The U.N. and arms control in Iraq: a new role?

• Author: Loehr, Robert C.
• Position: Interview with ambassador Rolf Ekeus - Continuity and Transformation: The Modern Middle East - Interview

Journal: What are the principal responsibilities of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), and what technical assets are at its disposal?

Ekeus: The principal responsibility of UNSCOM is to implement the weapons sections of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) - the cease-fire resolution of the Persian Gulf War - which are contained in paragraphs 8 to 13. There are two fundamental tasks. One is the identification and elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles (in this case, defined as having a range of over 150 kilometers), along with its production equipment and support systems for these capabilities. The other is the installation of an international monitoring system to verify Iraq's compliance with its obligation not to acquire these things again. In other words, we identify these assets, take them out and eliminate them, but we also have to ensure that Iraq is not reacquiring them.

The primary assets we utilize in achieving these two tasks are international specialists and aerial surveillance - both high-altitude surveillance (using U-2 platforms) and immediate, shorter-range overhead surveillance (using helicopter platforms). Inside Iraq, we identify all of the major production facilities in the engineering and electronics industries, as well as in heavy-metals production. We use monitoring cameras, which continuously send their imagery from the production plants directly to a monitoring center we have built in Baghdad. The cameras are also installed around chemical, biological and, of course, (theoretically) nuclear-capable facilities. All of these involve "dual-purpose" activities - activities with the potential for both military and civilian use. We tag, through a tamper-proof system, all machines and production equipment of any significance:

all high-precision instruments, all high-tech machines and all high-precision machine tools that could be used to advance Iraq's prohibited weapons programs. In the missile area, Iraq is permitted to produce shorter-range missiles. Therefore, UNSCOM must also identify all larger short-range missiles. They are tagged and monitored regularly through continuous inspection and camera supervision. Data on the tagged equipment, imagery from aerial surveillance and inspection reports are put into a sophisticated database. UNSCOM has specialized international inspection teams in all the weapons areas stationed in Baghdad, utilizing the assets of imagery, camera input and their own high mobility (with the help of helicopters and ground vehicles) to cover the daily work and the daily life of facilities and personnel perceived as "dual-capable." All of these efforts together should be effective.

Furthermore, UNSCOM is putting in place an export-import control mechanism. We expect to have the Security Council's acceptance of the mechanism shortly. This plan, which has already been approved in principle by the member states, presupposes a new resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which will make it obligatory for all states trading with Iraq to notify the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding specific items sold and exported to Iraq. This is not licensing, it is notification - an important distinction. We are not prohibiting Iraq from buying anything (of course, they are currently prohibited from buying weapons), but we are being informed whenever Iraq is importing a dual-purpose item. The data on imports is very useful, especially as UNSCOM can link the important data to other available information. Thus it will be possible to detect any effort by Iraq to re-establish any of the prohibited weapons programs. When the import data are linked with the monitoring system already in place, we will have a seamless and watertight control system.

Journal: Could you discuss the current state of Iraq's capacity to produce biological weapons, as this seems to be a current area of focus? Specifically, can you comment on the existence of complex media" or breeding grounds for bacterial cultures?

Ekeus: Iraq has imported large amounts of media suitable for the production of biological agents for weapons purposes. Our problem is that "complex media" are, in a sense, neutral. They are naturally an important element in the production of medicines and other civilian endeavors. What causes us to question the Iraqi holdings of media is the quantities. The quantities acquired by Iraq are much larger than reasonable civilian use requires. Iraq is not acting in an economically rational fashion - it has been buying too much. One can then use the economic argument and ask, "Why is Iraq buying so many times more than it needs for legitimate purposes?" We cannot find any purpose for these imports other than weapons-related production. This is a serious problem between Iraq and UNSCOM - we have simply not obtained any rational explanation for the disposal of the very large quantities of media that have been imported.

Journal. Would you say that this is your priority task between now and April, when sanctions come up for review?

Ekeus: Well, probably, yes. UNSCOM has a very good grasp of Iraq's activities in the other weapons areas. However, there are still problems. Special equipment usable for biological weapons production has been imported, and we have been given no reasonable explanation for these imports. Related facilities have been built in Iraq for which the rationales given have not been acceptable to our specialists. They do not understand the rationales and cannot honestly endorse them. So we have to clear up these issues.

Journal: If we could take a somewhat broader view for a moment, you have held that the desire to get sanctions lifted was the key to the change in the attitude of the Iraqi government. How do you respond to those recent commentators who have argued that the amount of damage to the Iraqi people and the Iraqi economy has been unacceptable, especially to someone who has been inside Iraq recently and seen conditions there?

Ekeus: We feel a direct responsibility vis-a-vis this situation in relation to the oil embargo, because of the construction of Paragraph 22 of Resolution 687. This is the paragraph that states that when the question of prohibited weapons in Iraq has been settled, the prohibition against Iraq's oil export shall no longer be in force. Paragraph 21 is broader; it goes beyond UNSCOM's mandate, as, in addition to spelling out Iraq's obligations to give up its weapons programs, it also refers to Iraq's other obligations under the cease-fire resolution. The end of the prohibition of exports to Iraq will be a consequence of Iraq's behavior vis-a-vis all these obligations. Thus, we do not have complete responsibility for all sanctions. But it goes without saying that sanctions could not be lifted without positive reporting from the Special Commission to the Security Council.

The response to the outright aggression against Kuwait and the destruction of that country was, in my opinion, a very humane one. The United States and the coalition stopped their operation well before entering the central areas of Iraq. If they had gone on to Baghdad, they probably could have managed to oust the leadership. There has been unfair criticism of the U.S. government and its coalition partners for...