The Origins of Human Rights: a Hegelian Perspective
| Author | Lewis P. Hinchman |
| Published date | 01 March 1984 |
| Date | 01 March 1984 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/106591298403700103 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
THE
ORIGINS
OF
HUMAN
RIGHTS:
A
HEGELIAN
PERSPECTIVE
LEWIS
P.
HINCHMAN
Clarkson
College
N
RECENT
YEARS,
the
idea
of
human
rights
has
evoked
more
I
attention
and
critical
scrutiny,
both
popular
and
scholarly,
than
.A-
perhaps
at
any
time
since
the
days
of
Paine
and
Jefferson.
But
anyone
who
reads
the
rights
literature
of
the
past
several
centuries
at
all
carefully
can
scarcely
fail
to
sense
a
fundamental
change
in
the
terms
of
discussion
as
well
as
in
the
practical
&dquo;uses&dquo;
of
the
rights
conception
itself.
Rights
are
claimed,
rejected
and
disputed
by
journalists
and
political
actors
as
if
they
were
the
most
self-evident
of
all
principles.
Indeed,
today
-
in
sharp
contrast
to
the
situation
that
prevailed
in
1789 -
almost
everyone
pays
lip
service
to
the
rhetoric
of
human
rights.
Scholars,
on
the
other
hand,
have
had
real
difficulties
both
in
distinguishing
rights
from
duties’
and
in
deciding
why
people
even
have
rights,
if
they
do
at
all.2
2
Ironically,
as
the
doctrine
of
rights
has
become
more
and
more
widely
accepted,
its
very
foundations
seem
increasingly
open
to
question.
Moreover,
the
relationship
between
rights-claimants
and
the
state
has
begun
to
shift.
Paine
could
still
contend
in
The
Rights
of Man
(following
Locke)
that
society,
left
to
its
own
devices,
would
naturally
regulate
itself,
and
that
government
has
been
the
principal
menace
to
human
rights
since
time
immemorial
(cf.
pp.
187-88).
But
recently
&dquo;human
rights&dquo;
has
tended
to
become
a
watchword
for
those
who
want
to
reinforce
the claims
of
impoverished
citizens
-
and
indeed
whole
nations
of
the
Third
World
-
to
have
their basic
needs
for
food,
medical
care
and
education
accorded
the
highest
possible
priority.3
In
effect,
&dquo;human
rights&dquo;
advocates
have
frequently
become
allies
of
the
modern
welfare
state,
fighting
battles
against
the
latter-day
descendants
of
Locke
and
Paine,
who
still
brandish
the
antistatist,
laissez-faire
birth
certificate
of
the
rights
doctrine.
1
Cf.,
for
example,
Lyons
(1969),
who
tries
to
refurbish
Bentham’s
claim
that
having
a
right
simply
means
being
the
beneficiary
of
a
duty,
an
argument
which
would
seem
to
make
"right"
a
superfluous
or
derivative
concept.
2
Some
philosophers,
notably
Robert
Nozick
(1974),
simply
take
it
for
granted
that
all
men
have
rights
as
a
practical
premise
in
need
of
no
further
justification.
In
other
cases,
philosophers
classify
the
language
of
rights
as
a
part
of
moral
discourse
and
explore
the
meaning
of
rights
in
relation
to
other
moral
and
legal
ideas.
Yet,
they
argue,
we
cannot
prove
that
men
actually
"have"
rights
since,
as
part
of
moral
speech
generally,
rights-talk
represents
only
a
"proposal"
or
prescription
about
how
we
should
treat
other
men,
not
a
description
of
what
men
are
actually
like.
See
for
example
Kamenka
(1978),
p.
12
and
Hart
(1955),
p.
54.
Finally,
legal
scholars
such
as
Wesley
Hohfeld
(1919)
provide
us
with
careful
accounts
of
the
meaning
of
a
"right"
as
the
term
is
used
in
Anglo-American
law,
but
cannot
say
whether
human
beings
in
any
sense
"have"
rights
which
positive
law
or
practice
denies
them
(pp.
