The price of speed: how seven county accelerates nepa retrenchment and redistributes risk

• Pages: 10213-10230
• Date: 01 May 2026
• Published date: 01 May 2026
• Author: Kelley Xuereb
• Subject Matter: Derecho del Medio Ambiente

MAY/JUNE 2026 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 56 ELR 10213

THE PRICE OF SPEED:

HOW SEVEN COUNTY ACCELERATES

NEPA RETRENCHMENT AND

REDISTRIBUTES RISK

by Kelley Xuereb

Kelley Xuereb is a 2026 graduate of the University of California, Davis School of Law.

In 2025, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

entered the most consequential period of retrenchment

in its 55-year history. In a single year, the U.S. Supreme

Court, the Donald Trump Administration, and bipartisan

lawmakers took coordinated steps to dra matically curta il

NEPA, codifying a unique political convergence around

the premise that environmental review bott lenecks prog-

ress. at premise did not emerge in a vacuum. It grew, in

part, from good-faith calls for faster construction of hous-

ing, public transportation, and clean energy, popula rized

by “abundance” advocates seeking to remove barriers to

development. NEPA’s swift retrenchment illustrates how

the Trump Administration is co-opting reformist momen-

tum to erode core procedural safeguards without assuring

material public benets.

is Comment does not question the importance of

addressing energy and infrastructure shortages. It instead

argues that wea kening NEPA as a mechanism to achieve

those goals redistributes, rather than reduces, the costs of

development. As a purely procedural statute, NEPA was

designed to surface risks and force careful consideration

of environmental and community impacts. It was born

from an era dened by miles of oil-slicked beaches, rivers

contaminated with radioactive waste, small towns devas-

tated by disaster, and human lives lost. is hi story shows

that the price of speed cannot be framed in economic

terms alone.

Part I explores NEPA retrenchment within the rise of the

“abundance movement” and its unique bipartisan appeal.

Part II traces NEPA’s inception and evolution into the sta-

ble procedural framework that structured federal decision-

making for over ve decades. Parts III and IV examine t he

swift erosion of that framework through actions including

the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County

decision1 a nd Trump’s E xecutive Order No. 14154.2

Part V pauses amid this doctrinal whiplash to reect

on NEPA’s public health and environmental successes

beyond binary economic frames. Part V I revisits uranium

mining in Utah and oshore drilling in Southern Cali-

fornia in light of permitting reform, revealing a familiar

reality where growth is privati zed and risk is public. Part

VII c oncludes.

I. The Abundance Movement Calls

for Regulatory and Permitting

Reform to Promote Development

A. Abundance as a Response

to Perceived Stagnation

e cover of Abundance, written by journalists Ezra K lein

and Derek ompson, depicts utopian skyrises existing

harmoniously alongside lush forests, a sky blue river, and

solar panel-lined elds. e book chronicles how Ameri-

ca’s well-intended anti-growth policies of the 1970s now

stymie solutions to modern problems: aordable housing,

energy infrast ructure, and a robust workforce.3 Instead, t he

authors propose a ird Way policy framework to address

the “shortage of what’s needed to build a good life.”4

Isotopes of Ronald Reagan-era conser vatism, New Deal

policies, a nd the YI MBY movement5 can all be found in

the abundance movement. Born from “deep frustration

over Democratic leaders’ inability to bui ld enough hous-

ing, provide clean streets, lower the cost of living a nd instill

a sense of safety amid a drug addiction epidemic,” the

movement turns on the idea that progress depends on reg-

1. 605 U.S. 168 (2025).

2. Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025).

3. See E K  D T, A (1st ed. 2025).

4. Id. at 20.

5. “YIMBY” stands for Yes, In My Backyard, which is a pro-housing social

movement. See California YIMBY, About Us, https://cayimby.org/about-us

(last visited Apr. 6, 2026).

Authors’ Note: A special thank you to Prof. Karrigan Börk

for his insights and guidance throughout this process, to

Prof. Albert Lin for his support, and to the friends and family

who reviewed drafts and encouraged this publication.

Copyright © 2026 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, https://www.eli.org

56 ELR 10214 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER MAY/JUNE 2026

ulatory reform.6 e term abundance was rst popularized

in a 2022 article by ompson, diagnosing “manufactured

scarcity” across health c are, housing, higher education,

transportation, a nd energy sectors.7 ompson’s subse-

quent newsletter, and later the publication of Abundance,

lled out a policy agend a grounded in supply-side expan-

sion through accelerated permitting, looser zoning, incen-

tivized capital investment, and streamlined regulations.8

Proponents of the abundance movement frame it as a

bipartisan alternative to the sta le binary of spend more ver-

sus cut more. ompson says he would “prefer to focus on

... perhaps the real problem: a national failure to increase

the supply of essential goods.”9 Critics note that the move-

ment’s top donors include billionaires like Michael Bloom-

berg and the Walton family, who stand to benet from

deregulation in ways reminiscent of the Rea gan-era dereg-

ulator y agenda.10 To these crit ics, the abunda nce movement

seems like a push for deregulation coupled with a latter-day

version of trickle-down economics, which, although pro-

moted as a path to broad economic prosperity, dispropor-

tionately beneted capital-rich industry.11

B. Emergence of a Bipartisan Consensus

for Permitting Reform

e abundance movement’s deregulatory ambitions c ol-

lide with the purpose of the modern administrative state.

Expanded through t he 1960s and 1970s, the administrative

state’s “animating obsessions were things that it wanted to

prevent from happening, such as racial and gender discr im-

ination, nuclear disasters, highways through central cities,

6. Dustin Gardiner, How California’s Excesses Inspired the “Abundance” Craze,

P (Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/27/

california-abundance-craze-00253159.

