The Response of the Colorado General Assembly To Proposals for Metropolitan Reform

• Author: Susan W. Furniss
• DOI: 10.1177/106591297302600409
• Published date: 01 December 1973
• Date: 01 December 1973
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE RESPONSE OF THE COLORADO GENERAL
ASSEMBLY TO PROPOSALS FOR
METROPOLITAN REFORM
SUSAN W. FURNISS
Colorado State University
WO
related themes have been woven through much of our social science
~ literature over the past two decades, and both address themselves to the
trials and tribulations of urban America. The first theme asserts that the
malapportionment of state legislatures has contributed to state neglect of urban
problems. The second theme suggests that urban problems are rooted in the frag-
mentation of local governmental structures. If one accepts the validity of these two
assumptions, then a third emerges: reapportionment, by altering the political con-
figuration of state legislatures, will evoke a sympathetic legislative response to
attempts to restructure metropolitan areas.
It is true that these assumptions have not been universally accepted. Thomas
Dye, for example, has suggested that alterations in state apportionment patterns do
not explain variations in policy output.’ And Vincent Ostrum, Oliver Williams,
and others have submitted that such metropolitan reforms as the massive consoli-
dation of governmental units may be neither desirable nor politically feasible.2 Still,
feeling remains widespread that apportionment, metropolitan reform, and urban
ills are closely related. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of
legislative politics in one state to the prospects for metropolitan reform in that
state’s largest urban center. The state is Colorado and the metropolitan area is
Denver.
The Colorado General Assembly is an appropriate setting for the analysis for
three reasons. First, during the decade of the sixties major demands for the restruc-
turing of local jurisdictions surfaced, primarily because the governor appointed a
blue-ribbon commission to initiate proposals. The major recommendations of the
commission involved structural changes and were formally presented to the legis-
lature for action. These demands generated conflict -
not between country and
city folk -
but, instead, within the metropolitan community itself.
Second, Colorado is an appropriate setting for analysis because urban ills are
viewed as concentrated in one area. While both Pueblo and Colorado Springs are
designated Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Colorado citizens tend to see
the metropolitan problem as the problem of Denver alone, partly because of its size,
and partly because of its history. In 1902 Colorado citizens had placed Denver in a
unique jurisdictional position by creating the City and County of Denver which
enjoyed powers exceeding those of other municipalities.
1
Thomas Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," Journal of Politics, 27
(August 1965), 586.
2
For a discussion of the influence of local governmental structure on urban problems and an
analysis of opposing points of view, see Donald R. Grant, "Urban Needs and State
Response; Local Government Reorganization," in The States and the Urban Crisis, ed.
Alan K. Campbell (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 60-63.
747

