The Perils of a Piecemeal Approach to Fighting ISIS in Iraq

• Author: John Weaver
• Date: 01 March 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12351
• Published date: 01 March 2015

192 Public Administration Review • March | April 2015

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 75, Iss. 2, pp. 192–193. © 2015 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12351.

Perspective

John Weaver is a retired Lieutenant

Colonel in the U.S. Army. He currently works

as a civilian U.S. Department of Defense

employee in the intelligence community at

Fort Meade.

E-mail : john.m.weaver1.civ@mail.mil

John Weaver

U.S. Department of Defense

 e Perils of a Piecemeal Approach to Fighting ISIS in Iraq

T he Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) now

has over 20,000 members and operates with

near impunity in Syria and Iraq (Quinlan

2014 ). The White House acknowledges the threat to

international security that ISIS poses and announced

on September 10, 2014, its commitment to com-

bat ISIS with airstrikes coordinated with coalition

partners and American troops acting as advisers to

Iraqi forces (White House 2014 ). On November 7,

2014, President Obama nearly doubled the commit-

ment of U.S. troops. Of the $5.6 billion the White

House requested for targeted operations against ISIS,

the Defense Department would get the vast prepon-

derance, with less than 10% intended for the State

Department (DOD 2014 ).

Noticeably absent from the White House press release

or associated fact sheet was any mention of other

federal departments or agencies. Also missing was an

articulation of a comprehensive mission and the corre-

sponding multilateral federal approach to dealing with

ISIS, specifically in Iraq, where U.S. troops are present

ostensibly to assist and train the fledgling military.

The high regard in which Americans hold our military

must be accompanied by an awareness of the limita-

tions of a military-only approach. If ISIS truly poses

a threat to the security of the United States, it requires

a unified effort by a consortium of federal depart-

ments and agencies. Diplomatic, informational,

military, and economic (“D.I.M.E.”) instruments of

power should come into play (Wilcox 2010 ), with a

clear mission statement articulated and promulgated

by the commander-in-chief.

Such a statement should avoid telegraphing to the

enemy self-imposed restrictions on military tactics,

such as ground force restrictions. Rather, a mission

statement that affords consideration for possible con-

tingencies would help enhance the chances of success.

This need not involve the Defense Department alone;

the Department of Homeland Security could help

train Iraqi police and other Iraqi forces charged with

internal security, leaving the Iraqi military to con-

centrate on external threats. Three other instruments

of power are equally important to the success of the

campaign.

First, the Department of State should undertake

a more assertive role, actively engaging with Iraqi

President Fuad Masum to dismantle tensions between

the Shiite and Sunni populations, allowing for a fairer

and more representative government and avoiding

disparate treatment. Such a step would reduce the

likelihood that the Sunni minority might see ISIS as

an instrument of retribution for injustice. The State

Department can also help assure continued American

domestic support for the effort by reporting back to

the American public on the progress of its efforts.

Second, the Justice Department has a complementary

role as well. Justice could foster transparency and

equality by pressing Masum ’ s government to ensure

citizen rights and advocate equality in a country

replete with sectarian violence. One of the main rea-

sons for Masum ’ s rise to power came about as a result

of the former Iraqi president suppressing the Sunni

minority. Messaging in this regard would be helpful:

Justice should also encourage the Iraqi government to

report to its people such progress, and to explain the

collective benefits of the sectarian cooperation that

equality should foster.

Finally, the administration must look for ways to

block funding for ISIS. The White House statement

acknowledged this need, but only addressed the role

of international partners. Clearly, the Department of

Treasury should be (and hopefully is) working to con-

strict the flow of money to ISIS and thus degrade their

resources and strength. Surprisingly, this nonstate actor

operates as many countries do by receiving funding

from eclectic sources such as oil, antiquities, donations,

and the banking sector, many of which are subject to

sanctions. The Department of Justice should identify

the appropriate legal options for the Treasury in reduc-

ing funding streams to this terrorist organization.