The Political Legacy of Forced Migration: Evidence from Post-WWII Germany

• Published date: 01 August 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221141833
• Author: Anil Menon
• Date: 01 August 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(9) 1398–1432

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140221141833

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The Political Legacy of

Forced Migration:

Evidence from

Post-WWII Germany

Anil Menon

Abstract

Do refugees reshape long-term political behavior in receiving areas? I argue

that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees,

which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-

based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest

forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from

Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior

over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections

spanning a century, I f‌ind that communities which received greater shares of

expellees remain more supportive of the expellees’political champions—the

radical right—over time. This relationship is particularly manifested when

identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. Mechanism

evidence, including novel data on expellee monuments and associations,

suggests that a durable expellee identity helps account for these results. My

analysis reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration.

Keywords

forced migration, identity, voting, radical right, time-varying historical legacy

Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Anil Menon, Cornell University, 202 White Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA.

Email: armenon@umich.edu

Violence is a prominent feature of politics and growing evidence illustrates its

potential for producing durable political legacies (Rozenas & Zhukov, 2019).

Studies on the impact of forced migration, a recurring yet understudied form

of political violence, suggest that such experiences inf‌luence the political

attitudes and self-reported behaviors of both refugees and their descendants

(Dinas et al., 2021a;Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017).

1

However, existing research

has not examined whether these forced migrant voters reshape long-term

electoral behavior in receiving areas. The answer to this question is in-

creasingly important, as there are more refugees in the world today than at any

other time since the end of WWII (UNHCR, 2021).

Forced migration can be deeply traumatizing. This shared trauma can force

otherwise heterogeneous populations to develop a coherent identity grounded

in their victimization. Forced migrants have been found to develop such

enduring identities whether they were relocated to areas populated by co-

ethnics (Dinas et al., 2021a) or non-co-ethnics (Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017).

I argue that individuals with a forced migrant identity will support political

parties that cater to the group’s political demands when their identity-based

grievances are unresolved and politically salient. I test this argument by

focusing on one of the largest forced migrations in modern history: the ex-

pulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany at the end of

WWII. Over 12 million ethnic Germans were forced to relocate into Germany,

composing 17.5% of the population.

Evidence of a lasting political legacy among German expellees has broader

relevance. Similar to conventional forced migrants, expellees lacked social

and economic capital. Like many forced migrants, they also faced tensions

with natives, forcing them to rely on each other to overcome their diff‌iculties,

fostering a strong group identity. However, unlike some conventional forced

migrants, expellees were relocated to areas inhabited by co-ethnics. Such

common ground with the native population should have facilitated not de-

terred their integration, weakening the need for a distinct identity. Thus, if we

observe a legacy of forced migration even in this setting, then we should

expect it to also manifest in situations were forced migrants are relocated

among non-co-ethnics. Take for example the forced migration of Crimean

Tartars in 1944. They were rapidly relocated to non-co-ethnic receiving areas

and did not receive immediate access to voting rights. Lupu and Peisakhin

(2017) found that even after 70 years, descendants of Crimean Tartars who

suffered more during their deportation experience identif‌ied more strongly

with their group, held more hostile attitudes toward Russia, and parti cipated

more in politics. Finally, expellees in West Germany, unlike many forced

migrants, enjoyed political freedoms and opportunities. However, existing

evidence of enduring political preferences among descendants of forced

migrants, even in contexts where forced migrants did not have such political

freedoms and opportunities, suggest that neither a democratic context nor

Menon 1399

extensive state-approved activism are necessary conditions for the emergence

of a legacy of forced migration (Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017).

I argue that the radical right has continued to attract expellee voter s for

multiple reasons. First, persecution by the Soviet Red Army cultivated “deep-

seated anti-communism”among expellees (Connor, 2018, p. 190), which in

turn would have drawn them to the anti-communism of radical right parties.

Second, the radical right has consistently made appeals to expellee voters,

portraying the latter as victims of WWII, maintaining calls for the return of

expellee lands in Eastern Europe long after such demands were dropped by

mainstream parties (Mudde, 2002), and lobbying to preserve “the legacy of

the German East”(Alternative für Deutschland, 2020). Moreover, the radical

right’s Euroskepticism might also attract expellees who resisted the inclusion

of expelling countries like Poland and the Czech Republic into the European

Union (Wood, 2005). Third, some expellees emphasized their membership in

the larger German Volk (people) to establish their right to exist in their new

surroundings in the face of native hostility. This notion of the Volk echoed

radical right rhetoric and could have made parts of the expellee community

receptive to such politics (Eisler, 2018). Fourth, expellee museums, news-

papers, youth groups, and various sociocultural events and activities facili-

tated the inter-generational transmission of a cohesive expellee identity and

provided opportunities for radical right ideas to be discussed and disseminated

(Melendy, 2003;Süssner, 2004). Finally, competitive victimhood among

some expellee descendants could also help explain their support for anti-

refugee radical right parties (Dinas et al., 2021b).

2

To test this argument, I collected district-level data on expellee allocation

across West Germany and electoral statistics from 32 elections over

100 years.

3

My f‌indings suggest that districts which received greater shares of

expellees are more supportive of the radical right over time. For instance, a

one standard deviation increase in the post-WWII expellee share adds half a

percentage point to Alternative für Deutschland’svote share in the 2019

European elections, or a 5% increase in the party’s average vote share in that

election. However, the association between expellee share and radical right

support only manifests when identity-related grievances remain unaddressed

and politically signif‌icant. It diminishes with broader society’s recognition of

expellee suffering and strengthens when political developments make the

narrative of German suffering during WWII salient. Moreover, consistent with

evidence of competitive victimhood and more negative attitudes toward

contemporary refugees among some expellee descendants (Dinas et al.,

2021b), I f‌ind that areas with greater shares of expellees became more

supportive of the AfD when it transformed into an anti-refugee party between

2013 and 2017. These f‌indings corroborate a growing body of work that

emphasizes the importance of political context for activating historical leg-

acies (Charnysh, 2015;Fouka & Voth, nd;Rozenas & Zhukov, 2019).

1400 Comparative Political Studies 56(9)