The neglected stepchild: military justice and democratic transition in Chile.
| Date | 22 June 2005 |
| Author | Pereira, Anthony W.,Zaverucha, Jorge |
| Published date | 22 June 2005 |
| Author | Pereira, Anthony W. |
Introduction
IN THE COMPARATIVE LITERATURE ON DEMOCRACY, CHILE IS OFTEN IDENTIFIED AS A LATIN American success story (see, for example, Carothers, 2002: 7). A key component of this alleged success has been a particularly effective rule of law (Galleher, 1988: 185). Along with Costa Rica and Uruguay, Chile is usually categorized as a country in which generalizations about Latin America's dysfunctional judiciaries and lack of respect for the law do not apply (O'Donnell, 1999). Furthermore, since Chile's democratic transition, the governments of Aylwin (1990 to 1994), Frei (1994 to 2000), and Lagos (2000 to the present) have enacted significant judicial reforms that have been praised by observers as being unusually coherent and effective (Prillaman, 2000:137-161).
This article will challenge the conventional wisdom about judicial reform in Chile. The characterization of this reform as a success can only be made by ignoring the issue of military justice, a justice system that affects many citizens. It is important to emphasize that the Chilean military justice system lacks certain elements of other court systems, such as the independence and autonomy of judges. In fact, its purpose is less the administration of justice than the protection of the armed forces' interests in hierarchy, discipline, and order. As long as military justice remains in its present form in Chile, it serves as a barrier to the creation of a democratic rule of law, thus damaging the prospects for democratic deepening.
In Chile, despite important advances in other areas of the legal system, an enlarged and insulated system of military courts still rewards the armed forces with special prerogatives that violate the principle of equality before the law. This court system is partly a legacy of the Pinochet regime (1973 to 1990), and partly a legacy of longer-term state-society interactions. Section I analyzes the importance of military justice to democracy. Section II describes the current organization, jurisdiction, composition, and procedures of Chilean military justice, pointing out how some of its features are incompatible with the principles of civilian supremacy over the military and citizens' equality before the law. Section III advances an argument that explains that outcome.
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Military Justice and Democracy
Military courts constitute the oldest, and often most archaic, court system in many states. Unlike their contemporaneous counterpart, ecclesiastical courts, they have rarely been abolished. In most countries they survive in the contemporary era, although typically with more limited jurisdiction than in the past. Their origin lies in the attempts of rulers to impose discipline on members of their own armed forces. (1)
In such systems, the disciplinary function takes precedence over the ideal that courts be impartial and independent, because the military hierarchy is at the same time a party to and judge of the case. Similarly, military courts are usually not well equipped or capable of judging crimes committed by their own personnel against other soldiers and civilians. When it comes to restraining the violence of its own armed force, military justice is tantamount to self-policing.
Unlike more modern court systems, which create a cadre of long-serving, often almost irremovable judges who are thereby supposed to be separate and independent from the rulers of other state institutions, there is no clear separation in military courts between the hierarchy of the military as an institution and the judges who serve, usually temporarily, in military courts. Typically, military court judges are active-duty officers and enlisted personnel, temporarily assigned to the court, who answer to commanding officers who themselves may have an interest in the outcome of the case being judged.
Military justice contains a pre-liberal vision of justice that antedates Montesquieu's separation of powers, because it embodies the principle that "who commands may judge," and mixes the administrative-disciplinary power of the commander-in-chief with penal power. In its very structure, therefore, military justice lacks an important element that can serve to protect the rights of the accused in civilian court systems.
