The Prospects of Populism.

• Author: Carroll, Jeffrey M.

The term populism has become a pejorative. In the United States, supporters of Donald Trump are often referred to as populists. Those same supporters labeled Bernie Sanders a populist. It is clear that neither use is intended to be a compliment. It is less clear what is meant by this now derogatory epithet.

The negative connotation tied to the word populism predates contemporary American politics. Although not the first such use, populism appears as the antagonist of William Riker's influential work Liberalism against Populism ([1982] 1988). Riker leaves no doubt that populism is the enemy of liberalism, but there is doubt about precisely who or, better yet, what this enemy is. The first task of this paper is to perform a conceptual analysis of populism. To know whether populism is antithetical to liberalism requires knowing what populism is. (1)

After gaining additional conceptual clarity, the second task of the paper is to assess Riker's contention that liberalism and populism are at odds. Riker's project was not one of conceptual analysis but one of investigating the implications social choice theory has for democratic theory. Although not the first to arrive at this conclusion, I contend that Riker's criticism of populism is not as damning as he suggests.

The final task of the paper is to discuss how James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's (1962) consensus model of justification is actually a promising possibility for a "populist" means of satisfying the justificatory conditions defended by Riker. What we might call ideal populism--which employs a unanimity rule--circumvents criticisms raised by Riker. But is ideal populism actually populism? The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, depends on what conception of populism one employs. If one employs the account put forth at the outset of the paper, then the answer seems to be no.

What Is Populism?

A Google search for the definition of the term populism produces the following result: "a political approach that strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elites." Although vague, this preliminary definition is helpful in that it emphasizes an important aspect of populism: antielitism. Jan-Werner Muller suggests in a book that shares its name with the title of this section that the heterogenous uses of the term populism actually have a common core, which can be more precisely stated as two necessary conditions--one of which is antielitism.

Antielitism: X is populist only if X is critical of elites. (Muller 2016, 2) Antipluralism: X is populist only if X identifies an out-group or set of out-groups that are not part of "the people," properly understood, and claims made by outgroups are illegitimate. (Muller 2016, 3)

The antipluralism condition is what Muller takes to be his contribution to understanding what populism is. Both supporters of Trump and supporters of Sanders are antielitist in some sense, but that alone does not make either a populist. To be a populist requires also being opposed to pluralism. Populists recognize a "people" as well as some group or groups that are not properly part of the "people" whose claims lack legitimacy.

Muller's addition of antipluralism helps make the notion of populism more determinate. However, I believe these two necessary conditions alone leave populism underspecified. A third necessary condition is required.

Antitoleration: X is populist only if X maintains that out-groups cannot consistently hold that their position, p*, is true if it is not the position, p, identified by "the people."

To be clear, populists need not be antitoleration in the sense that they permit violence toward the out-groups. Rather, populists are committed to antitoleration at the level of beliefs. For example, let p be the position that national borders ought to be closed, and let p* be the position that national borders ought to be open. A populist would say that an out-group is making a logical mistake by believing that the opening of national borders is justified given that "the people" settled that national borders should be closed.

Antitoleration is a furtherance of antipluralism. Whereas antipluralism holds that the claims of out-groups lack standing, antitoleration goes further to say that political truths are settled by "the people" and that one is being epistemically irresponsible by not internalizing the conclusions arrived at by "the people." The former is a negative claim about which claims do not matter, whereas the latter is a claim about political truth.

One could accept Muller's antipluralism condition without accepting anti-toleration. Take an out-group such as anarchists. If one accepts only antipluralism, the challenge to state authority by anarchists lacks standing insofar as "the people" conclude that the state has authority. But anarchists could still coherently maintain that the state lacks authority. When the anarchists make their case that the state is unauthoritative, though, there is no need to hear it out. (2)

However, if one accepts antitoleration, too, then anarchists are believing something false when they assert that the state lacks authority. The practical implication of a commitment to antitoleration is that out-groups are not justified in living on their own terms, even when those terms fail to interfere with the lives of parties that compose "the people" because the out-groups' position has been determined to be false. This means that a commitment to antitoleration rules out something like the utopian vision spelled out by Robert Nozick in part 3 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (2013; see also Kukathas 2003).

It seems to me that actual examples of populism are committed to antitoleration. The populist credo would not be that...