The Rise and Decline of Brazil as a Regional Power (2003–2016)

• Author: Raúl Bernal-Meza
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X221113248
• Published date: 01 September 2022
• Date: 01 September 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X221113248

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 246, Vol. 49 No. 5, September 2022, 51–67

DOI: 10.1177/0094582X221113248

© 2022 Latin American Perspectives

51

The Rise and Decline of Brazil as a Regional Power

(2003–2016)

by

Raúl Bernal-Meza

Translated by

Mariana Ortega-Breña

Brazil’s evolution as a regional emerging power began under Lula’s leadership and

declined with Rousseff’s dismissal and the domestic political, economic, and leadership

crisis that led to its loss of regional relevance, the deterioration of its leadership in South

America, and its failure to achieve a strategic international alliance of middle powers. This

decline was expressed on the international level in the core-periphery bond developed with

China within BRICS and on the level of South America in the loss of relevance of the

regional governance institutions Lula once promoted.

La evolución de Brasil como potencia emergente regional empezó bajo el gobierno de

Lula y declinó con la destitución de Rousseff y la externalización de la crisis política,

económica y de liderazgo interna y la consiguiente pérdida de relevancia regional, el dete-

rioro de su liderazgo en Sudamérica y el fracaso de objetivos en su alianza internacional

de potencias medias. Las manifestaciones de la declinación a nivel internacional se expre-

san en el vínculo de carácter centro-periferia desarrollado con China al interior de BRICS

y a nivel sudamericano en la pérdida de relevancia de las instituciones de gobernabilidad

regional que Lula había impulsado.

Keywords: Brazil, South America, China, BRICS, Leadership

Pieterse (2011) has described a turn in the global system as economic power

shifted to Asia and the Global South. Relations between the semiperiphery and

the periphery became key to understanding changes in the world’s political

economy. According to Miyamoto (2000), Cervo (2008), and Cervo and Bueno

(2015), Brazil’s ambition to be recognized as a regional power and aspirations

to leadership led it to engage in international activism identified with the

expression “Brazil: From the Region to the World” (Bernal-Meza and Bizzozero,

2014). The first Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT) government in

Brazilian political history sought to integrate the country into global politics.

International strategies and visions differed under the governments of

Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–

2010). With Cardoso, policy was idealistic and allied with the order led by the

United States while maintaining liberal multilateralism (Cervo, 2002; 2008);

Raúl Bernal-Meza is a researcher at Tarapacá University (Chile). Mariana Ortega-Breña is a free-

lance translator based in Mexico City. This article, corrected and updated, is the result of Fondecyt

Project No. 1220290.

1113248LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X221113248Bernal-Meza/RISE AND DECLINE OF A REGIONAL POWER

research-article2022

52 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

under Lula, it was realistic and counterhegemonic (Bernal-Meza, 2002; 2009;

2010; Pecequilo, 2008). Lula focused on South America, from which he sought

to project Brazil internationally, and chose Mercosur as a central element of this

regional positioning strategy. Brazil was to become the axis of a South American

subsystem that was not always explicitly acknowledged (Bandeira, 1996; Lima,

2008; Bizzozero, 2011; Almeida, 2014), and Lula sought to incorporate new

partners into the bloc. For Cervo (2008) and Bernal-Meza (2010), he represented

a shift in the approach to international policy and in the kind of state model that

was considered necessary for Brazil’s incorporation into the systemic context

of transitional global order in the capitalist economy/world. Both aspects

established a party line regarding South American integration and cooperation

vis-à-vis global political and economic systems.

Brazil’s rise to GloBal Power

Lula’s three foreign policy priorities, set out in the inaugural address of his

first presidency, were to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations Security

Council, to strengthen Mercosur as a foundation for the construction of a South

American economic space, and to complete the multilateral negotiations begun

in 2001 and invest in the hemispheric negotiations for the Free Trade Area of

the Americas accepted by Itamar Franco and his chancellor, Celso Amorim

(Almeida, 2014: 193). In an effort to turn Brazil into a regional power, he started

building a logistical state, an ideal model that drew elements from develop-

mentalist and neoliberal state models while transferring the responsibility for

wealth generation and economic growth to the private sector (Cervo, 2008),

pursued the internationalization of the national economy through large enter-

prises (public and private) with financial support from the Brazilian

Development Bank, and sought to incorporate new sectors into the middle

classes and consumption (Bernal-Meza 2015; Bernal-Meza and Bizzozero, 2014;

Mercadante, 2013). Brazil’s position improved significantly in economics,

trade, scientific and technological development, energy, and food, and it

became a global power in biofuels and food, high-technology aeronautics, and

exploration for and exploitation of oil on the high seas (Brainard and Martínez-

Díaz, 2009). It promoted South-South cooperation in pursuit of a balance with

the countries of the North, consolidating the necessary changes in the foreign

policy agenda with adherence to international principles and standards

through South-South alliances. South America became key in this strategy

(Couto, 2013; Saraiva, 2010).

Lula’s diplomacy favored the adoption of multipolar and antihegemonic

positions (Saraiva, 2016; Gratius and Saraiva, 2013; Garcia, 2013). Given Brazil’s

self-assigned position, its global strategies included building new alliances

with emerging powers or regional middle powers (Guimarães, 1999). The first

of these was IBAS (India, Brazil, South Africa), and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,

China, South Africa) followed. At the regional level, after differentiating

between an area dependent on the United States (Mexico and Central America)

and an independent one (South America) revolving around Mercosur, it

promoted the strengthening of the subregional bloc and the creation of new