The Personalization of Electoral Rules: How Shifting Influence From Selectors to Voters Affects Party Unity

• Author: Thomas Däubler
• Published date: 01 March 2022
• Date: 01 March 2022
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920987898
• Subject Matter: Articles

2022, Vol. 75(1) 160 –174

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920987898

Political Research Quarterly

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912920987898

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It is often argued that candidate-centered electoral sys-

tems add to the collective action problems of political

parties. They may threaten party unity in parliamentary

voting by weakening the party’s sanctioning potential and

creating incentives for members of parliament (MPs) to

differentiate themselves from co-partisans (e.g., Carey

2009; Carey and Shugart 1995; Depauw and Martin

2009; Sieberer 2006). Although recent work suggests that

party leaders can take precautions by screening candi-

dates in the selection stage (Carroll and Nalepa 2020;

Coman 2015; Preece 2014; Shomer 2016), the fact that

multidistrict proportional representation (PR) often goes

along with decentralized candidate selection (Bowler,

Farrell, and Katz 1999) still leaves many parties at risk.1

Moreover, European voters’ opportunities to express

preferences for candidates and the impact of these votes

on intra-party seat allocation have increased considerably

in recent decades (Renwick and Pilet 2016).

This study makes three main contributions by examin-

ing in depth how the personalization of electoral rules

affects party unity. First, it suggests conceptualizing the

incentives derived from personalizing the electoral sys-

tem as the result of a shift in electoral impact from party

selectors to voters.2 The scope for any change in a given

case therefore depends on whether targeted voters

rather than the selectors in the party want MPs to vote

differently. Second, in theoretical terms, I incorporate this

notion of a shift in principals’ influence in a spatial model

of parliamentary voting. Since the importance of moni-

toring capacity has been emphasized both in the general

literature (Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1986; Gailmard and

Jenkins 2009) and in work on electoral systems (André,

Depauw, and Shugart 2014; Bowler and Farrell 1993;

Shugart 2013), the theory also formalizes the (perceived)

monitoring/sanctioning probabilities of the two princi-

pals. From the resulting theoretical framework follows a

rich set of observable implications, notably that an unfor-

tunate trade-off between candidate focus and party-based

representation need not necessarily materialize. When

selectors disagree with a policy supported by the party

group (PG) and popular with an MP’s target electorate,

personalization—as defined here—may actually promote

party unity in voting.

Third, the study presents empirical evidence for this

prediction from the 2010 reform of Sweden’s flexible-list

PR (FLPR) system, which allows me to isolate the effect

987898

PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920987898Political Research QuarterlyDäubler

research-article2021

1University College Dublin, Ireland

Corresponding Author:

Thomas Däubler, University College Dublin, School of Politics and

International Relations, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland.

Email: thomas.daubler@ucd.ie

The Personalization of Electoral Rules:

How Shifting Influence From Selectors

to Voters Affects Party Unity

Thomas Däubler1

Abstract

How does making electoral systems more candidate-centered affect party unity? Using a principal-agent perspective,

this study makes three contributions to the literature on this topic. Conceptually, it suggests thinking about the

incentives due to personalization as arising from a shift in electoral impact from party selectors to voters. Theoretically,

it incorporates this notion into a spatial model of parliamentary voting that also considers principals’ monitoring

capacities. From the resulting framework follows a rich set of observable implications, notably that candidate-centered

electoral systems facilitate rather than undermine collective action within parliamentary parties under certain

conditions. Empirically, this study then analyzes the 2010 reform of Sweden’s flexible-list proportional representation

system, which changed the preference vote threshold. As expected, I find that when extreme (district-based) selectors

disagree with the moderate bills supported by the party group leadership, personalized rules incentivize politicians to

support these policies and vote in unison.

Keywords

parliamentary voting, party unity, personalization, candidate selection, flexible-list PR, principal-agent model

Article