The unfailing of the State.

• Author: Gourevitch, Alex
• Position: Book Review

When States Fail: Causes and Consequences Edited by Robert I. Rotberg Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003, 336 pages.

State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction Edited by Jennifer Milliken Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2003, 336 pages.

The Nation-State in Question Edited by T. V. Paul, G. John Ikenberry, and John A. Hall Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003, 400 pages.

When Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner published their essay "Saving Failed States" in Foreign Policy, in late 1992, they could not have predicted just how well-received their assessment of the bewildering terrain of post-Cold War international politics would be. The new concept of "failed state" seemed to sum up in one pithy phrase the dark side of the new world order, while simultaneously providing a new sense of purpose to those seeking direction in the rudderless, unipolar global scene. It spread like wildfire among diplomats, politicians, policy wonks, academics and anyone else grasping to make sense of recent changes. Madeleine Albright justified the ill-fated Somalia intervention on the grounds that it would "help lift the country and its people from the category of a failed state." (1) The CIA established a "State Failure Task Force" composed of academics, policy experts and government officials to identify the determinants of state failure. Academia registered this new political focus with books like Robert Jackson's seminal Quasi-States, I. William Zartman's edited volume Collapsed States, and with journal articles like "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order" and "Responding to State Failure in Africa." From this growing body of scholarship emerged the three anthologies reviewed here: When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, edited by Robert I. Rotberg, State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction, edited by Jennifer Milliken and The Nation-State in Question, edited by T. V. Paul, G. John Ikenberry and John A. Hall.

By the end of the 1990s, discussion of failed states was so entrenched that this new phenomenon was held responsible for just about every threat to international peace and security that existed: civil war, mass migration, ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, drug smuggling, arms trafficking and terrorism. The general consensus on the problem was matched by similar agreement on the solution: intervention. Domestic anarchy required a third party to stabilize the situation. Given that these new threats impacted not only local communities but also global peace and security, the international arena had an interest, not just a moral obligation, in intervening. State building became a new purpose for the UN, foreign ministries and international organizations.

This dominant view no doubt had its detractors. Some felt the failed state was not a real security threat, though such critics were often derided for relying on antiquated notions of security. Others felt that intervention would be ineffective or reflected an imperial impulse, though they were likewise derided for clinging to antiquated notions of sovereignty. But what was particularly strange about the new debate was that while everyone seemed to know what they were talking about, no one could really define it.

Two of the books under review here--State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction and When States Fail--share the dual aims of trying to improve on existing theory and assessing current practice. Both are collections of essays that balance academic investigations with policy-oriented conclusions. State Failure is broader in scope than When States Fail and it is more cautious about intervention. It includes chapters on the nature of the Third World state, on the purposes, limits and justifications of intervention and on case studies of past interventions. When States Fail, on the...