The Politics of Hidden Policy: Feedback Effects and the Charitable Contributions Deduction

AuthorKelly L. Russell
Published date01 March 2018
Date01 March 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218754504
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218754504
Politics & Society
2018, Vol. 46(1) 53 –80
© 2018 SAGE Publications
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DOI: 10.1177/0032329218754504
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Article
The Politics of Hidden
Policy: Feedback Effects
and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction
Kelly L. Russell
University of Michigan
Abstract
Policy feedback, or the process in which policies create constituencies vested in
their maintenance, is a durable feature of the American welfare state. Scholars have
shown that policy visibility conditions how feedback effects unfold: for public-private
policies—arrangements in which the state delegates service provision to private actors,
often described as “hidden” or “submerged”—policy feedback typically galvanizes not
citizens but market actors that benefit indirectly from these subsidies. This article
extends theories of public-private policy feedback from market actors to charitable
organizations through a case study of the charitable contributions deduction. The
deduction’s incremental expansion is found to have mobilized charities as powerful
stakeholders in the policy’s endurance. Charities’ efforts to protect the deduction,
together with the efforts of lawmakers, have couched the policy in a politics of
neoliberalism and disguised its effects, insulating it from reform even as elites have
netted a greater share of its benefits over time.
Keywords
Policy feedback, charitable organizations, tax expenditures, social policy, public-
private welfare state
Corresponding Author:
Kelly L. Russell, Sociology Department, University of Michigan, 3001 LSA Building, 500 S. State St., Ann
Arbor, MI 48109-1382, USA.
Email: klruss@umich.edu
754504PASXXX10.1177/0032329218754504Politics & SocietyRussell
research-article2018
54 Politics & Society 46(1)
In the early days of 2013, the US government faced a singular dilemma: too much debt.
On the eve of the new year, the Treasury had taken extreme measures to finance the
government in order to offset a projected fiscal cliff, which experts feared would exacer-
bate unemployment and slow economic growth. As a result, the government hit its debt
ceiling and found itself in desperate need of revenue. Lawmakers, seeking quick solu-
tions to the mounting crisis, came up with a proposal: to quickly reduce expenditures, the
state could place limits on the tax deduction for charitable contributions. The idea gained
steam in the halls of Washington as legislators began to debate possible forms such a
limit could take, from percentage and absolute dollar caps on the deduction to its replace-
ment with a more modest tax credit. Once publicized, however, proposals to limit the
charitable deduction came under fire. Charitable organizations excoriated them, arguing
that a cap would threaten nonprofit organizations and punish those in need. As one chari-
table leader argued: “Millions of poor Americans will pay the price. Without the gener-
ous support of America, nonprofits will be forced to abandon their work.”1 Charities
characterized the deduction as a broad social benefit and a core source of support for
nonprofit organizations in their efforts to meet public needs—needs that the government
“cannot or will not attempt to address.”2 Awash in controversy, proposals to alter the
charitable deduction were abandoned and the policy went untouched.
Indeed the charitable deduction has gone untouched for most of its century-long his-
tory. The policy is one of the oldest features of the United States’s public-private welfare
state—the collection of policies and programs that provide benefits to citizens through
indirect means.3 Established in 1917, the deduction was designed to serve a much differ-
ent purpose than the one heralded by nonprofit organizations some hundred years later.
Lawmakers created the deduction to incentivize elite philanthropy in the heyday of
World War I: at the time, elites were the only citizens required to pay income taxes, and
lawmakers enacted the charitable deduction to encourage elites’ support of private orga-
nizations despite a significant tax hike to fund the war effort. The deduction’s designers
viewed the policy as a quick fix to a specific problem. Its creation predated the modern
American welfare state—and the large-scale privatization of public provision that began
in the post–World War II years and gained steam in the latter third of the twentieth cen-
tury.4 But the deduction has endured within the tax code ever since, and though its formal
parameters have remained quite stable, its size and scope have transformed considerably
as socioeconomic conditions have evolved. The policy’s size in terms of raw dollars
deducted has ticked upward from $4 billion in 1917 to over $200 billion today, and its
benefits have expanded beyond elites to include the middle class; today, nearly a third of
taxpayers take the charitable deduction. As the deduction has grown, charitable organi-
zations have emerged as the policy’s most powerful constituency, collectively mobiliz-
ing to protect and expand its parameters in moments of contention. They have largely
succeeded in this effort, and their interpretation of the policy as a cornerstone protection
for nonprofits and the welfare services they provide carries considerable weight today.
How has the charitable deduction transformed from a modest subsidy for elite tax-
payers to one of the nation’s costliest tax expenditures? Why has the policy, designed as
a complement to state spending, become a conduit for the private provision of public
goods? In this article, I argue that the charitable deduction has been transformed through

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