The Renovation That Failed: Mendès-France and the Radical Party

• DOI: 10.1177/106591296001300211
• Author: Luther A. Allen
• Published date: 01 June 1960
• Date: 01 June 1960
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE RENOVATION THAT FAILED:
MENDÈS-FRANCE AND THE RADICAL PARTY*
LUTHER A. ALLEN
University of Massachusetts
Y
MAY, 1958, there was virtual unanimity in France and elsewhere con-
cerning the need to modify, perhaps drastically, the Constitution of the
~-
Fourth Republic. The insurrection in Algiers brought General de Gaulle
to power in circumstances requiring both a solution to the Algerian problem and
a renovation of French political institutions. Pierre Mendes-France, throughout
the short life of the Fourth Republic and especially after the termination of his
brief period of service as premier, devoted himself to these twin problems. Un-
like De Gaulle, he made no frontal attack on the political system with its multi-
plicity of parties. The Third and Fourth Republics, for him, were the Republic,
constituting a tradition of parliamentary democracy worthy of preservation. What
was needed was a renovation of the existing system in order to resolve the major
problems of economic reconstruction and the recasting of the links between
France and her overseas possessions. Cabinet instability was the characteristic
vice, but if it were to be reduced and more affirmative government to develop,
the place to begin was not the formal constitution but the structure, the appeal,
the representation, and the co-ordination of the larger political parties, especially
those of the non-Communist Left who traditionally were the defenders of the
Republic and who were the most likely sources of a reformist policy capable of
constructive action at home and overseas.
What did Mendes-France try to do and why did he fail? In an effort to deal
with these questions in the perspective of the collapse of the Fourth Republic it
is first necessary to examine the organizational problems posed by Mendes-
France’s own party, the Radical Socialists,’ and to survey chronologically his ef-
forts in broad outline. Following this is an attempt to characterize the function-
ing of the Radical-Socialist party under the influence of Mendes-France by ex-
amining the practices of (a) the extraparliamentary party organization; (b) the
party in the electoral process; and (c) the parliamentary party with its relation-
ship to other parties, to governments, and to major policy issues. Finally some
this article is the product of research undertaken in France during two extended visits in
1956 and 1957. The author would like to express particular appreciation to the staff of the
Centre de documentation of the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques in Paris and to
numerous unnamed officials of the Radical-Socialist party in Paris and in selected diparte,
ments.
1
Gordon Wright has recently suggested the need for study of the organization and character of
the French Radical-Socialist party, "Some Unexplored Avenues in French Political Be-
haviour," PROD (
Political Research: Organization and Design
),
I (May, 1958), 14. The
best effort at describing the internal organization of the Radical party in its pre-Mendèsist
phase is Alain Gourdain, "Le Parti Radical," in Maurice Duverger (ed.), Partis politiques et
classes sociales (Paris, 1955), pp. 223-39. An analysis of changes in the statutes of the party
in 1955, is found in J. A. Laponce, "Mendès-France and the Radical Party," Western Political
Quarterly, XI (June, 1958), 340-56. See also C. Nicolet, Le Radicalisme (Paris, 1957); Philip
Williams, Politics in Post-War France (2nd ed.; London: Longmans, 1958), pp. 90-106 and
xx-xxi; and Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1954) passim.
445

