The Representational Effects of Communal Property: Evidence from Peru’s Indigenous Groups

• DOI: 10.1177/0010414021997157
• Date: 01 October 2021
• Published date: 01 October 2021
• Author: Christopher L. Carter
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021997157

Comparative Political Studies

© The Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0010414021997157

journals.sagepub.com/home/cps

Article

The Representational

Effects of Communal

Property: Evidence from

Peru’s Indigenous Groups

Christopher L. Carter1

Abstract

Why do some indigenous groups achieve coethnic political representation

while others do not? In this paper, I highlight the primary role of communal

property in shaping indigenous representation. While scholars often laud

the developmental benefits of communal land titling, I argue that formalizing

collectively held land can inhibit indigenous coordination to achieve political

representation. Where communal land is informally held, indigenous groups

are more likely to invest in traditional institutions that facilitate collective

action to elect coethnic candidates to political office. Conversely, titling

communal property secures indigenous land access but in the process

erodes traditional institutions that would otherwise promote collective

action during elections. I test my argument using a multi-method approach

that includes interviews and experiments with three-hundred Peruvian

indigenous leaders, historical land-title data, and information scraped from

mayoral candidate CVs. The findings suggest that the oft-cited economic

benefits of collective property may generate negative political effects.

Keywords

indigenous politics, representation and electoral systems, race, ethnicity and

politics, Latin American politics

1Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Christopher L. Carter, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, 1727 Cambridge

Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.

Email: christopher.carter@berkeley.edu

997157CPSXXX10.1177/0010414021997157Comparative Political StudiesCarter

research-article2021

2021, Vol. 54(12) 2191 –2225

2192 Comparative Political Studies 54(12)

2 Comparative Political Studies 00(0)

Indigenous groups throughout the Americas have historically experienced

political exclusion and underrepresentation. Yet, in recent decades, decen-

tralization reforms, electoral quotas, and ethnically based political parties

have created institutional spaces through which indigenous groups can

achieve coethnic political representation at various levels of government

(Hoffay & Rivas, 2016; Htun, 2016; Madrid, 2012; Rice & Van Cott, 2016;

Van Cott, 2009). While some indigenous communities have effectively

coordinated to take advantage of these opportunities for greater representa-

tion, others have been less successful. In this paper, I analyze the sources of

this variation. Specifically, why have some indigenous groups successfully

mobilized to achieve coethnic political representation while others have

failed to do so?

To explain variation in indigenous groups’ ability to achieve coethnic

political representation, I focus on a key institutional reform that has often

defined indigenous-state relations over the past century: the titling of native

groups’ communal land.1 Indigenous groups possess the majority of the

world’s communal land, and for these groups, the titling of communal land

constitutes an essential step toward achieving their “central demand” of

greater autonomy (Díaz-Polanco, 1998; Stavenhagen, 2000; Van Cott, 2001;

Yashar, 2005). State recognition and formalization of communal property

also provides indigenous groups the promise of economic benefits, which are

generally thought to equal or even exceed those of private property (Cramb

& Wills, 1990; Sjaastad & Bromley, 1997; cf. Place & Hazell, 1993). Unlike

private property, a communal land title belongs to no single individual but

rather to the “community” that occupies the land, and this collectively held

property—by law—is generally indivisible and inalienable.

I argue that the purported economic benefits of communal land titles can

be accompanied by negative political effects, particularly with respect to

indigenous representation. Communal land titles allow indigenous groups to

shift their focus from defending their land to improving agricultural produc-

tivity and integrating into markets. While this transition may provide certain

private economic benefits, it may also erode traditional institutions of reci-

procity (Polanyi, 1944). The loss of these institutions complicates intra-group

electoral coordination to achieve coethnic political representation.

Informally held communal land, on the other hand, is more likely to

encourage the persistence of reciprocity institutions, which promote indige-

nous groups’ electoral coordination in two ways. First, indigenous candidates

who subscribe to these institutions can more credibly commit to reciprocat-

ing electoral support with post-election benefits if they win. Therefore, these

candidates will be generally more appealing to indigenous voters. Second,

reciprocity institutions facilitate turn-taking among communities around who

Carter 2193

Carter 3

nominates candidates for local office. Voters from a given indigenous com-

munity will support a candidate from another community, confident that a

member of their community will have an opportunity to run for office and

will receive similar support in a future election.

I examine this argument drawing on evidence from Peru, where ethnicity

is a fairly weak political identity (Albó, 2008; 1991; Degregori, 1998; Yashar,

2005).2 As such, political coordination across indigenous communities can-

not be easily explained by ethnic solidarity or primordial ties, thus facilitating

an analysis of other factors that may affect inter-community electoral mobili-

zation. Crucially, the Peruvian case also exhibits variation in the key indepen-

dent variable of interest to this study. Peru features both formally titled and

informally possessed communal landholding institutions, or “communities.”

This feature of the Peruvian case allows me to trace how different forms of

communal landholding—titled or informally held—have shaped the persis-

tence of traditional institutions and ultimately, political representation.

I use a multi-method approach that draws on historical and contemporary

evidence. I first show that the 20th-century extension of communal land titles

was associated with an increase in market integration and a decline in reci-

procity institutions, or ayni. As further evidence that reciprocity institutions

were less likely to persist in title-possessing communities, I draw on a lab-in-

the-field experiment with over three-hundred indigenous community presi-

dents. I show that reciprocal behavior is more likely to be observed in

communities that historically lacked a formal title to their communal land.

A second empirical section demonstrates the important coordinating role

of traditional reciprocity institutions in achieving coethnic representation.

First, I use data scraped from the CVs of candidates for municipal office in

2014 to show that reciprocity institutions reduce the number of community-

member candidates who run in a given municipality. Then, using a conjoint

experiment, I provide evidence that cross-community coordination to elect

indigenous candidates to subnational office is more likely to occur in com-

munities that preserve reciprocity institutions. Finally, I draw on interview

and case study evidence from two Peruvian provinces to illustrate how indig-

enous communities coordinate to achieve coethnic political representation.

The findings offer insights into not only indigenous groups’ access to

representation, but also their access to state-provided distributive benefits.

Scholars have often observed that the scarcity of government investment in

indigenous communities is driven by low levels of indigenous representation,

especially in local governments (Freire et al., 2015; Hoffay & Rivas, 2016;

Htun, 2016; Van Cott, 2005). In other work, I use a regression-discontinuity

design to show that indigenous groups receive more public goods when

municipal leaders are themselves indigenous (Carter, 2021a). Therefore, an