The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

• Published date: 01 February 2021
• Date: 01 February 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720967434
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The Political Costs

of Abusing Human

Rights: International

Cooperation in

Extraordinary Rendition

Rebecca Cordell

1

Abstract

From 2001 to 2005, over a quarter of all countries in the world cooperated in a

secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to

secret detention sites. While governments in some states have not been punished

for participating, others have incurred political costs, including electoral defeats.

What explains variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11

extraordinary rendition program? I argue that left of center governments, particu-

larly those in democracies, suffered greater political costs from being caught because

of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the name of

national security. I test the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat at the

election following the revelation of participation in extraordinary rendition using a

matched sample where the party in office at the time of participation remained the

same. The analysis provides empirical support for my theoretical argument.

Keywords

human rights, counterterrorism, international cooperation, international law

1

Department of Political Science, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at

Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Rebecca Cordell, Department of Political Science, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences,

University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W Campbell Rd., Richardson, TX 75080, USA.

Email: rebecca.cordell@utdallas.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(2-3) 255-282

ªThe Author(s) 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002720967434

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From 2001 to 2005, over a quarter of all countries in the world helped the United

States of America (U.S.) run a post-9/11 global rendition network that enabled the

transfer of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) terrorist suspects to secret detention

sites across the world (Open Society Foundations 2013). In response, several inter-

governmental and governmental institutions launched high-profile investigations on

the issue of rendition, detention and interrogation (RDI). They described how for-

eign governments had assisted with the arrests, detention and interrogation of CIA

terrorist suspects and enabled extraordinary rendition aircrafts to fly in their airspace

and land at their airports (Council of Europe 2006b; European Parliament 2006a).

The reports elicited mainstream media coverage, public debates and condemnation

from the international community.

1

International relations and conflict scholars

continue to debate the political costs of committing human rights violations (HRVs)

and the conditions under which governments are more or less likely to be punished

(Moore 2000; Davenport 2007a; Pierskalla 2010; Shadmehr 2014; Esarey and Bry-

ant 2019). The study of this topic is further hindered by data availability given the

routine attempt by governments to cover up HRVs (Hafner-Burton 2014). Unlike

many instances of HRVs, international cooperation in RDI has the advantage of

being observable (ex-post) using detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary

rendition flight data. It also provides a unique opportunity to study the political costs

of abusing human rights in different domestic po litical environments across the

world for a group of states that engaged in the same network of HRVs.

2

While the issue of RDI has received widespread media coverage and public

interest across the world, there has been substantial variation in the political costs

for those countries that were caught cooperating. For example, while governments in

some states have not been punished for participating, others have incurred political

costs, including electoral defeats. What explains variation in the political costs of

participation in RDI? First, I argue that states with left of center governments

suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that

they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch

and Schuster 2005; Moeckli 2008; Neumayer, Plu

¨mper, and Epifanio 2014).

3

Left of

center voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties in the name of

national security and are more likely to perceive the revelation that their government

was complicit in HRVs as a grievance (McClosky and Brill 1983; Davis and Silver

2003). Second, I argue that the political costs of participation in RDI should be

greater for left of center governments in democracies than those in non-democracies.

Democratic institutions provide voters with the opportunity to express their discon-

tent and punish the government for committing HRVs (Van Belle 2000; Davenport

2007b; Davenport, Armstrong, and Moore 2008). Moreover, the revelation that a left

of center government participated in RDI is more likely to lead to public outcry in a

democracy because of the perception that democratic actors are better at protecting

human rights and respecting the rule of law (Kelley 2007). Left of center voters

disillusioned by the government’s behavior could respond by voting for another

party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own or withdraw

256 Journal of Conflict Resolution 65(2-3)