The Perils of Politics

• Date: 01 September 1961
• Published date: 01 September 1961
• Author: Charles E. Martin
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296101400367
• Subject Matter: Articles

SUMMARY
OF
PROCEEDINGS OF
THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
THE PERILS OF POLITICS
CHARLES E. MARTIN
University of Washington
HAVE
JUST RETURNED from the experience of delivering the presi-
) dential address before a highly specialized group of scholars, practitioners,
and statesmen operating on a national basis. I now shall attempt to give
the presidential talk before a rather broadly based body of scholars operating in
a remote but important region of the country. In location, we are as far north and
west as one can get. In the significance of subject matter, we believe we stand
at the center, with our lines of thought and action extending to the extremities of
the country, and even penetrating the contours of the world.
Like most Western political scientists, my professional life has been divided
equally between teaching and research in my special field, and in meeting the
demands, on a broader scale, of our general discipline. I should, therefore, like
to refer to the general character and interest of our Association, and to speak
today as a political scientist rather than a professor of international law and
relations.
My title may seem to be a discouraging one. It may suggest a spirit of nega-
tion, and a counsel of despair. It is not so intended. My aim is to set forth the
principal defect of our discipline today. I shall indicate certain manifestations of
this defect which I deem to be evidential of my major premise.
Political science today, as a discipline, and in its totality, is less than the
sum of its parts. We are known among our colleagues more for our divisions
than for our unity. Our achievements seem to lie in some of our special fields
rather than in the advancement of our subject as a whole. Several of our areas
of instruction find far more congenial association with other disciplines, or areas
of disciplines, than with some more specialized subjects within the ambit of
formal political science. In some instances, we function as a &dquo;federation&dquo; of
groups, with some organic integration and even some control. In other situations,
we are little more than a &dquo;confederacy&dquo; of provinces of politics, with little
organic or causal relationship between them, and with the special claims of each
taking precedence over those of the main body.
Political science, I fully realize, must be an &dquo;arrangement of convenience&dquo;
as between its many parts and the several levels of its operation. My argu-
ment is that, while this is good for purposes of operation and administration,
it is not good enough as the basis of a subject in which we live, move, and
have our academic and professional being. There can be no sustained loyalty
NOTE: This is the presidential address given at the fourteenth annual meeting of the Pacific
Northwest Political Science Association held at Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washing-
ton, May 12-13, 1961.
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56
to a mere &dquo;arrangement of convenience.&dquo; No genuine or lasting values can be
found in an operating device.
Our segmentation runs throughout the substance of our discipline. Seg-
mented processes and procedures inevitably follow, extending in many directions.
I shall deal only with the more obvious ones, the more devastating ones, and
those about which I believe something can be done. They are, in the order
of my presentation, the following:
1. The Partible Character of our Discipline
2. Our Conflicting Approaches to the Subject
3. Our Proliferation of Fields
4. Our Strange Alliances
,
5. Our Unbalanced Divisions of Labor
6. Our Diverse Training Objectives
7. Conclusion: The Way Out and the Way Ahead
THE PARTIBLE CHARACTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
What is politics? From the days of the ancient philosophers until today
we find no definition among many which is absolute. They are, in the main,
relative. Nor do we find convincing unity among them. They seem to partake
of a special character, or to follow some particular angle.
Is politics mainly a science? This would seem to be politics in the Aristo-
telian sense. Aristotle was a man of many accomplishments. To us, however,
he was a political thinker. He came to be &dquo;the master of those who know,&dquo; not
necessarily the leader of those who believe. Under this concept, politics is re-
garded as a body of knowledge, which gives rise to theories that may find ap-
plication in practice. Political scientists address themselves to the facts of
politics, based on the political record. These facts are rooted in history.
If the science of politics is political knowledge, the fruit of such knowledge
must be other than purely utilitarian or pragmatic. Rather the goal is political
wisdom. Is the statesman politically wise? Is his judgment reliable? Are his de-
cisions prudent ones? Is the public issue one which squares with our political
knowledge and experience of today?
This view of politics is perhaps the prevailing one among present-day po-
litical scientists. It has many virtues. However, it also has some limitations.
The pure scientist, despite denials, cannot but be concerned with the use the
technologist will make of his findings. In our complicated state life of today,
political knowledge doubtless should be our final objective. It cannot be the
only one. Is it our principal purpose? A show of hands among us would reveal
divergent views. The political scientist must begin with facts and figures. He
cannot stop there. For the scientist, along with his discoveries, must also inter-
pret, discover, and explain. He has a function, and even an obligation beyond
that of merely &dquo;setting forth the record.&dquo;
Is politics principally an art? The Machiavellian concept of politics em-
phasizes this view. To be sure, Machiavelli has had many words and opinions

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57
ascribed to him that he never said or meant. He would have the Prince do
the good and wise thing so long as he could realize his aims without acting
otherwise. And he would have the Prince remain at peace so long as war was
not essential to his personal and national objectives. In case of &dquo;necessity,&dquo;
however, he would employ arbitrary measures within, and war without.
The art of politics need not, of course, partake of the Machiavellian
character. We are compelled to agree with Alexander Hamilton that &dquo;a gov-
ernment ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad
government.&dquo; Pragmatism in politics, then, is not necessarily evil or bad. It
is interested in success, in achievement, and in results rather than solely in
justice, ethics, or judgment. It is the area of the administrator, the practical
politician, the man who must get things done. The institution and processes of
politics which contribute to these results appeal to him.
The art of politics asks substantially different questions than does its
science. Of the man in politics, whether statesman or boss, it asks whether he
is effective and efficient. Does he get things done? Does he push things
through? And of political measures, while hoping that they are &dquo;sound&dquo; in
theory, and &dquo;right&dquo; in ethics, his principal inquiry and concern are whether
they will &dquo;work.&dquo;
Is politics more or less of art than science? This question, as we follow our
discipline today, is truly a divisive one.
To what degree is politics a system of ethics? Are we to regard the Platonic
approach to the state as the basic one? The area of Platonic ideas is one of
values. The just and perfect state is found in the life of the just man, who
must be specially trained for such experience.
Like Plato of old, there is a division of politics today which is concerned
with the justice or unjustice of laws, policies, administrative action, or any other
state function. I would call this the ethics of politics. It deals with what is
right and wrong in politics. Of the statesman and politician, it will inquire
into the moral values in his public conduct and his official action. It will seek
to take the measure of his political conscience. Of the political issue, it asks
whether or not it is right. Will it result in injustice? Does it comply with
the individual and collective moral standards of the community?
The scientists and artists of politics make no more frequent or disastrous
mistake as to underrate the importance and effect of this arm of the nature
of politics. In a democracy, and especially in the United States, it sometimes
enjoys the greatest solicitude of the voter or the concern of the citizen. Great
national decisions frequently turn on what is deemed politically right than what
is politically wise or workable. And statesmen and rulers, whether elective or
appointive, lean strongly toward emphasizing the ethical, which in turn easily
becomes the hortatory. President Eisenhower, for example, spoke frequently as a
political moralist, delivering in substance if not in form what was virtually
a civic sermon. Overwhelmingly favorable verdicts of the public abundantly
sustained his approach.

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58
What, then, is the nature of our discipline? Is it essentially a...