The Motivation to Enlist Among Kurds

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211038026
Published date01 January 2023
Date01 January 2023
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20917183
Armed Forces & Society
2023, Vol. 49(1) 48 –69
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X20917183
journals.sagepub.com/home/afs
Article
1134644AFSXXX10.1177/0095327X20917183Armed Forces & SocietyLevy
research-article2022
The Motivation to Enlist
Among Kurds
Matthew Cancian
Abstract
Although humans have voluntarily joined militaries throughout history, research on the
motivation to enlist has increased dramatically since the adoption of the All-Volunteer
Force in the United States. Moskos categorized the motivations to enlist as institutional
(the value alignment of the individual with the military) or occupational (the seeking
of monetary rewards for competencies at market rates). This study explores the
prevalenceof these two traditional motivationsin addition to two less commonly studied
motivationsgroup mobilization and revenge-seekingin an important context: the
Kurds of northernIraq. A survey of 2301 Kurdish soldiers (Peshmerga) during their war
against the Islamic State (IS) indicates that institutional motivations are the most
prevalent, although all four motivations are present. The importance of group mobili-
zation and revenge-seeking represent important variations from the better-studied
Western contexts that complicate our understanding of the motivation to enlist.
Keywords
civil wars, military culture, recruitment/retention, Middle East
Introduction
Azad had graduated from a university in the United Kingdom before following his tribe
into battle against the Islamic State in August 2014. He posted on Facebook, Today
[our] tribe showed up in our thousandsto show them that we are here and that they
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Matthew Cancian, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 770 South Rd., East Greenwich, RI 02818,
Cambridge, MA, USA.
Email: mcancian@mit.edu
https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20917183
Armed Forces & Society
2023, Vol. 49(1) 48 –69
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211038026
journals.sagepub.com/home/afs
Cancian 49
will never take Kurdistan.He held a rocket-propelled grenade launcher in the photo he
posted. When Welat was 12, the Baghdad government forced his family to move to
Iran. As soon as he was old enough, he returned to Iraq as a Peshmerga, a Kurdish
soldier. Naqib deserted the Iraqi Army in February 1991 as it was being destroyed by
American forces and returned north. When his fellow Kurds rebelled against Saddam
Hussein in March, Naqib joined them. In contrast, Dilo joined during the relatively
peaceful 2000s: I was just happy to have a job,he said of his f‌irst day as a Peshmerga.
These mens stories provide windows into their reasons for joining the Peshmerga,
the Kurdish soldiers of northern Iraq. The purpose of this study is to explore the
motivation to enlist among soldiers in an under-studied and important context: the
Kurds of northern Iraq. These Kurdish soldiers were instrumental in f‌ighting the Islamic
State (IS) from 2014 to 2017. Over 150,000 Peshmerga deployed (Rudaw, 2017), and
about 1760 died in the f‌ighting (Mostafa, 2017). Previous studies have examined this
case using interviews with a relatively small number of Peshmerga (Nilsson, 2018);
however, larger-scale quantitative data have been lacking.
Besides being strategically important, this case also offers an opportunity to explore
the motivation to enlist in a different context than the well-studied militaries of Western
countries. Since 2003, the Peshmerga have been the legally appointed armed forces of
the Kurdistan Regional Government, although they have a long history of conf‌lict with
the central government in Baghdad (Aziz, 2017). Despite being a legally established
entity, the Peshmerga is less bureaucratized than contemporary Western militaries,
suffering from divided command structures, tribal stacking of units, and a reliance on
personal connections (ISSAT, 2020;Wilgenburg & Fumerton, 2015). This lower
bureaucratization offers pathways for enlistment that are not available in militaries that
rely solely on bureaucratic mechanisms. Previous surveys have focused on highly
bureaucratized armed forces, such as the Belgian (Manigart, 2005), British (Edmunds
et al., 2016), Indian (Singh, 2017), and Turkish (Aydiner et al., 2019) militaries.
Therefore, the case of the Peshmerga offers an opportunity to test the external validity
of theories developed and ref‌ined in those highly bureaucratized contexts. This study
aims to do so using novel survey data, thereby improving our understanding not only of
this important case, but of the general question of why individuals voluntarily risk their
lives by enlisting.
Literature Review
This article def‌ines enlistmentas an individuals voluntary decision to join a military.
Although many militaries distinguish between the enlistmentof non-off‌icers and the
commissioningof off‌icers, this article applies the term enlistmentto both for
simplicitys sake. The term also overlaps with recruitment,although the latter
emphasizes the efforts of the military itself to attract new members versus the indi-
viduals own motivations. As the focus here is on the individuals motivations, en-
listmentis preferred. The def‌inition used here also excludes coercive induction, such
as conscription or abduction. Finally, motivations inf‌luencing enlistment are separate
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