---

446
tentative conclusions will be advanced as to how far Mendes-France’s efforts at
renovation succeeded, why he did not achieve his aims, and relationship of his
undertaking to the fate of the Fourth Republic.
’
I
&dquo;At heart,&dquo; according to Maurice Duverger, it was the dream of Mendes-
France &dquo;to create a Radical party embodying numerous militants in a disciplined
structure, to substitute a mass party like that of the French Socialist party in
place of the old ’cadre’ Radical party of the past.&dquo; 2 T’he French Radical-Socialist
party possessed a traditional middle-class base, especially in that portion of France
which is least industrialized. It was a &dquo;caucus&dquo; party of notables which neglected
the recruitment of mass membership. Its basic units served mainly as loosely
organized electoral societies possessing great autonomy and constituting electoral
bastions for powerful parliamentary figures. The co-ordinating machinery of
extraparliamentary organization lacked structure, articulation was weak, and
local decentralization abounded. The Radicals were a party largely controlled
by and oriented toward parliament. The party’s position in the political spectrum
made it a pivotal governmental party most of the time. Inconsistent in alliances,
it was opportunistic on many policy questions. Challenged by the SFIO to its
left after 1905 and by the Communist party after 1920, it emerged weakened
after World War II only to find the MRP to its left on social and even constitu-
tional issues. Hostile to the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, the Radical
party, mainstay of the Third Republic, nevertheless could have served as a re-
vitalizing force to the French parliamentary tradition. To do so it needed to
imitate the organization of the SFI03 and the MRP, to try to turn the latter party
or even both on the left, and, under Mendes-France, to provide the keystone of
a stable government determined to resolve in time the problems of the French
economy and especially of Algeria.
In choosing to take over the apparatus and mystique of an existing organiza-
tion, Mendes-France sought to avoid the creation of a movement completely tied
to one man. Certainly he challenged key traditions of the old party, and the
character of its clientele was hardly ideal for so revolutionary an undertaking.
Yet both he and his party shared the symbols of the Revolution and the Republic.
In any case Mendes-France himself evoked great enthusiasm while he was pre-
mier. The overthrow of his government after a dramatic and exhilarating seven
months and seventeen days demonstrated the weakness of the party basis of his
leadership. His government had raised the possibility of bringing vitality to the
Fourth Republic; consequently his effort to build a political base for the future
beginning with his own party stirred the interest of many republicans in France.
2
Duverger et al., "Quel est l’avenir du Mendèsisme?" L’Express, Feburary 8, 1957. For a criticism
of Mendès-France’s decision to reform the Radical-Socialist party see Georges Lavau, "Men-
dèsisme, prophétisme, guerre civile," Esprit, No. 280 (January, 1960), 174-86.
3
Duverger, "La Toile de Pénélope," Le Monde, April 4, 1957.

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447
With the possible exception of De Gaulle, no man in recent French politics at-
tained greater popularity;’ similarly no recent French statesman has made more
enemies nor suffered greater calumnies.
In a sense Mendes-France was a traditional Radical. At an early age he
implanted himself in the local politics of a provincial town and joined the
Radical-Socialist party.5 Soon he was speaking at national party congresses, build-
ing a strong Radical Committee in Louviers, and contributing toward the develop-
ment of a strong Radical Federation for the Department of the Eure. Deputy in
1932 and mayor of Louviers in 1935, he was among the &dquo;Young Turks&dquo; favoring
the Popular Front alliance of Communists, Socialists, and Radicals, and he parti-
cipated on a subordinate level in the brief second Popular Front government of
L6on Blum in 1938. By 1945 he became president of the Departmental Council
of the Eure. He had, in sum, established both strong local roots in the Radical
tradition and status in the national party, especially on the parliamentary level.
His resistance record and his obvious talents as an economist made him a
brilliant choice after the Liberation for the post of finance minister in General de
Gaulle’s provisional government. Characteristically his firm beliefs in the ne-
cessity of rigorous monetary policy subsequently brought about his resignation.
Instead of becoming the Sir Stafford Cripps of a French post-Liberation economy,
he became an isolated Cassandra increasingly critical of French involvement in
the Indochina war.~
6
By late 1951 he began to attract attention because of his
program which called for the curtailment of French overseas involvement and
for the promotion of massive state-sponsored expansion of the French domestic
economy. The Radical party’s tolerance of divergent opinions and personalities
permitted this despite participation by many of its leading figures in increasingly
right-wing governments. In June of 1953 Mendes-France won almost enough
votes in the National Assembly to form a government committed to reverse
French policy. His voice became stronger in party congresses and he attracted
significant regional support. Characteristically most of the parliamentary group,
however, upheld participation in the government of Joseph Laniel. It was Menes-
France, himself, who brought that government down, concentrating his attacks
on the MRP’s role in the already disastrous Indochina war.
The Mendes-France government had the support of the Radical group as
did that of Laniel. The party apparatus remained in the hands of L6on Marti-
naud..Déplat, a minister under Antoine Pinay and Laniel, and in the last weeks
he and Ren6 Mayer, banker and...