The Power of Humanitarian Narratives: A Domestic Coalition Theory of Justifications for Military Action

• Published date: 01 September 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912919852169
• Date: 01 September 2020
• Author: Sarah Maxey
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919852169

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Article

In October 2001, weeks after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,

George W. Bush (2001) presented US intervention in

Afghanistan as “a sustained campaign to drive the terror-

ists out of their hidden caves and to bring them to jus-

tice.” By employing security frames, he joined a tradition

of presidents using rhetoric about the United States’ well-

being to rally public support and limit opportunities for

dissent (Brody 1991; Drezner 2008; Krebs and Lobasz

2007; Western 2005). In the same speech, however, Bush

(2001) immediately followed this security rationale with

a humanitarian appeal, noting, “At the same time, we are

showing the compassion of America by delivering food

and medicine to the Afghan people, who are, themselves,

the victims of a repressive regime.” Such humanitarian

justifications offer a helpful alternative explanation when

there is “no obvious national interest at stake for states

bearing the burden of intervention” (Finnemore 2003,

52), but critics and proponents alike expect them to be

less effective than security claims. From this view,

humanitarian justifications should have little influence on

public opinion toward interventions like Afghanistan

because support is already maximized by security frames.

But Bush’s rhetoric is not unique—US presidents have

used humanitarian narratives in their explanations for

every military intervention of the post-Cold War period.

What, if any, benefits do presidents receive for offering

humanitarian justifications for security-driven interven-

tions? Are humanitarian narratives inconsequential when

US security is at stake?

I argue that humanitarian justifications play an under-

appreciated and critical role in mobilizing domestic sup-

port, even in security interventions. Uncovering the

power of humanitarian narratives requires moving

beyond aggregate analysis—focused on whether anyone

responds to humanitarian claims—to ask who responds to

these appeals and under what conditions. I develop a

domestic coalition framework that evaluates the effec-

tiveness of humanitarian frames in the context of who

presidents most need to persuade in the build-up to inter-

vention. Drawing new implications from the public’s

852169PRQXXX10.1177/1065912919852169Political Research QuarterlyMaxey

research-article2019

1Loyola University Chicago, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Sarah Maxey, Loyola University Chicago, 1032 W. Sheridan Road,

Chicago, IL 60660, USA.

Email: smaxey@luc.edu

The Power of Humanitarian Narratives:

A Domestic Coalition Theory of

Justifications for Military Action

Sarah Maxey1

Abstract

Conventional wisdom assumes the best way to mobilize public support for military action is through the lens of

national security. Humanitarian justifications provide a helpful substitute when US interests are not at stake, but are

less reliable. However, US presidents have provided humanitarian explanations for every military intervention of the

post-Cold War period. What, if any, power do humanitarian justifications have in security-driven interventions? The

article answers this question by developing a domestic coalition framework that evaluates justifications in terms of

whose support matters most in the build-up to intervention. Survey experiments demonstrate that humanitarian

narratives are necessary to build the largest possible coalition of support. However, presidents risk backlash if they

stretch humanitarian claims too far. Data from thirteen waves of Chicago Council surveys and an original dataset

of justifications for US interventions confirm that humanitarian justifications are a common and politically relevant

tool. The findings challenge both the folk realist expectation that the public responds primarily to threats to its own

security and the constructivist tendency to limit the power of humanitarian justifications to cases of humanitarian

intervention. Instead, humanitarian justifications are equally, if not more, important than security explanations for

mobilizing domestic support, even in security-driven interventions.

Keywords

military interventions, humanitarian, public opinion, presidents

Maxey 681

foreign policy beliefs (FPBs), I identify cooperative

internationalists as key players in domestic coalitions.

Humanitarian narratives are powerful, effective tools in

security interventions because they are necessary to max-

imize cooperative internationalists’ support.

The argument raises three questions: (1) who responds

to humanitarian considerations, (2) are these individuals

a non-negligible segment of the public, and (3) do presi-

dents provide humanitarian justifications for security

interventions in a manner that capitalizes on their power?

