Japanese who are
well integrated into society. These data show that marital status is not a strong deter-
minant, as numerous members are married and have families.9 And finally, in contrast
to studies that have emphasized the immediate political effects of the new Far Right,
our study stresses the significance of more long-term, ideological effects by pointing
to the expansion of popular hate books that continue to sell millions of copies even
after the Zaitokukai’s decline. We thus admonish scholars to seriously consider the
enduring ideological influence of the new Far Right, which in the case of the Zaitokukai
threatens to extend beyond the scope of its electoral reach and outlast the efficacy of
its street protests.

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