The Politics of Democratizing Finance: A Radical View*

DOI10.1177/0032329219878990
AuthorMichael A. McCarthy
Published date01 December 2019
Date01 December 2019
Subject MatterSpecial Issue Articles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329219878990
Politics & Society
2019, Vol. 47(4) 611 –633
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0032329219878990
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Special Issue Article
The Politics of Democratizing
Finance: A Radical View*
Michael A. McCarthy
Marquette University
Abstract
How can finance be durably democratized? In the centers of financial power in
both the United States and the United Kingdom, proposals now circulate to give
workers and the public more say over how flows of credit are allocated. This article
examines five democratization proposals: credit union franchises, public investment
banks, sovereign wealth funds, inclusive ownership funds, and bank nationalization. It
considers how these plans might activate worker and public engagement in decision
making about finance by focusing on three modes of public participation: representative
democracy, direct democracy, and deliberative minipublics. It then considers the
degree to which democratization plans might be resilient to de-democratization
threats from business. It argues that of the five, bank nationalization goes furthest in
guarding against de-democratization threats but is still pocked with pitfalls if it relies
solely on representative democracy. It argues that two criteria appear necessary for
democratically durable alternatives: the active direct participation of workers and
citizens and the weakening of businesses’ capacity for democratic retrenchment.
Keywords
finance, democracy, labor, credit, business power
*This article is part of a special issue titled “Democratizing Finance” that includes an introduction, anchor
articles by Robert C. Hockett and Fred Block, and commentaries by William H. Simon, Lenore Palladino,
Mary Mellor, Michael A. McCarthy, and David M. Woodruff. The papers were originally presented at a
workshop held in Madison, Wisconsin, in July 2018 organized by the late Erik Olin Wright as part of his
Real Utopias Project.
Corresponding Author:
Michael A. McCarthy, Social and Cultural Sciences, Marquette University, Lalumiere Hall 340, 1310 W.
Clybourn St., Milwaukee, WI 53233, USA.
Email: michael.mccarthy@marquette.edu
878990PASXXX10.1177/0032329219878990Politics & SocietyMcCarthy
research-article2019
612 Politics & Society 47(4)
Proposals now circulate that aim to democratize financial flows by subjecting them to
democratic processes and public accountability. Politicians in both the Democratic
Party in the United States and the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, less than a
decade ago key sources of market reforms, are developing parallel plans that call for
the creation of a public investment bank and a share levy on firms to fund worker-
owned pools of capital that would be subject to democratic allocation.1 Other plans,
such as Fred Block’s and Robert C. Hockett’s, democratize finance at other scales. By
developing a credit franchise model, their plans aim to democratize finance through
local credit unions, whose boards are elected by and responsible to their members and
subject to public policy constraints about lending practices.
Yet few have offered a full account of how their plans will enhance democratic par-
ticipation and make such processes durable. That political concerns lie beyond the
attention of much of the popular and scholarly discussion is, in my view, a mistake.
Financialization has transformed politics in rich capitalist democracies, weakening
democratic institutions and rearticulating political coalitions.2 This article suggests that
unless the democratic politics of reform are confronted with clear eyes and policies
developed that can also weaken the capacity of financial elites to erode newly installed
democratic institutions, the viability of those democratic projects will likely be under-
mined. Democracy must be workable not just economically but also socially and politi-
cally. To explore this argument, I compare several popular progressive plans for
democratizing finance. My aim is to assess the degree to which they might enhance or
diminish the democratic accountability of finance to the public and weaken the capaci-
ties of business or political elites that stand to erode it.
In the first part of this article I examine three modes of public participation that
might be relied on in the development of new institutions for the public management
of finance: representative democracy, direct democracy, and deliberative minipublics.
Then I turn to a brief description of Block and Hockett’s credit franchise system along
with several other plans to democratize finance, including public investment banks,
sovereign wealth funds, inclusive ownership funds, and bank nationalization. Next I
explore the ways that both financial and nonfinancial sectors of business crowd out the
voice of ordinary citizens in politics. Drawing from the political sociology of business
power, I identify two critical mechanisms of corporate political influence, active
engagement and structural prominence, that might erode and undermine democratic
projects. I then ask how the proposals might perform democratically once installed. I
focus on the degree to which each reform does or does not confront the direct and
indirect powers of capital identified in part 1. In particular, I consider how democratiz-
ing finance itself might restructure the balance of political forces in society or leave
those forces undisturbed. Answering these questions requires us to shift away from
purely economistic concerns, such as the allocation of financial assets and market
efficiency. Additionally, we need to address questions of power and politics. I argue
that for democratizing finance to be viable, it first needs to be radical, simultaneously
curtailing the power of finance in politics and empowering ordinary people in the
management of public finance.
Although this article throws out more questions than it can answer, it suggests that
of the five proposals, bank nationalization goes furthest in guarding against the

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