The Politics of Presidential Agendas

• DOI: 10.1177/106591290505800206
• Author: Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha
• Published date: 01 June 2005
• Date: 01 June 2005
• Subject Matter: Articles

The Politics of Presidential Agendas
MATTHEW ESHBAUGH-SOHA, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY
Past research holds that if presidents are to increase their success in Congress, they must set the policy agenda
in their favor. But what determines the propensity of presidents to propose or support different policies?
Because presidents influence the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, presidents develop their yearly
domestic policy agendas in anticipation of each policy’s success or failure in Congress. After all, presidents
want to emphasize their strengths to achieve their goal of policy enactment in Congress. From this assump-
tion, I devise a typology of long-term and important presidential policies, and argue that political limitations
and fiscal constraints influence the president’s yearly domestic policy agenda. I show that presidents offer dif-
ferent types of policies as part of their yearly domestic agendas given Congressional makeup and the federal
budget deficit.
The president’s agenda is of immense importance to Two scholars have explored the determinants of the pres-
American politics. Several argue that presidents
ident’s policy agenda. Light (1999) notes that information,
have substantial influence over the agenda-setting
expertise, and political capital are a premium in the presi-
stage of the policy process (Baumgartner and Jones 1993;
dent’s agenda decisions, and that presidents have the most
Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon 1995; Schattsneider 1960).
potential to shape the legislative agenda early in their
Others maintain that the way presidents package their
tenure. He shows how these factors influence the types of
agenda explains much of their eventual success or failure in
policies on the president’s agenda, without confirming his
Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989; Jones
inferences through hypothesis testing (see King 1993).
1994; Light 1999; Neustadt 1990). The implication of
Peterson (1990) also studies the president’s agenda. He ana-
these works is that presidents anticipate the contextual
lyzes the contextual environment and its impact on whether
environment and, when it is favorable, will be successful in
presidents prefer large or small, and new or old policies.
Congress. Edwards (1989: 146) argues that the president
Although he finds that the Congressional environment is
may be successful given a strategically packaged agenda
important in the president’s agenda decisions, seemingly rel-
and a favorable contextual environment, while the “the
evant variables such as the federal budget deficit are statis-
president’s greatest influence over policy comes from the
tically insignificant.
agenda he pursues and the way it is packaged” (Bond and
The underlying premise of agenda-setting research is
Fleisher 1990: 230).
that the president should be able to package policy prior-
Despite scholarly consensus that agenda setting is impor-
ities so as to increase the likelihood of their adoption.
tant to American politics and presidential-Congressional
Doing so may require presidents to assess the probability
relations, previous research relies on the assertion that
that a proposal will be successful depending on contextual
agenda setting is important to presidential relations with
circumstances, such as Congressional makeup. Neverthe-
Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989), without
less, Peterson (1990: 207-08) finds little impact of the
providing empirical support for if and how presidents
contextual environment on presidential policies, bringing
strategically package their domestic policy agendas. Indeed,
into question the conventional wisdom that presidents can
these works do not answer one important question: what
package their agendas strategically to increase their suc-
determines the president’s propensity to propose or support
cess in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards
different types of policies?
1989). With this in mind, I rely on agenda-setting and
anticipative reactions theories to argue that fiscal and
political factors should affect the content of the president’s
yearly domestic policy agenda from 1949-2000. Lacking
NOTE: I thank the comments of three anonymous reviewers for revisions
any readily available data source to test this argument, I
on this draft, B. Dan Wood, Kenneth J. Meier, George C. Edwards,
III, Jon R. Bond, and Cary R. Covington for comments helpful to
also advance a new policy typology that categorizes
the development of this article; Valerie Heitshusen and Garry
domestic policies across both time and importance dimen-
Young for guidance in the genesis of this project; and Jeffrey S.
sions. I use the number of yearly policies for each policy
Peake for providing a list of failed important legislation. RATS
type (major, minor, incremental, and meteoric) as dependent
5.01, and E-views 4.1 were used for statistical analysis. An earlier
variables in four separate analyses. To account for the
version of this work was presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, April 2001. It
yearly changes in the political environment, I offer a time-
was awarded the APSA Presidency Research Section Founders
series analysis of several hypotheses. I argue that presi-
Award for the Best Graduate Student Paper on the Presidency,
dents seek to optimize their domestic policy preferences,
2000-2001.
and because their success depends on broad legislative
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 2 (June 2005) pp: 257-268
cooperation, presidents anticipate the reaction of Congress
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258
POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
and support or propose different policies accordingly in
policy agenda. Scholars have long echoed E. E.
their yearly domestic policy agendas.1
Schattschneider’s (1960) proclamation that presidents are
key actors in expanding the scope of conflict and affecting
THEORY
the “definition of alternatives.” Neustadt (1960) agrees
when he writes that legislators need priorities from the pres-
Three areas of theory—presidential goals, agenda setting,
ident. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) also imply that the
and anticipative reactions—provide a useful framework for
president’s national stature allows him to set the national
discussing the determinants of the president’s domestic policy
policy agenda. Similarly, Kingdon (1995: 23) claims that
agenda,2 including a justification for why a time-importance
“the president can single handedly set the agendas, not only
policy typology is useful for assessing the president’s strategy
of people in the executive branch, but also of people in
in determining his yearly domestic policy agenda.
Congress and outside the government.” Even though
Edwards and Wood (1999) show that presidents have some
Presidential Goals
difficulty setting Congress’ agenda across several policy
areas, Edwards and Barrett (2000) demonstrate that presi-
The guiding force behind the president’s actions while in
dents can secure agenda space for nearly all of their signifi-
office is goal achievement. Presidents essentially have three
cant initiatives.
goals—policy enactment, reelection, and historical recogni-
Presidents who secure agenda space for their policies tend
tion (Light 1999)—that they hope to achieve while in office.
to increase their policy success in Congress. Covington,
Of primary concern to presidents when they submit their
Wrighton, and Kinney (1995) show that presidents have
domestic policy agenda is the enactment of that agenda.
greater success on initiatives that are on rather than off their
Although reelection and historical recognition may influ-
agenda. Edwards and Barrett (2000) find that over 60 per-
ence the policies presidents propose or support, presidents
cent of the president’s initiatives passed either the House or
need a policy record on which to run and be reelected, and
the Senate, even though just 42 percent became law. Clearly,
by which they may be remembered historically.3 Reelection
a president’s first step in achieving his policy goals is framing
and historical recognition are also term-specific goals—
the available alternatives. But because the partisan makeup
presidents pursue reelection during their first term and
of Congress drives the success of presidential initiatives
strive for a legacy in their second. Policy enactment per-
(Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997), presidents must con-
vades the president’s entire tenure and helps presidents in
sider the politics of Congress—and the contextual environ-
the achievement of their other goals.
ment—when figuring their yearly domestic policy agendas.
Agenda-Setting
Anticipative Reactions
To meet their policy goals, presidents need to emphasize
To optimize policy goal achievement through Congress,
an important source of political power, influence over the
presidents must anticipate what impact the contextual envi-
ronment may have on their eventual legislative success as
1
they support or propose different types of policies.
I examine only domestic policies for three reasons. First, both Light
(1999) and Peterson (1990: 27), upon whom this project builds, restrict
Undoubtedly, “the president’s program really (is) presiden-
their analyses to domestic policy. Second, there seem to be different fac-
tial,” (Peterson 1990: 33), and a president usually only con-
tors that explain domestic and foreign policies, with presidents being
sults with legislators after they decide on a policy’s content
more successful on foreign policy roll-call votes, at...