The Perils of Reconciliation: Achievements and Challenges of Daniel Ortega and the Modern FSLN

• Date: 01 January 2019
• Author: Héctor Cruz Feliciano
• Published date: 01 January 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0094582X18803876
• Subject Matter: Articles

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 224, Vol. 46 No. 1, January 2019, 247–262

DOI: 10.1177/0094582X18803876

© 2018 Latin American Perspectives

247

The Perils of Reconciliation

Achievements and Challenges of Daniel Ortega and the

Modern FSLN

by

Héctor Cruz Feliciano

Against the background of unprecedented levels of support and popularity since recov-

ering power, the experience of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) shows

that alliances unorthodox for a leftist party have rendered electoral results at the cost of

putting more profound structural transformations on hold. Ten years after its electoral

comeback, the FSLN has a lot to show for itself, largely because of the stable climate attrib-

utable to its decision to make peace with its historical foes. At the same time, its efforts at

empowering the citizenry have been limited at best. Entrenched in the wealth of political

capital it has accumulated, it is in a good position to take calculated risks in favor of bold

redistributive policies. Not taking more daring steps toward the socialist transformation

of society at this juncture could in due time cost it its role as articulator of the leftist

agenda in Nicaragua.

En un contexto de niveles de apoyo y popularidad sin precedentes desde la recuperación

del poder, la experiencia del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) muestra

que alianzas heterodoxas para un partido de izquierda han dado resultados electorales a

costa de detener transformaciones estructurales más profundas. Diez años después de su

regreso electoral, el FSLN tiene muchos logros que mostrar, en gran parte debido al clima

estable atribuible a su decisión de hacer las paces con sus enemigos históricos. Al mismo

tiempo, sus esfuerzos para empoderar a la ciudadanía han sido limitados en el mejor de los

casos. Afirmado en la abundancia de capital político que ha acumulado, se encuentra en

una buena posición para tomar riesgos calculados a favor de políticas redistributivas

audaces. No dar pasos más audaces hacia la transformación socialista de la sociedad en esta

coyuntura podría, a su debido tiempo, costarle su papel como articulador de la agenda

izquierdista en Nicaragua.

Keywords: Socialism, Elites, Nicaragua, Alliances, Left

Reconciliation aspires not to rid the world of contradictions or struggles but to take

advantage of a good armistice. There is time, then, to struggle and to reconcile

Héctor Cruz Feliciano is Latin America senior programs manager for CET Academic Programs in

Washington, DC. He has taught at the University of Puerto Rico–Rio Piedras, the Universidad

Metropolitana (Puerto Rico), and the Universidad Thomas More (Nicaragua) and in the Political

Science Graduate Program at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. From 2008 to 2013 he

directed the Social Justice and Development Program for international students at the National

Autonomous University of Nicaragua.

803876LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X18803876Latin American PerspectivesCruz / Ortega And The Modern Fsln

research-article2018

248 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

under the contradictory reality of doing it by struggling in one track and

reconciling in the other.

—Orlando Núñez, 2015

While most of the governments that rose to power as part of Latin America’s

left turn either have lost their seats or are struggling to renew their electoral

mandates, after more than a decade in power Nicaragua’s Frente Sandinista de

Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front—FSLN) still enjoys

a high level of popularity. Capitalizing on its excellent relations with former

foes, in November 2016 Daniel Ortega won the presidential election for the third

time in a row with an unprecedented 72.5 percent of the votes. Drawing paral-

lels with the dictatorship toppled by the guerrillas in 1979, some critics claim

that the FSLN has ceased to exist and that the “ideology” that best describes the

party today is Orteguismo, not Sandinismo. In doing so, they point to Ortega’s

lack of integrity as a person and as a revolutionary. Detractors call attention to

the centralization and accumulation of power around the Nicaraguan president

and his family, which in their view pervades not only the party but also the

institutions of the state. From this perspective, Nicaragua’s current government

has de facto become an authoritarian, populist one that threatens to do away

with the country’s young democracy. In the face of such charges, virtually all

public opinion polls agree that Ortega’s popularity exceeds by a wide margin

that of his actual and potential political opponents.1 At the same time, most

reputable sources regard the performance of the economy under his command

as one of the best in the region. Besides its pragmatic alliance with local elites,

key to Ortega’s economic success and popular support has been the govern-

ment’s massive investment in social projects, which has contributed to a con-

stant reduction in poverty levels since the FSLN’s return to power in 2007.

In this work I begin with the historical background of the policy of pragmatic

alliances between the FSLN and its former adversaries. Second, I look at the

government’s ideological rationale in pursuing these alliances and various

observers’ views of its contradictions and counterproductive results. Lastly, I

evaluate the state of democracy in Nicaragua against the government’s stated

goal of implementing a participative model that will lay the foundations for the

establishment of a socialist order and assess the policy of pragmatic alliances

with regard to that aim.

AlliAnces And Their incepTion

The Sandinistas’ darkest hour was when they lost the election to Violeta

Chamorro’s Unión Nacional Opositora (National Opposition Union—UNO)

coalition in 1990. After 10 years in government, the revolutionary dream proved

to be brief, costly, and elusive. The electoral defeat led to the division of the

Sandinistas into camps that—in contrast to those of the past—differed not only

on the preferred means to a common end but also on the end itself. Many his-

torical leaders left the FSLN. In fact, many of the party’s most renowned figures

did so, and as a result the Sandinistas’ heroic image began to fade (Cruz Feliciano