The Revolving Door in Judicial Politics: Former Clerks and Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court

• Author: Huchen Liu,Jonathan P. Kastellec
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211070806
• Published date: 01 January 2023
• Date: 01 January 2023

Article

AmericanPoliticsResearch

2023,Vol.51(1)3–22

©TheAuthor(s)2022

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DOI:10.1177/1532673X211070806

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TheRevolvingDoorinJudicialPolitics:

FormerClerksandAgendaSettingonthe

U.S.SupremeCourt

HuchenLiu

1

andJonathanP.Kastellec

2



Abstract

WeexaminetheroleofformerclerkstoSupremeCourtjusticesontheCourt’sagendasettingprocess.Wefindthatwhena

formerclerkistheattorneyoneitheracertpetitionoranamicusbrief,theCourtismorelikelytohearacase,comparedto

advocacybyanon-formerclerk.Tohelpexplainthesepatterns,wedrawonthebroaderliteratureon“revolvingdoor”politics.

Wearguethatthemostplausiblemechanismsareeitherthatformerclerksaremoreeffectiveadvocatesorthattheirpresence

inacasesignalsitsimportancetotheCourt.Alternatively,formerclerksmayselectintocasesthattheCourtislikelytogrant.

Whilewecannotdefinitivelydisentanglethesecompetingmechanisms,thestrongpatternsinthedatasuggestthattheim-

portanceoftherevolvingdoorinjudicialpoliticsextendsbroadlyintothedomainofagendasettingandisthusworthyoffurther

investigation.

Keywords

SupremeCourt,clerks,cert,amicusbriefs,revolvingdoor

Akeyinstitutionalfeatureofthemodern-dayUnitedStates

SupremeCourtisthatthenumberofcasestheCourtcould

hearandthenumberofcasestheCourtdoeshearhavemoved

instrikinglyoppositedirectionsoverthelastfewdecades.

Dueinparttothegrowthingeneralofthefederalgovernment

andthecreationoffederallyjudiciallyenforceableindividual

rights,thenumberofcasesinwhichlitigantshavesought

reviewbytheCourt—thatis,theCourt’sdocket—hasex-

plodedoverthelast75years.AsseeninFigure1,thenumber

ofcasesontheCourt’sdockethasroughlyquintupledsince

1950,goingfromaround1300casesthatyeartoabout7500

in2015,followingapeakofabout10,000in2006.

1

BecausetheSupremeCourthasnearlycompletediscretion

overthecasesithears,thesizeofitsdocketistheupperbound

onthenumberofactualdecisionsonthemeritsitmakes.That

numberisdeterminedbythenumberofcertiorari(or“cert”)

petitionstheCourtgrantsinagiventerm.Instarkcontrastto

theCourt’srisingdocketnumbers,thenumberofcertpeti-

tionsgrantedbytheCourthasdeclineddramatically.Thiscan

beseeninFigure2,whichdepictsthenumberofcertpetitions

grantedbetween1970and2015.Thegraphsmakeclearthe

steepdeclineingrants;theCourtnowgivesfullconsideration

toonlyabout80casesayear,oraboutonepercentofthe

numberofcasesthatenterthedocketeachyear.

2

ThedivergingpathsoftheCourt’sdocketandthenumber

ofcasesit“decidestodecide,”toborrowH.W.Perry’s(1991)

famousphrase,areofcoursewellknownamongthosewho

studytheSupremeCourt.Butakeyimplicationofthisdi-

vergenceisoftenunder-appreciated.Ifwewanttolookfor

externalinfluencesonthedecisionmakingofthejustices,the

startingpointisnotnecessarilythesetofcasesgivenfull

consideration,includingoralargument,bytheCourt.

3

Rather,

theplacetolookforsuchinfluenceisthesetofcasestheCourt

coulddecidetoweighin,simplybecausestatisticallyitisso

rarethatacaseonthedocketwillbeformallydecidedbythe

Court(thatis,decidedinamannerotherthanacertdenial).

Inthispaper,weexamineaparticularavenueforinflu-

encingtheCourt’sagenda:theroleofformerlawclerksfor

thejustices.Thepotentialinfluenceofformerclerkshas

receivedscholarlyattentionwithrespecttotheireffectiveness

atoralarguments(Black&Owens,2020;McGuire,2000).

Andmoregenerally,scholarshaverecognizedtheimportance

ofclerksfortheabilityofjusticestomanagetheflowofcases

comingtotheCourtandtohelpthemdraftopinions(Peppers,

2006;Ward&Weiden,2006);thisinfluence,ofcourse,can

onlyariseduringaclerk’sshorttime(usuallyoneterm)

1

UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor,MI

2

PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,NJ,USA

CorrespondingAuthor:

JonathanP.Kastellec,PrincetonUniversity,39CorwinHall,Princeton,NJ

08544,USA.

Email:jkastell@princeton.edu

workingforasinglejustice.But,tothebestofourknowl-

edge,noacademicstudyhasyetexaminedwhetherformer

clerksexertanyinfluenceattheagendasettingstage.

4

Inthis

paper,wedoexactlythat.

Inparticular,wecombineexistingandoriginaldatato

examinewhetherthepresenceofaformerclerkonacaseis

associatedwithahigherlikelihoodoftheCourtgrantingcert.

Ourtheoreticalexpectationsherearedrawnfromthebroader

literatureon“revolvingdoor”politics,inwhichindividuals

movefromgovernmentjobsintolobbying.Inparticular,we

focusontwopathwaysthroughwhichformerclerkinfluence

mightplayoutinthecertprocess.Thefirstisbydirect

representation;thatis,whenaformerclerkrepresentsaparty

inasuitanddirectlyfilesacertpetitionseekingSupreme

Courtreviewofthecase.Thesecondisbyindirectrepre-

sentation;heretheformerclerkdoesnotdirectlyrepresenta

partytothecase,butstillbecomesinvolvedbyauthoringan

amicusbriefthaturgestheCourttotakethecase.Inthisform

ofindirectrepresentation,attorneysoftenassistorganized

intereststhatlobbytheCourtasamicicuriae.Withournewly

collecteddata,weareabletoexamineformerclerks’potential

advantageinbothcapacitiesduringthecertprocess.

Forbothtypesofrepresentation,wefindthatthepresence

ofaformerclerkinthecaseisassociatedwithasubstantially

higherlikelihoodoftheCourtgrantingcertcomparedto

advocacybyanon-formerclerk,ceterisparibus.Inaddition,

theestimatedmagnitudeofthesedifferencesisquitesub-

stantial.Forcertpetitions,ourbestestimateisthatthe

Figure1.TheSupremeCourt’sCaseload,1878–2017.ThegraphdepictsthetotalnumberofcasesontheCourt’sdocket,foreachterm.

Figure2.CertPetitionsGrantedbytheSupremeCourtperterm,1970–2017.

4AmericanPoliticsResearch51(1)