The Political Geography of Distributive Politics

• Date: 01 February 2015
• Published date: 01 February 2015
• Author: Charles J. Finocchiaro,Austin C. Clemens,Michael H. Crespin
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12067

AUSTIN C. CLEMENS

Texas A&M University

MICHAEL H. CRESPIN

The University of Oklahoma

CHARLES J. FINOCCHIARO

University of South Carolina

The Political Geography of

Distributive Politics

Distributive politics playsan integral role in theories of legislative politics because

it represents a fundamental aspect of legislators’ electoral connection to constituents. We

argue that because distributive politics is at its core a constituency-centered process, it is

essential to take geography into account in both substantive and statistical terms. Our

analysis, which employs Geographic Weighted Regression, reveals substantial spatial

heterogeneity in traditional models of pork-barreling. The results challenge the implicit

assumption that one size f‌its all when modeling the behavior of members of Congress in

the realm of distributive politics.

Legislative bodies in which members owe their position to faithful

representation of a subnational constituency often tend toward particu-

larism, in which members focus intently on local interests. This localism

typically involves building a “personal vote” that provides insulation

from partisan tides and the broader reputation of a national party. A great

deal of theoretical and empirical research focuses on the conditions under

which this sort of an electoral connection will emerge and thrive. Schol-

ars have, for instance, constructed rationales for legislative organization

built exclusively on distributive politics as well as attempted to demon-

strate the electoral benef‌its of engaging in pork-barrel politics. More

recently, a burgeoning cross-national literature on legislatures has

grappled with questions about the sorts of electoral systems under which

particularism is most likely to f‌lourish as well as the role of electoral

reforms in shaping legislators’ representational styles and approaches.

Yet considerably less attention has been paid to the variable role of

distributive politics at the subnational level, particularly in the realm of

electoral politics. Scholars have noted that local appeals highlighting

pork may gain more traction in less economically developed constituen-

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LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 40, 1, February 2015 111

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12067

© 2015 The Comparative Legislative Research Center of The University of Iowa

cies than in urban areas (Desposato 2006) and that ideological and

partisan concerns are likely to affect the types of pork in which individual

candidates traff‌ic (Lazarus and Reilly 2010; Sellers 1997). Moreover,the

underlying level of constituent “demand” for gover nmental services

above and beyond “need” is likely to play a major role in shaping

legislators’ choices about where to focus their representational efforts.

Each of these dynamics suggests that pork-barrel politics may have a

variable role across states and districts. Unfortunately, much of the

research on distributive politics implicitly assumes that the impact of

pork is roughly the same across geographic units.

In this article, we discuss some of the key perspectives on pork-

barrel politics and delineate why there may be an underlying geographic

basis that has escaped attention in the existing literature. We then use

spatial analytical tools to demonstrate that prior models of distributive

politics fail to account for the role of political geography.Specif‌ically, we

argue that current models are unable to account for the possibility that

coeff‌icients may vary across geographic space (spatial heterogeneity).To

account for this, we employ a method, Geographic Weighted Regression,

that is relatively new to political science and present results that reveal

heterogeneity in the effects of covariates across congressional districts.

Our f‌indings challenge the implicit assumption embodied in much of the

previous research on distributive politics that one size f‌its all when

modeling the behavior of members of Congress. We conclude with a

discussion of the implications of our f‌indings for future research.

Distributing Pork in Legislatures

Characteristic of much of the research on pork-barrel politics in

legislatures throughout the world is the study of earmarks in the US

Congress. Though earmarks represent just a small slice of federal spend-

ing, much of the recent congressional literature on distributive politics

focuses on them because of the ease with which they can be measured

and the potential they offer for evaluating competing theories of congres-

sional decision making. Accordingly, recent literature on congressional

pork-barreling seeks to identify covariates that best explain the distribu-

tion of pork. These models draw upon two dominant theories of cong res-

sional behavior: distributive theories that explain pork as a result of

electorally motivated legislators (Ferejohn 1974; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle

and Weingast 1981) and partisan theories that posit majority leaders who

use pork, amongst other tools, to achieve party goals (Cox and

McCubbins 1993). In this vein, scholars have found that leaders some-

times use earmarks to protect vulnerable incumbents (Engstrom and

112 Clemens, Crespin, and Finocchiaro