The Reality and Diversity of Buddhist Economics

AuthorWolfgang Drechsler
Date01 March 2019
Published date01 March 2019
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12271
The Reality and Diversity of
Buddhist Economics
By Wolfgang Drechsler*
abstract. This essay develops three central points:
1. Buddhist economics (BE), like most religion-based economics, is
not only an extrapolation from the basic texts but is also how BE
has recently been practiced. Examples of that practice include
the application of the concept of “Gross National Happiness” in
Bhutan, the implementation of a “sufficiency economy” in
Thailand, and action based on the principle of the Unification of
King and People in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
2. BE as a concept comes originally from an outside understanding
of Buddhism that entails perspectives that text-based BE might
not have.
3. Buddhism, as such, is at odds with standard textbook economics
(STE). BE thus potentially forms its own economic paradigm, but
BE as practiced often coexists with ST E.
Discussing these points will hopefully result in seeing that there is
considerable diversity within BE and that there is such a thing as real,
existing BE that truly does matter.
The Realit y of Buddhist Econom ics
It is by no means unambiguous what Buddhist economics (BE)
actually is, including among those dealing with it on a professional
basis. The Dalai Lama has even called the term confusing (in Dunne
2015). However, we can say that BE today is usually constructed
from Buddhism, rather than something that emerges directly from the
authoritative texts.
American Jour nal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March , 2019).
DOI: 10 .1111/ajes.122 71
© 2019 American Journa l of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
*Professor of Governance, Ragnar Nurkse Department, TalTech,Estonia. Associate,
Davis Center,Harvard University. Formerly served as Advisor to the President of Estonia,
Executive Secretary with the German Wissenschaftsrat, and, as APSA Congressional
Fellow, Senior Legislative Analyst in the U.S. Congress. Email: wdrechsler@fas.harvard.
edu
524 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology
This construction has two starting points coming from different
directions: some start with what can be extrapolated from the teach-
ings of the Buddha regarding economic policy (Payutto 1994: 42,
47–48; Puntasen 2008: 2), others the other way around, by taking
economic positions already held, and then legitimizing them back-
wards by relating them to Buddhism. An example of this may be Clair
Brown’s recent Buddhist Economics (2017), which has had quite a
high profile; another is Tomer (2017). However, Manandar (i2017)
has emphasized that, in many of these cases, ideas that appear to be
based on positions held by authors already can actually be linked
back to what the Buddha taught.
However, defining BE entirely in terms of how individual authors
have constructed it risks reducing it to an almost arbitrary potential-
ity.1 To address BE comprehensively, one also needs to look at actual
economic systems that are called or call themselves Buddhist. To
understand BE, we should therefore examine such economies that
really exist or have really existed. As some considerable truth lies
in what actually exists—notwithstanding the ambiguous position of
“reality” in Buddhism—BE can be discerned in patterns that are not
always closely related to what academic treatises on BE or Buddhist
theory say should exist (Pryor 1990, 1991; Zadek 1993; Piboolsravut
1997).
Yet before delving into the historical or contemporary examples of
how BE was and is practiced, we should first take note of the difference
between micro- and macro-level economies. Micro-level practices are
typical for Buddhism (Prayukvong 2005: 1184); as Phuntsho (i2016)
has argued, they are particularly relevant in Mahayana Buddhism, and
they exist even in countries where Buddhism is not the majority re-
ligion, such as Nepal. However, our focus will be on the macrolevel
and so what matters are economic systems that prevail throughout
the country or some of its territorial units. Therefore, we will examine
states or country-like structures that use BE elements (Khamman 2013:
27). The very fact that these practices exist is important because, as
Kant ([1793] 1923) explains, when a theory is applied in practice, no
matter how lightly, the theory will change in and of itself.
525Reality and Diversity of Buddhist Economics
Buddhism is multifaceted; there is not one Buddhism but there
are many variations; contexts of time and space matter (Greschat and
Kraatz 1985: 5–8). Even within denominations, countries, and schools
of Buddhist teaching, the difference in form can be so complex that
putting them under one label can be difficult. Puntarigvivat (2013)
shows how that is the case in Thailand, but all religions inevitably
change over time (Greschat 1988: 19). Due to what Lanczkowski (1980:
30–35) calls “inner-religious pluralism,” they empirically contain many
aspects that may strongly contradict each other. In addition, more
people worship the Buddha who are not “card-carrying” Buddhists
than those who are. Specifically, there are hundreds of millions of fol-
lowers of amalgamated or syncretistic religions such as Chinese Folk
Religion (CFR), most of whom worship the Buddha.
This dynamic is typically found when one juxtaposes “theology”
and “folk religion.” The latter generally contains older beliefs and
practices underneath newer layers (Smith [1962] 1991: 48–50; Vrijhof
1979). In what is known as the conflict between philological and an-
thropo-sociological Buddhology, and for the purposes of this article,
I assume a “Cœdèsian totality” (Cœdès [1935] 1990: *3–4; Rozenberg
2005: 41–46). Within Buddhism, “reality … is one” (Cœdès [1935]
1990: *4). All variants of BE, therefore, deserve legitimately the label
“Buddhist” prima facie—as long as they do not completely pervert the
(original) intention of the faith. We might argue about whether this
should also pertain to the purely “theological” aspects of Buddhism,
but economics is always applied and thus changes with the applica-
tion. In law, for instance, Llewewllyn ([1930] 2008: 4) has explained
the position of the legal realism school, which follows a similar
practice, as follows:
Rules alone, mere forms of words, a re worthless. … [T]he heaping up of
concrete instances … is necessar y to make any general proposition, be it
rule of law or any other, mean anyt hing at a ll.
In this article, we will look at three diverse cases of actual Buddhist
economies: Thailand, Bhutan, and the Special Region of Yogyakarta in
Indonesia. All three are Southeast or South Asian k ingdoms (Kershaw
2001). These three have specific economic development theories

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