The Problem of "Priority" Unemployment
| Published date | 01 November 1942 |
| Date | 01 November 1942 |
| Author | J. Douglas Brown |
| DOI | 10.1177/000271624222400112 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
69
The
Problem
of "Priority"
Unemployment
By
J.
DOUGLAS
BROWN
THE
displacement
of
labor
due
to
&dquo;priorities&dquo;
is
but
a
phase
of
the
total
problem
of
separating
out
pro-
ductive
factors
engaged
in
less
essential
production
and
reassembling
them
in
the
production
of
goods
with
which
to
fight
a
war.
It
is
an
old
saying
that
one
cannot
make
an
omelet
without
breaking
eggs.
No
more
can
a
nation
bring
together
the
materials,
machinery,
factory
facilities,
management,
and
skilled
labor
for
a
tremendous
surge
of
war
production
without
diverting
the
flow
of
commodities,
stopping
the
manu-
facture
of
thousands
of
products,
and
displacing
for
a
time
thousands
of
work-
ers.
The
negative
aspect
of
curtailment
and
displacement
hurts
so
many
people
that
the
fundamental
character
of
the
process
of
economic
mobilization
for
war
is
often
lost
from
sight.
An
analy-
sis
of
the
character
of
&dquo;priority&dquo;
un-
.
employment
and
of
plans
for
its
allevia-
tion
must
be
an
analysis
of
the
labor
aspects
of
economic
mobilization
as
a
whole
if
one
is
to
avoid
half-baked
con-
clusions
and
proposals.
The
expression
&dquo;priority
unemploy-
ment&dquo;
grew
out
of
the
first
type
of
war
restriction
on
industry
which
seri-
ously
affected
employment.
As
pro-
spective
shortages
of
materials
like
aluminum
or
nickel
were
recognized,
essential
users
were
given
priority
in
obtaining
a
part
of
the
limited
supply.
Users
without
priority
ratings
began
to
find
the
supplies
available
to
them
in-
sufficient
to
maintain
normal
produc-
tion.
Such
industries
as
aluminum
die
casting
and
nickel
plating
were
ad-
versely
affected.
At
this
stage,
the
emphasis
was
on
the
shortage
of
mate-
rials
rather
than
on
the
total
process
of
conversion
of
industry
to
war
pro-
duction.
ALLOCATION
OF
MATERIALS
To
assure
adequate
supplies
of
strate-
gic
materials
to
war
producers,
it
soon
became
necessary
to
go
beyond
the
stage
of
priority
assistance
and
to
allo-
cate
definite
amounts
of
materials
to
specific
uses
and
concerns.
As
the
to-
tal
supply
of
a
particular
material
came
under
allocation,
the
lot
of
ci-
vilian
industry
using
that
material
be-
came
more
serious.
In
the
case
of
some
materials,
such
as
raw
silk,
it
became
necessary
to
cut
off
nonmilitary
uses
with
drastic
suddenness.
To
the
extent
normal
users
of
allocated
mate-
rials
could
find
substitutes,
facilities
and
labor
were
not
converted
to
war
production.
When
substitutes
were
not
available,
however,
manufacturing
plants
throughout
the
country
began
to
be
shut down
in
a
hit-or-miss
manner
according
to
the
amount
of
raw
material
previously
in
inventory
or
the
ability
to
shift
to
war
production.
While
priority
and
allocation
orders
served
a
useful
purpose
in
diverting
materials
to
war
production,
their
ef-
fect
in
shifting
facilities
and
manpower
was
slow,
uncertain,
and
inefficient.
No
one
could
foretell
the
precise
plants,
or
even
the
precise
industries,
that
might
be
affected
by
the
shutting
off
of
a
single
raw
material.
For
example,
a
diversion
of
copper
at
the
source
might
affect
such
widely
different
in-
dustries
as
photoengraving,
zipper
mak-
ing, ’
and
ornamental
coffin
making.
There
was
no
assurance
that
either
the
facilities
or
the
manpower
released
would
be
of
the
right
kind
or
in
the
right
location
to
be
used
in
war
pro-
duction.
Useless
facilities
were
released
along
with
the
useful.
Men
and
man-
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