Fascist regimes that arose in Europe between the world wars generally expanded the jurisdiction of military courts. This can be seen most clearly in Germany, where the Weimar Constitution of 1919 curtailed the jurisdiction of military justice except in time of war and on board ships (article 106). With the rise of Nazism, military justice was reestablished and expanded. Military justice was again restricted after the end of the Third Reich in Germany, and in 1985 the German Parliament awarded compensation for surviving victims of military justice on the grounds that the verdicts constituted an "obvious injustice." (2)
In Italy, the fascist regime also considerably expanded the jurisdiction of military justice, although not to the extent that it was in Nazi Germany; in the postwar period, the Constitution of 1948 (article 103.3) restricted it again. A similar process of expansion and contraction of military justice can be seen in the history of Spanish fascism. The fascist dictatorship expanded the jurisdiction of military justice to include common crimes of military personnel and some crimes of civilians. After the demise of the Franco regime, the Constitution of 1978 limited military justice jurisdiction to the military sphere and states of siege. (3) Today in Spain, common crimes of military personnel are tried in ordinary courts, and civilians can only be tried in military courts in the rare cases in which they have participated with military personnel in a military crime. (4)
If fascist regimes have often found military courts to be convenient tools of repression and bellicosity, social democratic regimes have sometimes found them to be entirely dispensable. The Swedish government, for example, abolished military justice in peacetime in 1949. Military crimes were added to the civilian penal code, but applied only to military personnel. Members of the Swedish military from then on were judged in civilian courts for both military and civilian crimes; military courts were preserved only for the rather unlikely contingency that Sweden goes to war. (5)
Unfortunately, this sensible approach has not been widely emulated. In Latin America, for example, the advent of military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s led to the widespread use of military courts to prosecute those deemed to be threatening to "national security." For example, the Chilean military regime used military courts to prosecute alleged subversives. Once they began to operate, military courts gradually acquired more power and a larger jurisdiction.
Therefore, one of the most relevant indicators of a democratic civil-military relationship is the existence of a clear institutional separation between civil and military jurisdiction (Rice, 1992). Stepan (1988) suggests that countries in which civilian politicians are able to reduce military jurisdiction and in which civilians are not subject to judgment in military courts are more democratic than their counterparts, where such reforms have not taken place.
For this reason, in democratic countries civilians in peacetime cannot be tried in military courts, which are exclusively for members of the armed forces accused of military crimes, i.e., crimes by military personnel that have to do with their function in the military (desertion, disobedience, the theft of military resources) rather than common crimes such as murder, rape, and the theft of nonmilitary property. (6) This is not the case in Chile. In general, the less democratic the country, the more expansive the jurisdiction of military justice. Like the proverbial canary in the coalmine, the vitality of civilian court jurisdiction vis-a-vis its military counterpart is an indicator of the larger political environment. It can be taken as a sign of the health of democracy--perhaps not an infallible sign, but one that is highly revealing.
Nevertheless, military justice is often used as an instrument of authoritarian social control over civilian populations. For example, according to a Chilean government commission, (7) a factor in the abuses committed during the Pinochet era was the military penal code. Many of its articles facilitated the violation of the human rights of thousands of Chileans.
In addition, the concept of the rule of law includes the ideal of equality of all citizens before the law. This is not attained when military justice has an expansive definition of military crime and judges civilians. Under these circumstances, military justice serves to constrain those who oppose the dominant martial values of the moment, rather--as we have pointed out before--than administer justice. As Shapiro (2003: 3) writes, "democracy is better thought of as a means of managing power relations so as to minimize domination." Whoever mentions domination has an obligation to reflect on military justice and the need to minimize the state's power, reducing its abuses.
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Features of Chilean Military Justice
Chilean military courts were an important instrument of the political repression carried out by the Pinochet regime (1973 to 1990). Although military courts had jurisdiction over civilians before military rule, trials of civilians in military justice were rare (O'Keefe, 1989: 44). The Pinochet regime expanded military court jurisdiction and prosecuted thousands of civilians, first in "war-time" tribunals (8) and then, after 1978, in peacetime courts for crimes such as violations of the 1972 Arms Control Law, membership in various banned organizations, the propagation of "subversive" propaganda, and the like.
This use of military courts against the authoritarian regime's political enemies has left important legacies for Chile's contemporary democracy. These include an exceptionally wide...
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