The Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting

• Published date: 01 April 1995
• Author: Peverill Squire
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X9502300206
• Date: 01 April 1995
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE

PARTISAN

CONSEQUENCES

OF

CONGRESSIONAL

REDISTRICTING

PEVERILL

SQUIRE

University

of

Iowa

In

an

earlier

examination

of

redistricting

plans

in

the

1970s,

the

author

found

little

evidence

that

gerrymanders

were

successful.

A

similar

examination

of

gerrymanders

in

the

1980s

finds

that

in

many

states

they

worked.

The

parties

that

drew

the

lines

usually

won

more

seats

than

they

had

before

redistricting

and

they

almost

always

held

the

seats

created

for

them.

In

addition,

redistricting

parties

usually

got

a

higher

percentage

of

seats

than

percentage

of

the

vote.

The

author

argues

that

a

general

decline

in

the

competitiveness

of

House

races

accounts

for

the

increased

success

of

gerrymanders

in

the

1980s.

No

one

disputes

that

gerrymanders

occur.

Certainly,

in

some

states

parties

try

to

draw

congressional

district

lines

to

their

benefit

and

to

their

competitors’

detriment.

But

are

these

attempts

to

gain

partisan

advantage

successful?

Can

a

party

draw

lines

that

reward

it

with

a

disproportionally

greater

percentage

of

seats

than

the

percentage

of

votes

it

receives

would

warrant?

And

even

if

a

gerrymander

is

suc-

cessful

after

the

first

election,

is

it

still

successful

after

five

elections?

In

an

earlier

article

examining

redistricting

in

seven

states

in

the

1970s,

I

found

scant

evidence

that

gerrymandering

worked,

and

that

any

initial

advantages

gained

by

the

party

drawing

the

lines

washed

out

over

the

10

years

a

plan

was

in

effect

(Squire

1985).

These

results

were

roughly

consistent

with

the

conclusions

reached

in

earlier

studies

by

Erikson

(1972)

and

Scarrow

(1982).

More

recent

examinations

of

redistricting

plans

in

the

1970s

and

1980s

by

Niemi

and

Winsky

( 1992)

and

Basehart

and

Comer

(1991)

confirm

that

initial

partisan

advan-

tages

tend

to

dissipate

over

the

course

of

five

elections.

Authors

Note:

I

thank

David

Wilkerson

for

research

assistance.

This

article

was

originally

prepared

for

presentation

at

the

14th

Hendricks

Symposium,

University

of

Nebraska,

Lincoln,

April

8-9,

1994.

AMERICAN

POLITICS

QUARTERLY,

Vol

23

No

2,

Apnl

1995

229-240

@

1995

Sage

Publicauons,

Inc

229