The national security exception in wto law: emerging jurisprudence and future direction

AuthorJacob Gladysz
PositionJ.D. Candidate 2022, Georgetown University Law Center
Pages835-861
THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION IN WTO
LAW: EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE AND
FUTURE DIRECTION
JACOB GLADYSZ*
ABSTRACT
The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) was written
with a broadly worded national security exception. This national security exception
was copied into the founding agreements of today’s World Trade Organization
(WTO). The exception allows a contracting party, under certain specified circum-
stances, to take any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essen-
tial security interestsnotwithstanding other WTO commitments.
Despite the national security exception’s potential as an almost total escape clause
from WTO commitments, it was rarely invoked and even more rarely adjudicated.
That is, until now. Over the past five years, a number of WTO members—includ-
ing the United States—have invoked the national security exception as a defense to
alleged violations of WTO commitments. Additionally, in 2019 and 2020, the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) interpreted the scope of the national security
exception for the first time in two landmark decisions: Russia – Measures
Concerning Traffic in Transit and Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning
the Protection of Intellectual Property.
This Note analyzes the Russia and Saudi Arabia decisions and explores what
they mean for future applications of the national security exception in WTO law.
It suggests that despite the common approach applied in the Russia and Saudi
Arabia cases, the future direction of the WTO’s national security exception is far
from clear. Within the Russia and Saudi Arabia decisions lie significant ambigu-
ities that will condition both the future use and adjudication of the national secu-
rity exception. This Note uses the United States’ invocation of the national security
exception to defend its Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs to demonstrate the
variety of outcomes that could result from future application of the Russia/Saudi
Arabia decisions. With the collision between national security and trade showing
no signs of abating, navigating the jurisprudential ambiguities of the national se-
curity exception will be a critical task for the WTO.
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 836
II. NATIONAL SECURITY IN WTO AGREEMENTS ................ 838
* J.D. Candidate 2022, Georgetown University Law Center. The author extends his thanks to
Professor Timothy C. Brightbill for his guidance and encouragement throughout the process of
writing this note. V
C2021, Jacob Gladysz.
835
III. NATIONAL SECURITY IN WTO PANEL DECISIONS ............. 842
A. Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit ........ 843
B. Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights ........................ 846
C. Common Features of WTO Panel Decisions ............. 848
IV. THE BIFURCATED APPROACH OF THE RUSSIA &SAUDI ARABIA
PANELS.......................................... 849
A. Articulation of Essential Security Interests.............. 849
B. Good Faith Requirement .......................... 850
C. Means-Ends Fit ................................ 852
V. PATHS FORWARD FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION ...... 854
A. Section 232 Tariffs ............................. 855
B. Application of the FormalApproach ................ 857
C. Application of the PracticalApproach............... 860
VI. CONCLUSION &EVALUATION........................... 860
I. INTRODUCTION
The intersection of national security and trade is an increasingly im-
portant space in international trade law. In recent years, states have
incorporated notions of economic security into existing concepts of
national security. This securitizationof economic concerns has
caused friction in the global trading order as matters relating to the
international flow of goods, capital, and ideas are fused with security
concerns.
1
The interaction of trade and national security is nothing new in the
history of trade. Both free-traders and trade skeptics have appealed to
national security as a key reason for either expanding or restricting
trade. Free traders tout the role of tradeand international trading rules
in promoting peace between nations.
2
Trade skeptics of both strong
and mild varieties argue that unrestricted imports from abroad can
1. Securitizationis a term borrowed from the international relations literature, in which it
describes the process by which states incorporate new subjects into existing concepts of security
or national security.BARRY BUZAN,OLE WÆVER &JAAP DE WILDE,SECURITY:ANEW FRAMEWORK
FOR ANALYSIS 25 (1998).
2. See, e.g.,NORMAN ANGELL,THE GREAT ILLUSION:ASTUDYOF THE RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY
POWER TO NATIONAL ADVANTAGE (1913) (arguing that the expansion of international trading
networks makes war less likely). For a more modern view of this thesis see Erik Gartzke, Quan Li &
Charles Boehmer, Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict,55INTL
ORGS. 391 (2001).
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
836 [Vol. 52

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