7. Derek ompson, A Simple Plan to Solve All of America’s Problems, A-

 (Jan. 12, 2022), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/01/

scarcity-crisis-college-housing-health-care/621221.

8. K & T, supra note 3.

9. ompson, supra note 7.

10. Henry Burke & Vishal Shankar, Who’s Behind Abundance Coachella?, R-

 D P (June 3, 2025), https://therevolvingdoorproject.

org/welcomefest/ (relying on publicly available data from the Federal

Election Commission). is report analyzed donors and speakers at Wel-

comeFest, a centrist-Democrat conference that “convenes elected ocials,

media gures, journalists, and thought leaders to chart a new path forward

for our party” and included Abundance co-author ompson. Id.; Welcome.

team, Home Page, https://www.welcome.team (last visited Apr. 6, 2026).

e report’s authors criticized the lineup, which included, for example,

LinkedIn cofounder Reid Homan, who “strongly opposed the Biden ad-

ministration’s anti-monopoly policies.” Burke & Shankar, supra. ey argue,

“[g]iven the WelcomeFest lineup, it’s clear that the donor class views Abun-

dance as key to carrying out this self-serving crusade against populism.” Id.

Abundance co-author Klein has acknowledged these criticisms, but said “I

don’t believe, even if I would like to get money out of politics, we are go-

ing to get money out of politics in a full-on way, and end oligarchy, on the

pace we need to decarbonize. We have to build things in the next couple

years.” Ezra Klein, Abundance and the Left, N.Y. T (Apr. 29, 2025),

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/29/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-saikat-

chakrabarti-zephyr-teachout.html (transcript from e Ezra Klein Show).

11. See, e.g., David Jacobs & Lindsey Myers, Union Strength, Neoliberalism,

and Inequality: Contingent Political Analyses of U.S. Income Dierences Since

1950, 79 A. S. R. 752 (2014); M S, C 

E  P R, A S H  F D-

   U S (2009).

industrial accidents, dangerous toys, and environmental

pollu ti on.” 12 e U.S. Congress responded to these failures

with a wave of prevention-oriented agencies, including the

National Highway Trac Safety Administration (1970),

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1970),

Occupational Safety a nd Health Administration (1971),

and Consumer Product Safety Commission (1972).

Today, a growing sense that the modern administrative

state is unworkable has helped catalyz e the rise of the abun-

dance movement. In May 2025, over 30 lawmakers formed

the bipartisan Build A merica Caucus. Rep. Josh Harder

(D-Cal.) described the group’s intent as “making sure that

things are built faster, better, cheaper.”13 In June, Califor-

nia Gov. Gavin Newsom tweeted that his administration

is “urgently embracing an abundance agenda.”14 e gov-

ernor’s tweet celebrated passage of A.B. 130 and S.B. 131,

which codify st atutory exemptions for urban inll housing

developments under the California Environmental Qual-

ity Act (CEQA).15 ey follow S.B. 149’s passage in 2023,

which gave courts a 270-day window to resolve CEQA

challenges in an e ort to streamline lawsu its.16 Meanwh ile,

organizations lik e the Abunda nce Network a nd Abun-

dance Elected Network are attracting hundreds of mem-

bers across the country for “government that gets results.”17

e abundance agenda may have found an al ly in

the nation’s highest court. In a landmark 2025 decision,

Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, the

Supreme Court oered a critique of NEPA that, while

not doctrinally novel, was notable for its adoption of pro-

abundance rhetoric. On behalf of a 5-3 majority, Justice

Brett Kavanaugh wrote, “[a] 1970 legislative acorn has

grown over the years into a judicial oak that ha s hindered

infrastruc ture development ‘under the guise’ of just a little

more proces s.”18 His opinion framed NEPA as a proce-

dural burden rather than an environmental tool, import-

12. Robert Saldin & Steven Teles, e Rise of the Abundance Faction, N

C. (June 4, 2024), https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-rise-of-the-

abundance-faction/.

13. Nicolas Wu & Holly Otterbein, House Democrat Starts “Abundance

Movement”-Inspired Caucus, P (May 8, 2025), https://www.politico.

com/news/2025/05/08/house-democrat-abundance-caucus-00333760.

14. Governor Gavin Newsom (@CAgovernor), X (June 30, 2025, 8:31PM),

https://x.com/CAgovernor/status/1939889648744206429.

15. Mack Carlson et al., CEQA Inll Exemptions and “Near Miss” Streamlin-

ing—A Concrete Fix for California’s Housing Crisis?, B (July

16, 2025), https://www.bhfs.com/insight/ceqa-inll-exemptions-and-near-

miss-streamlining-a-concrete-x-for-californias-housing-crisis/.

16. On November 6, 2023, Governor Newsom certied the Sites Reservoir

Project, making it the rst project certied under S.B. 149. Press Release,

Sites Reservoir Project, California Certies Sites Reservoir Under Senate

Bill 149 for Streamlined Judicial Review (Nov. 6, 2023), https://sitesproject.

org/press-releases/press-release-california-certies-sites-reservoir/. Sites is an

o-stream reservoir with a 1.5-million-acre-feet storage capacity. Id. Envi-

ronmental groups have raised concerns over its ecological implications. See,

e.g., Press Release, Friends of the River, Conservation Groups Undaunted

by Court Ruling: Sites Reservoir Is a Bad Deal for Rivers, for Fish, and for

California (June 5, 2024), https://www.friendsoftheriver.org/wp-content/

uploads/2024/06/2024-06-05-PRS-RLS_Envi-Grps-Respond-to-Sites-

Ruling.pdf. See S.B. 149, 2023-2024 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2023).

17. Abundance Network, Home Page, https://www.abundancenetwork.com/

(last visited Apr. 6, 2026).

18. Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 184 (2025).

Copyright © 2026 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, https://www.eli.org