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748
Reapportionment also received an unusual amount of attention and visibility
in Colorado during the sixties. Two initiated constitutional amendments dealing
with reapportionment appeared on the ballot in 1962. The adopted amendment
was the subject of one of the 1964 reapportionment cases, Lucas v. The General
Assenzbly of Colorado (337 U.S. 742). The intervention of the Supreme Court in
overturning that amendment and the subsequent reapportioning of the General
Assembly to comply with that decision promoted public awareness of the change
in the composition of the legislature. For those concerned with the Denver Metro-
politan Area, the change was viewed as salutary.
This study attempts to analyze the response of the legislature to proposals for
metropolitan reform -
proposals which were placed before the Assembly at the
same time that the composition of that body was being altered by the dictates of
one-man, one-vote. The hypotheses offered in this study are as follows:
1. Voting patterns in the Colorado General Assembly generally follow party
lines.
2. Voting patterns depart from party lines when bills dealing with local gov-
ernment are considered, while district voting increases.
3. District interests weigh more heavily than partisan interests with legislators
in their attitudes toward metropolitan structural reform.
4. Reapportionment failed to advance the prospects for metropolitan reform.
5. A growing split is developing between legislators from core city and subur-
ban areas.
THE DENVER METROPOLITAN AREA
The history of the relationship between the Colorado legislature and Denver
began in territorial times. From the very beginning structural reform was viewed
as the primary solution to intergovernmental tensions inherent in the concentration
of population in urban areas. The first jurisdictional dispute arose when settlers
almost simultaneously established the Auraria Town Company and the Denver
City Town Company on opposite sides of Cherry Creek &dquo;which at that time in the
spring of the year was from ten to twenty feet wide and about six inches deep. As
the summer progressed it diminished to a silvery threadlike current.&dquo; 3 For two
years the communities were intense rivals, but in 1860, reason prevailed, and the
citizens of the two groups met at a mass meeting which resolved that the two cities
were one. The first Colorado Territorial Assembly ratified the decision and added
a third community, Highland, when it incorporated the city of Denver on Novem-
ber 7, 1862. From that time forward Denver’s fortunes rested with the Assembly.
In the early days of the Territory, Denver was consistently outvoted in the
legislature. &dquo;Until very late in this period the mountain districts had full control
of the legislature. Denver, therefore, could secure local legislation mainly through
vote-bargains only and had no extensive influence in shaping general legislation.&dquo;4
4
3
Percy Stanley Fritz, Colorado: The Centennial State (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941),
pp. 113-14.
4
Clyde Lyndon King, The History of the Government of Denver with Special Reference to its
Relations with Public Service Corporations (Denver: The Fisher Book Co., 1911), pp.
48-49.

---

749
As a result, the special legislation to which Denver was subject was not always
designed to strengthen the powers of what was already Colorado’s largest city.
Denver, like all other towns in Colorado, began with a council form of govern-
ment. In the years 1869-76, as population boomed, Denver’s place in the legisla-
ture grew in power. Denver used that power to change her government to one more
in tune with growth and industrialization. Administration of the government was
increasingly centralized in the office of the mayor. In 1889, however, Denver’s
autonomy was lessened when the General Assembly created the State Board of
Public Works to manage all municipal public works in Denver. Denver was thus
made a political football for the dominant political party in the General Assembly.
This tying together of city and state had repercussions for the later move toward
home rule.5
5
In 1893, the legislature adopted a new charter for Denver. King describes it
as &dquo;thoroughly inefficient as any scheme that could have been devised.&dquo; 6 The
General Assembly later extended their control through a police and fire board.
The court consistently upheld state domination of the city. A growing resentment
by Denver citizens led to the calling of a charter convention in 1898. The first
meeting died for lack of a quorum, and one year later, the legislature’s attempt at
consolidation of county and city failed when questions of constitutionality were
raised.
In 1901, however, the drive to home rule was merged with a scheme for city-
county separation. An amendment, known as the &dquo;Rush&dquo; bill, proposed a new
article for the Constitution, Article XX. The author of that bill describes its ra-
tionale in these words:
Instead of renewing the impracticable and probably unconstitutional plan to consolidate the
City of Denver and the County of Arapahoe ... the bill provided that the City of Denver and
the six contiguous towns of Argo, Berkely, Elyria, Globeville, Montclair and Valverde be
separated from the county and be consolidated into a new political entity as &dquo;a single body
politic and corporate&dquo; under the name of the City and County of Denver.~
According to Rush, the proposal received the support of all political parties,
women’s groups, business organizations, and leading newspapers. It was opposed
by special interests, especially public utility corporations who believed they could
control their fortunes more effectively in the General Assembly than in the Denver
city council. Rush claims that the people of the state were sufficiently aroused to
insure passage because they were &dquo;tired of having the time of the legislator taken up
with quarrels over the Denver charter and were disgusted with the political chi-
canery that entered into amendments thereto.&dquo; $ The legislature submitted the pro-
posal to the people in 1902; Article XX
was
adopted, 59,750 to 25,767.
Rush enumerates the powers of Denver’s home rule charter and notes the rul-
ing of the Supreme Court in the Hallet case in which the court said: &dquo;It was
3
King cites three motives for the Board’s creation: the desire of Denver residents to "protect
the city from itself; to...