Banishing the bogey of incommensurability.

• Author: Alexander, Larry
• Position: Response to articles by Ruth Chang and Lewis A. Kornhauser in this issue, p. 1569, 1599 - Symposium Comments: Law and Incommensurability

I have two major worries whenever I am asked to comment on others' articles. The first is that I will know nothing about the subject, which, given the large number of subjects I know nothing about, is highly likely. The second is that I will agree down the line with the articles on which I am to comment, the probability of which increases with the eminence of the authors, and which becomes almost a certainty if my first worry is borne out.

That is my predicament here. I really have not been a close follower of the literature on incommensurability, having just gotten snatches of it from reading Joseph Raz,(1) Elizabeth Anderson,(2) and others.(3) Ruth Chang(4) and Lewis Kornhauser(5) are also very able theorists, both of whom I find quite convincing.

Yet, because Chang and Kornhauser are so good, they actually have saved me from the ignominious fate of having nothing to say. They have caused me to reflect upon certain aspects of the incommensurability debate and to reach some conclusions, though quite tentative ones. What I am interested in are various moral phenomena that might be taken as demonstrating value incommensurability but that I believe do nothing of the sort.

1. WHAT INCOMMENSURABILITY IS NOT: A LAUNDRY LIST

   I agree completely with Ruth Chang that to say a choice is justified is to imply the comparability of the thing chosen with those not chosen.(6) The worry about incommensurability, then, is that if two courses of action are of incommensurable value, the choice between them cannot be justified.(7) That is surely a problem in the domain of prudence. And it is a huge problem in the domain of moral values, for it raises the specter of moral relativism.

   Is there reason to believe that either moral or prudential values are incommensurable, so that many moral or prudential choices cannot be justified? I cannot demonstrate the complete absence of value incommensurability. What I shall attempt to do, however, is point out a number of things that might be taken to reveal value incommensurability but do not, at least not in the way that would undermine justified choice.

   1. Hard Choices

      Frequently we are confronted with really difficult choices. Should we pursue a career in law, for which we are moderately talented, and which will allow us to have a conventional family life and considerable comfort? Or should we instead pursue an artistic life, for which we have great talent and love, but which will deprive us of the joys of family and wealth? Should we move our family to a remote wilderness, where we will be free from the pollution, crime, and moral corruption of city life, and where we can share the togetherness brought about by isolation and home schooling? Or should we remain in the city, where our children will have friends their own age and a chance to encounter diverse peoples and values and become cosmopolitan in outlook?

      These dilemmas are paradigmatic of many hard choices we or others might face. Do they suggest incommensurable values and thus the incomparability of the chosen paths? I think not.

      For one thing, as a matter of phenomenology, the choices seem to be ones that might be unjustified. That is why we anguish over them. If the values truly were incommensurable and the choices incomparable, then why the anguish? If isolation is neither better nor worse than city life, then whichever is chosen is as unjustified as its competitor. One might as well blithely flip a coin. After all, when choices are of equal value--as in picking a number on which to place a bet in roulette--anguish is uncalled for. Anguish seems uncalled for as well in cases in which incommensurability holds.

      There is a second reason why these hard choices suggest commensurable rather than incommensurable values. Suppose that in the choice, say, between being a lawyer and being an artist, we alter some of the outcomes. Suppose, for example, that if we become a lawyer, we will be very successful, perhaps with a good chance of being appointed to the Supreme Court. And suppose that if we become an artist, our work will be mediocre at best. The choice to become a lawyer begins to look somewhat better than the choice to become an artist. But if this is so, it suggests that these choices are comparable--perhaps the metric of comparability is something like a "deeply satisfying life"--and that what looked like incommensurability was really just epistemic uncertainty within a range.(8) Once lawyering moves above that range, or being an artist moves below it, we are more confident in the justifiability of the choice of lawyering.

   2. Personal Death

      Some values appear incommensurable, I suspect, because the choice of one rather than another would change us in...