36-37,
73-74).
3
Cf.
"The
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights"
(1948),
especially
Articles
22,
23, 24,
25
and
27.
8
The
present
essay
reflects
concern
that
the
doctrine
of
human
rights
may
imperceptibly
degenerate
into
empty
rhetoric
unless
it
can
be
given
a
rational
foundation
in
a
more
encompassing
theory
of
man
and
nature.
We
ought,
at
the
very
least,
to
be
able
to
explain
why
it
is
impermissible
to
treat
human
beings
in
the
same
way
we
do
inanimate
objects
or
lower
animals
whom
we
exploit
for
our
own
benefit.
Further,
we
should
be
in
a
position
to judge
the
contemporary
claims,
mentioned
above,
that
human
beings
have
not
only
fundamental
rights
against
the
state’s
interference,
but
also
rights
to
its
help
and
support
in
securing
goods
now
deemed
indispensable
to
a
genuinely
human
existence.
There
is
nothing
inevitable
or
sacrosanct
in
the
doctrine
of
human
rights.
The
position
of
an
&dquo;im-
moralist&dquo;
such
as
Thrasymachus
in
Plato’s
Republic
is
always
a
possibility
and
indeed
may
even
now
represent
the
&dquo;true&dquo;
opinions
of
more
than
a
few
Americans.
With
these
concerns
in
mind,
I
try
to
do
three
things
in
the
following
pages.
First,
I
briefly
reconstruct
the
connection
which
the
original
liberal
theorists
of
human
rights
envisaged
between
rights
and
nature
(especially
human
nature).
By
reviewing
their
arguments
we
may
understand
more
clearly
why
they
thought
it
plausible
to
claim
that
all
men
do
have
certain
basic
rights.
Second,
I
draw
attention
to
some
difficulties
in
the
liberal
account
of
the
origins
of
human
rights
and
present
a
summary
of
Hegel’s
alternative.
The
emphasis
is
on
relevant
passages
from
the
Phenomenology
of
Spirit
and
the
Philosophy
of
Mind,
for
reasons
to
be
explained
below.
Third,
I
suggest
that
Hegel’s
justification
of
human
rights
seems
a
prom-
ising
source
of
ideas
for
rethinking
the
doctrine
in
the
light
of
modern
problems.4
In
the
context
of
this
task,
I
also
point
out
some
areas
of
intersection
and
even
convergence
between
Hegel’s
arguments
and
those
of
certain
contemporary
moral
philosophers.
I
The
natural
rights
tradition
of
the
17th
and
18th
centuries
presents
at
first
a
picture
so
complex
and
variegated
that
one
despairs
of
isolating
any
general
principles
that
would
hold
good
for
the
entire
period.
But
for
the
purposes
of
this
essay
we
shall
try
to
avoid
the
pitfalls
of
hasty
generaliza-
tion
by
focusing
primarily
on
the
writings
of
Hobbes
and
Locke.
Several
considerations
recommend
this
strategy.
To
begin
with,
Hobbes
and
Locke
seemed
to
Hegel
much
more
significant
figures
than
their
contem-
poraries
such
as
Grotius
or
Selden.’
Moreover,
they
have
had
a
much
broader
impact
on
20th
century
thought,
especially
through
their
devel-
opment
of
state
of
nature
and
social
contract
theories .6
So
in
these
two
4
By
no
means
will
I
argue
that
Hegel’s
approach
to
providing
a
grounding
for
human
rights
is
the
only,
or
even
the
best,
one.
For
an
especially
thought-provoking
alternative
see
Gewirth
(1982).
5
Cf.,
for
example,
Vol.
III
of
the
History
of
Philosophy,
where
Hegel
devotes
22
pages
to
Hobbes
and
Locke,
only
2
to
Grotius
and
none
to
Selden.
6
Cf.
Rawls
(1971)
and
Nozick
(1974)
for two different
uses
to
which
these
liberal
constructs
have
recently
been
put.
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