The Pragmatic Justifications for Extending Additional Statutory Protection to Animals.

• Author: Prober, Clare

"The history of the world will, one day, be defined by the people who witnessed the tragedy of impending extinction and were able to turn humanity's destructive patterns into creative solutions." (1)

1. INTRODUCTION

   Human beings began domesticating animals around 3500 b.c.e. (2) People have relied on the companionship and consumption of animals for survival, and our relationship with animals has evolved alongside our own genetic and societal evolution. (3) Yet what has not evolved--or at least not comprehensively enough--is the protection we offer the animals that we share our lives with and depend on. (4) Human beings globally exploit animals to further their own interests with little to no regard for the pain and suffering we cause them. (5) This Article advances the position that such rampant exploitation of animals needs to end because our actions are also profoundly hurting us. There are admittedly many moral and philosophical reasons for why human beings need to end the systematic exploitation of animals, and this Article will explore those justifications. (6) Philosophers and ethicists, however, have been advancing moral theories of animal welfare for decades with little-to-no-luck convincing the general public to change its exploitative ways. (7) Instead, this Article will primarily explore the human-centric reasons for why our society needs to stop exploiting animals, and why we must grant animals greater legal protections.

   Part II of this Article will provide a detailed overview of animals' current treatment under American law. (8) Part III will outline three philosophical and moral theories that accommodate and argue for an extension of broader legal protections for animals. (9) Part IV will advance the non-moral reasons for extending animals protections. (10) Specifically, Section IV.A will focus on the reasons for extending further protections to companion animals. (11) Then, Section IV.B will provide justifications for extending statutory protections for animals raised for consumption, and will ultimately advance the position that advocates for the phasing out of factory farms. (12) Finally, Part V will conclude this Article. (13)

2. OVERVIEW OF ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

   American law treats all animals as personal property. (14) Personal property is defined as "[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not classified as real property." (15) Because animals are considered a type of property, they have virtually no independent legal protections, and any remedies the law affords on their behalf exist merely as an extension of human property rights. (16) Given human beings' historic use of animals for food, hunting, clothing, and experimentation, animals' legal classification as personal property is not surprising--otherwise, it would be incredibly difficult to justify and continue using animals for our benefit to the degree to which our society has become accustomed to. (17)

   1. Consequences of Property Designation on Companion Animals

      1. Market Value Damages

         The American legal system's designation of animals as property has many far-reaching consequences on how people may get justice for their animals when someone causes them harm. (18) Due to animals' property classification, humans have extremely limited options when they sue on behalf of their companion animals. (19) For instance, a person whose companion animal is either injured or killed through the acts of another can traditionally only recover economic damages to compensate for the harm caused to the animal. (20) This is because noneconomic damages are generally not available to people whose only injury involves property damage. (21) When a companion animal is injured or killed, a plaintiff can generally recover economic damages based on the animal's fair market value to restore the plaintiff back to the position he or she would have been in prior to when the animal's injury or death occurred. (22) Because courts generally use the animal's pedigree and breed to help identify its market value, in cases where the animal is considered mixed breed, the market value is typically very low. (23) In such instances, some courts may determine the animal's "actual value" instead of its "market value" by calculating the amount of money the plaintiff spent on vet bills, other "previous expenditures[,] and future economic losses." (24)

      2. Infliction of Emotional Distress and Loss of Companionship Damages

         Because plaintiffs whose animals are injured or killed generally cannot recover noneconomic damages, they cannot recover for emotional or psychological pain experienced as a result of their companion animal's injury or death. (25) Nevertheless, some jurisdictions allow plaintiffs to recover under a theory of infliction of emotional distress, which aims to compensate plaintiffs for the pain and suffering they experience as a result of their companion animal's injury or death. (26) Recovery for infliction of emotional distress in such instances is jurisdiction-specific. (27) Some jurisdictions are more willing to allow a plaintiff to recover damages under intentional infliction of emotional distress where the defendant intentionally injured or killed the animal, and where the plaintiff saw the act occur. (28) Although there are also jurisdictions that allow recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, they are in the minority, and often require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's actions were grossly negligent or reckless. (29) Finally, a minority of jurisdictions allow plaintiffs to recover for loss of companionship--namely "to help [the plaintiff] 'fill the void' created by the loss of a loved one." (30)

   2. Consequences of Property Designation on Animals Raised for Consumption

      Currently, no federal laws exist that enforce or regulate "humane care standards for animals in factory farms." (31) The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), however, regulates animal food production in the country through sub-agency programs. (32) The USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) administers "the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and the Animal Care Program (ACP)." (33) The ACP "[r]egulates food safety and slaughter of food production animals[,] ... [e]nsures quality of the nation's commercial supply of meat, poultry, and egg products[,] ... [and] [e]nsures the labels of meat, poultry, and egg products are truthful and accurate." (34) Yet farm animals' living conditions are not subject to federal regulations, and are exclusively dictated by state law. (35) Currently, only twelve out of fifty states have enacted any laws extending limited protections to animals raised for consumption. (36)

3. PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING LEGAL PROTECTIONS TO ANIMALS

   Although this Article primarily advances practical and human-centric justifications for extending greater legal protections to animals, it is important to note that philosophers and ethicists have written volumes on philosophical and moral reasons to justify such extensions. The following sections will briefly survey three of the leading moral and philosophical arguments in favor of granting animals additional protections. (37)

   1. Animals Can Feel Pain and Experience Profound Suffering

      Animals are physiologically capable of feeling pain. Pain is a phenomenon "involving sensory and emotional components: [I]t is not just about how [something] feels, but also how it makes you feel." (38) While many people agree that animals likely experience the physiological aspects of pain, some still debate whether animals have the necessary cognitive ability to recognize their own pain. (39) Science, however, is moving in a direction that recognizes animals' ability to comprehend the pain they feel--both physically and cognitively. (40) Such a recognition of animals' ability to understand pain exists because scientists are finally researching animals' ability to experience a range of complex emotions we historically believed only humans were capable of experiencing. (41) This means that animals are certainly able to cognitively appreciate the gravity of their circumstances when they are being abused, neglected, and when they are awaiting their slaughter--as in the case of animals raised for consumption. (42)

      Thus, because animals are capable of feeling pain, experiencing suffering, and understanding their pain and suffering, many philosophers and ethicists argue they should be legally protected from experiencing routine and profound pain and suffering. (43)

   2. Human Connection to Animal Companions Goes Beyond Mere Property Rights

      Anybody who has ever loved and lost a companion animal can attest to the overwhelming trauma a human being endures upon the death of his or her animal. (44) This is because humans form incredibly strong bonds with their companion animals, which are often stronger than their human-to-human bonds. (45) Human-animal relationships are not just simple companionships, but actually consist of multiple separate types of codependent relationships. (46) Companion animals provide people with unconditional love, develop codependent routines with their humans, and provide scientifically-measurable support during difficult times. (47) In fact, people frequently refer to their companion animals as their "children" because the care and investment people dedicate to these relationships mirror what parents do for human children. (48) The law, however, fails to account for the profoundly personal and intimate relationships people form with their companion animals. (49) Thus, a logical extension of the fact that animals form incredibly close bonds with humans is to require greater legal protections that account for animals' inherent value as companions. This can be done by extending the ability for human beings to file wrongful death suits on behalf of their animals; broadening the scope of tort liability to allow recovery for...