The public safety exception to Miranda: analyzing subjective motivation.

• Author: Reiner, Marc Schuyler

INTRODUCTION

In Miranda v. Arizona,(1) the Supreme Court announced a set of procedural safeguards to protect a criminal suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when being questioned by the police. The Court required that when "an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning," the police must give the suspect the now-familiar pre-interrogation Miranda warnings.(2) The Court subsequently made it clear that Miranda warnings were required in every instance of custodial interrogation.(3) In New York v. Quarles,(4) however, the Court created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda requirements for situations where a threat to public safety compels the police to question a criminal suspect immediately.

In Quarles, a young woman approached two police officers and informed them that she had just been raped. She described the perpetrator and told the police that he had just entered a nearby supermarket and that he was carrying a gun. A policeman--Officer Frank Kraft--went to the store and discovered a man--Benjamin Quarles--who matched the description given by the woman. A chase ensued and Kraft temporarily lost sight of Quarles. Upon finding Quarles again, the police arrested him. Kraft frisked Quarles and found an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing Quarles, Kraft asked him about the location of the gun. Quarles responded "the gun is over there," gesturing to some empty cartons. Kraft retrieved the handgun and then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights. Quarles waived his rights and then admitted that he owned the gun.(5)

During pretrial proceedings on weapons charges, the trial court suppressed Quarles's initial and later statements, finding a Miranda violation because the police had failed to advise him of his rights before questioning.(6) The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression ruling and, as part of this ruling, also explicitly refused to recognize a public safety exception to the Miranda requirements because they felt there was no evidence that the officer's motive was to protect either his own safety or the public's safety.(7)

The Supreme Court reversed, creating a "public safety" exception to the Miranda requirements.(8) The Court held that the need for answers in a situation presenting a threat to public safety outweighs the protections afforded by the Miranda warnings.(9) In creating a public safety exception to the Miranda requirements, the Quarles Court sought to allow officers to obtain information necessary to defuse an emergency. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion declined to force an arresting officer in a hectic situation to choose between concern for public safety and desire to obtain a conviction.(10)

There is considerable confusion among commentators and lower courts about how to decide whether the public safety exception is applicable to a particular case. Many have interpreted Quarles as prohibiting any inquiry into an interrogating officer's subjective beliefs and motivations; they claim to look only for objectively reasonable indicia of danger in applying the public safety exception.(11) Courts generally consider the facts of Quarles--the unknown whereabouts of a weapon in a public place--to be an appropriately objective emergency for these courts.

This Note argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry under Quarles is whether an actual and reasonable belief in an emergency motivated the interrogating officer. This Note proposes a two-prong test to facilitate this inquiry. The subjective motivation prong evaluates the officer's subjective motivation as revealed by objective factors: the content of the officer's questions, when he asked them, and when the suspect received Miranda warnings. The objective reasonableness prong looks at the objective circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief in an emergency.

Part I demonstrates that the Quarles opinion actually contemplates and requires analysis of the officer's subjective motivation and therefore comports with this Note's test. Part II then fully describes the subjective motivation prong of this Note's test; it outlines which objective factors are most probative of the officer's subjective intent. Part III outlines the objective reasonableness prong of this Note's test; it argues that the perceived danger must be both reasonably substantial and reasonably imminent in order to satisfy this prong. Part IV then argues that courts have implicitly or explicitly looked to an officer's subjective motivation and that doing so best comports with the policies of Miranda and Quarles.

1. HOW THE QUARLES OPINION APPROVES OF EXAMINING SUBJECTIVE MOTIVATION

   A very common misinterpretation of the Quarles opinion is that it disclaims entirely any inquiry into an officer's subjective motivation.(12) The courts that have prohibited subjective analysis primarily rely on a single passage in Quarles. Section I.A argues that the context of that passage actually suggests the necessity of a subjective analysis. Section I.B then argues that other parts of the opinion clearly require that the officer has a proper subjective motivation in order for the public safety exception to apply.

   1. Context of the Apparent Disclaimer

      Several commentators and lower courts that have interpreted the Quarles opinion as denying a subjective inquiry rely upon the following language from Quarles: "[T]he availability of [the public safety] exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved."(13) Rather than interpreting this language to mean that an officer's motivation is irrelevant, the immediate context suggests that an arresting officer's improper motivation will not invalidate the public safety exception so long as his actions are also reasonably prompted by a genuine concern for public safety.(14) When an officer has several motives, the presence of an improper motive is not determinative of whether the exception applies.(15)

      The context of the surrounding language in Quarles bears out this interpretation.(16) The Court, in explaining the role subjective analysis should play, anticipated that an officer may have several motives: "Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives -- their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect."(17) The Court listed the first two motives-their own safety and public safety--as appropriate instinctive concerns for an arresting officer by stating that an officer "[u]ndoubtedly . . . would act" based upon them. Thus the Court stated that the appropriate time for a court to apply the exception is when an officer is "placed in Officer Kraft's position"--when he is acting on one of these motives. By permitting the officer to act "perhaps as well" out of an incriminatory purpose, the Court was merely acknowledging the myriad of motivations upon which a police officer may act.

      The next paragraph of the opinion further outlines the appropriate situation for the exception's application and confirms the above analysis. The Court continued: "Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety."(18) The language-"whatever the motivation of individual officers"--might appear to disclaim an analysis of their motivation, but the same sentence clearly states that the exception only applies when the officers on the scene are "reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety." In order to determine whether the officers were prompted by such a concern, a court must engage in a subjective analysis.(19) In this context, the language "whatever the motivation" again appears merely to permit improper motivation in a situation in which a proper motivation is also present.

      When the Court described the proper questions for officers to ask, it again suggested that an investigatory motivation is permissible so long as a concern for safety accompanies it. The Court called for police officers to "distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect."(20) The Court distinguished between these different questions, implying that the former questions--those questions that may be partially motivated by a desire to elicit testimony--are permissible, whereas the latter--those with a sole purpose of incrimination--must be excluded. By limiting impermissible questions to those whose sole purpose is to produce incriminatory evidence, the Court suggested that the purpose behind a permissible question must, at least in part, be a genuine belief in a public safety emergency.(21)

      In applying the exception to the facts of Quarles, the Court confirmed the argument outlined above. The Court investigated the motivation of the arresting officer and permitted an investigatory motivation because a concern for safety was also present. The Court stated: "Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area."(22) The Court acknowledged that an improper motive may have been present--the desire to make a case against the suspect--but held that such a motive was permissible when an officer also had a proper motive, such as the desire to secure a dangerous weapon.(23)

      Several lower courts support this Note's interpretation of Quarles's apparent disclaimer of an inquiry into subjective...