I use a multi-method design to address each question on

its own terms. First, survey experiments vary the content

of justifications for intervention to investigate whether

humanitarian claims persuade individuals who are less

convinced by security frames. The findings demonstrate

that there are individuals—cooperative international-

ists—whose support is maximized by humanitarian rather

than security considerations. Contrary to early scholar-

ship that viewed a public responsive to humanitarian

claims as too emotional to be trusted (Almond 1950;

Lippmann 1955; Morgenthau 1978), the results suggest

individuals can be humanitarian and prudent. Cooperative

internationalists are responsive to humanitarian claims,

but they are also sensitive to their misuse. Second, I use

data from thirteen waves of the Chicago Council Survey

to determine whether cooperative internationalist values

are common enough to matter for coalition building. The

findings suggest that the magnitude of cooperative inter-

nationalist sentiment is non-negligible. Appealing to

cooperative values is thus worthwhile for leaders trying

to build the largest possible coalition. Third, I construct

an original dataset of justifications for US interventions

to determine whether presidents take advantage of the

power of humanitarian narratives. The analysis confirms

that humanitarian appeals are common, carefully used

tools in security interventions.

The findings show that conventional wisdom underes-

timates the power and scope of humanitarian narratives.

Focusing on how leaders can build the largest possible

domestic coalitions challenges the folk realist expecta-

tion that the public responds primarily to security threats

and the constructivist tendency to evaluate humanitarian

justifications only in cases of humanitarian intervention.

Instead, making a compelling humanitarian case is as

important as demonstrating clear links to the national

interest and these narratives are a critical mobilizing tool

in security interventions.

Presidents and Public Opinion

Formation

Official justifications for intervention deserve attention

because presidents’ statements influence how the public

evaluates their leadership and policies (Cavari 2012;

Druckman and Holmes 2004; Nelson and Oxley 1999).

Unlike other domestic actors, presidents can “use the

mass media to speak directly and at length to the general

public” (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, 238). Their

messages are communicated directly through publicly

televised addresses and repeated via media coverage and

responses from other elites (Berinsky and Kinder 2006,

641). These messages shape public opinion through a

combination of (1) persuasion—changing the content of

beliefs, (2) framing—changing the importance of beliefs

used to evaluate an issue, and (3) priming—changing the

accessibility of considerations (Nelson and Oxley 1999;

Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Zaller 1992).

Presidential statements carry amplified influence at

the beginning of interventions because of information

and first-mover advantages (Baum and Groeling 2010;

Kernell 1997, 194; Western 2005, 14). The president’s

decision to make a statement sends the initial cue that the

conflict is important enough to warrant a military

response. The president’s account may also be the only

one available in the early stages of intervention because

elites lack both access to classified information and polit-

ical incentives to challenge official claims (Baum and

Groeling 2010; Kriner 2009, 668; Schultz 2003). In this

low-information environment with a public “highly sen-

sitive to questions of war” (Western 2005, 14), the presi-

dent’s early statements frame the intervention and set the

terms of the debate that follows. An extensive body of

scholarship shows that official frames affect public atti-

tudes on issues ranging from free speech to environmen-

tal protection (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman

et al. 2010; Druckman and Holmes 2004; Nelson and

Oxley 1999; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). The

frame the president uses can shape public views by mak-

ing certain factors more accessible or important in evalu-

ations of the policy or by changing the content of

individuals’ beliefs altogether (Druckman et al. 2010;

Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Zaller 1992).

Over time, more information about the intervention

becomes available and elite consensus plays an important

role in maintaining public support (Berinsky 2007;

Guisinger and Saunders 2017). Even as presidents lose

their monopoly over information, however, Cavari (2012,

337) finds evidence that by using their first-mover advan-

tage, “presidents generate a momentum of public support

that may have a long-term effect on the structure of mass

opinion.” In addition to creating public momentum, early

frames are reiterated throughout the intervention and

affect the claims opponents focus on discrediting. For

example, Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis (2003, 571) show that

many Americans held “misperceptions relevant to the

rationales for going to war with Iraq” in line with Bush’s

initial justifications. The persistence of these beliefs and