The Programmatic Shifts in the PT’s Constitutionalist Agenda (1988–2013)

• Author: Gabriel Funari
• Published date: 01 September 2020
• Date: 01 September 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X20942605
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X20942605

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 234, Vol. 47 No. 5, September 2020, 163–178

DOI: 10.1177/0094582X20942605

© 2020 Latin American Perspectives

163

The Programmatic Shifts in the PT’s

Constitutionalist Agenda (1988–2013)

by

Gabriel Funari

The historical trajectory of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) has been influenced by its

fluctuating policies with regard to the 1988 Constitution and its efforts to mediate the

demands of its marginalized constituents and its commitment to abide by the constituted

distribution of power. Case studies of the PT’s policy proposals during the 1987–1988

constituent assembly and the party’s constitutional plebiscite proposal in response to the

mass protests of June 2013 reveal the unresolved contradictions underpinning constituent

and constituted power that have bound it to the constitutional disputes defining Brazil’s

democratic regime.

A trajetória histórica do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) foi influenciada por suas políticas

flutuantes em relação à Constituição de 1988, em seus esforços para mediar as demandas

de seus constituintes marginalizados e seu compromisso de respeitar a distribuição de

poder constituída. Estudos de caso das propostas de política do PT durante a assembléia

constituinte de 1987-1988 e a proposta de plebiscito constitucional do partido em resposta

aos protestos em massa de junho de 2013 revelam as contradições não resolvidas subjacen-

tes ao constituinte e ao poder constituído que vincularam o partido às disputas constitu-

cionais que definem o regime democrático do Brasil.

Keywords: Brazil, Constitutionalism, Partido dos Trabalhadores, Governance,

Democracy

Understanding contemporary Brazil inevitably involves contending with

the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT). Since the party’s estab-

lishment in 1980, no other political actor has immersed itself so profoundly in

both institutionalized rule and social movements in Brazil. Established during

the waning days of the military dictatorship, the PT grew in tandem with

Brazil’s democratization process by becoming the principal node through

which the politics of alterity was expressed in the country (Baiocchi, 2004). Its

historical progression is intertwined with the formation, consolidation, and

ongoing disputes surrounding Brazil’s democratic regime.

In order to understand the PT’s transformation from an agglomeration of

radical movements to a national ruling party, it is imperative to grasp the par-

ty’s fluctuating policies regarding the 1988 Constitution. Social scientists have

Gabriel Funari is a researcher at the Center for the Study of Violence at the University of São Paulo.

He holds a Master’s degree with distinction in Latin American studies from the University of

Cambridge. He is also a graduate of American University, with a Bachelor’s degree in interna-

tional relations and philosophy.

942605LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X20942605Latin American PerspectivesFunari / Shifts in the PT’s constitutionalist agenda

research-article2020

164 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

neglected these programmatic disputes in favor of its electoral performances

(Avritzer, 2016; Hunter, 2010; Keck, 2010), a historical narrative that aptly iden-

tifies the ideological sacrifices it made to attain power. However, any study of

the PT’s impact on the Brazilian political system must contend with the differ-

ent ways that the party has interpreted and sought to influence constitutional

arrangements.

With that in mind, this study examines two cases in which the PT directly

grappled with the constitution—the party’s participation in the 1987–1988 con-

stituent assembly and President Dilma Rousseff’s proposal to hold a plebiscite

on a new constituent assembly following the mass protests of June 2013. The

theoretical framework of constituent and constituted power helps delineate the

party’s mediation of the demands of its militant base and the logic of institu-

tional governability. Examining the PT in the framework of constituent and

constituted power also exposes the party’s role in reinforcing the two defining

dynamics of Brazilian democracy: the consolidation of democratic institutions

through popular mobilization and the distribution of graft and patronage to

ensure governability. The PT’s constitutionalist shifts illustrate the ceaseless

confrontations between the radical impetus of the party’s militant base and its

insistence on winning political power by abiding by established norms. It is

precisely through these programmatic tensions—those of a radically transfor-

mative political project continuously molded by ordered imperatives—that the

PT’s political power became bound to Brazil’s constitutional regime.

The study utilizes an array of primary and secondary sources to outline the

PT’s policies regarding the 1988 Constitution. Resolutions from party confer-

ences and speeches given by PT delegates during the 1987–1988 constituent

assembly were obtained from the Fundação Perseu Abramo, the think tank

founded and operated by the PT. The June 2013 protests are examined through

news articles that trace the escalation of the street demonstrations and the pleb-

iscite proposal as well as through transcripts obtained from the website of the

Presidency of the Republic of Rousseff’s speeches in response to the protests.

The constituent assembly marked the point at which the PT began to oper-

ate within formal institutions at the national level. Despite holding only 3

percent of the assembly’s seats, the PT successfully advocated for the inclu-

sion of participatory governance mechanisms in the constitutional text

(Keck, 2010). The PT deputies voted against the final constitutional text but

agreed to sign the magna carta (Ribeiro, 2003). By doing so they acknowl-

edged the party’s participation in the deliberative process and signaled their

willingness to collaborate with the newly formed democratic institutions.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s election in 2002 vindicated the PT’s decision to

immerse itself in the mechanisms of government. Nonetheless, in taking

power within the constitutional arrangement set in place in 1988, the PT

increasingly distanced itself from its radical origins. It distributed bribes to

pass legislation, allied itself with conservative parties, and committed to a

market-oriented economic platform (Avritzer, 2017).

The conflict between constituent and constituted power in Brazil erupted

with the massive street protests that broke out throughout the country in June

2013, while the PT’s Dilma Rousseff held the presidency (Nobre, 2013). A central

critical point could be derived from the diverse set of complaints by protesters: