The moral self: A review and integration of the literature

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/job.1919
• Published date: 01 February 2015
• Date: 01 February 2015
• Author: Peter L. Jennings,Sean T. Hannah,Marie S. Mitchell

The moral self: A review and integration of

the literature

PETER L. JENNINGS

1

*

,†

, MARIE S. MITCHELL

2†

AND SEAN T. HANNAH

3

1

Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California, U.S.A.

2

Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, U.S.A.

3

School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, U.S.A.

Summary The role of the self in moral functioning has gained considerable theoretical and empirical attention over the

last 25 years. A general consensus has emerged that the self plays a vital role in individuals’moral agency.

This surge of research produced a proliferation of constructs related to the moral self, each grounded in

diverse theoretical perspectives. Although this work has advanced our understanding of moral thought and

behavior, there has also been a lack of clarity as to the nature and functioning of the moral self. We review

and synthesize empirical research related to the moral self and provide an integrative framework to increase

conceptual coherence among the various relevant constructs. We then discuss emerging opportunities and

future directions for research on the moral self as well as implications for behavioral ethics in organizational

contexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords: moral self; moral identity centrality; moral judgment disposition; self-conscious moral

orientation; self-conscious moral emotions; moral strength; moral functioning

The corruption and scandals that have plagued organizations in recent years have prompted significant interest in the

study of ethical work behavior. Accounting for human moral functioning and behavior, however, has proven to be a

complex and difficult problem. Initial research relied heavily on Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive moral development

theory, which emphasizes the importance of moral reasoning to explain ethical behavior. Indeed, research has shown

that cognitive moral development predicts moral behavior (see Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006 for a review) but

that the strength of these effects varies considerably and is modest at best (Blasi, 1980). This weak and inconsistent

relationship between moral judgment andmoral behavior is known as the “judgment–actiongap”(Walker, 2004, p. 1).

This judgment–action gap motivated the search for more comprehensive theoretical frameworks in which moral psy-

chologists (e.g., Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004) and, recently, organizational behavior ethics researchers (e.g., Treviño

et al., 2006), have focused on the moral self as the key to explaining the complexity of human moral functioning.

We propose thata deeper understanding of whatconstitutes the moral self, andits development is essential to advancing

research on ethical behavior in morally complex and challenging organizational contexts.

Scholarly interest in the moral self traces back to Aristotle who expounded a holistic concept of the moral self

grounded in character and virtue (Solomon, 1992). Yet, it was only after Blasi (1983) introduced his “self model”

of moral functioning that the topic gained momentum. Blasi sought to bridge the judgment–action gap by proposing

that moral action results from the integration of morality into one’s sense of self (e.g., Erikson, 1964). A person has a

moral self to the extent that moral notions (e.g., moral values, ideals, goals, and concerns) are central to self-

understanding (Blasi, 1993), which motivates felt responsibility to behave consistent with those notions. Blasi’s

model has proven to be foundational for moral self theory and launched the post-Kohlbergian era of scholarly

work (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). A surge of research followed (e.g., Aquino & Reed,

2002; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). However, this work is not integrate d into a holistic framework,

*Correspondence to: Peter L. Jennings, Leavy School of Business, Department of Management, Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real,

Santa Clara, CA 95053, U.S.A. E-mail: pjennings@scu.edu

†

Note that these authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 02 May 2012

Revised 10 December 2013, Accepted 10 December 2013

Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav. 36, S104–S168 (2015)

Published online 20 February 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/job.1919

The IRIOP Annual Review

which has created ambiguity about the nature of the moral self. Reviews (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Narvaez &

Lapsley, 2009; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008) and edited books (Lapsley & Narvaez , 2004; Narvaez &

Lapsley, 2009) have consolidated some aspects of this literature, but a review survey ing empirical research

and its significance to ethical behavior in organizations is lacking.

Our review seeks to bring clarity to the state of knowledge about the moral self and provide directions for future

research. We begin with an overview of the theory of the moral self and review empirical work that has explicitly

examined the moral self as a focal construct. Our goals are to capture the main empirical findings associated with

the moral self that are relevant to organizations and synthesize these findings into an integrative framework. We also

discuss emerging opportunities and future research directions, with an emphasis on the implications for the nature of

the moral self and its functioning in organizational contexts.

Theory of the Moral Self

Moral self research is based on the Aristotelian premise that morality is a characteristic of a person and not simply a

result of abstract moral reasoning (Blasi, 1993; Solomon, 1992). Morality is understood to be at the heart of what it

means to be a person (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). The moral self is concerned with the morality of selfhood (the

qualities by virtue of which a person is oneself) that implicates both who a person is (a person’s sense of self and

identity based on deeply felt concerns, commitments, and attachments) and how a person acts (a person’s character-

istic ways of thinking, feeling, and regulating behavior; Baumeister, 1987; Solomon, 1992). These ideas follow an

ontological tradition in moral philosophy and psychology, which posit that the self involves both a private dimen-

sion rooted in the core of one’s being and a public dimension manifested in an orientation to be true to oneself in

action (Erikson, 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; James, 1892/2001; Schlenker, 1980; Solomon, 1992).

Thus, moral self research has focused on explaining (i) how morality is internalized into a person’s sense of self,

which we refer to as the “having”side of the moral self, and (ii) how that internalized morality influences cognitive

and affective self-regulatory capacities that govern decisions and behavior, which we refer to as the “doing”side of

the moral self.

The “having”side of the moral self is cognitively and socially constructed (Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). Social

construction occurs through roles, practices, and interpersonal interactions within the social-moral context in which

a person is embedded, such as family, community, or organization (Harter, 1999; Hunter, 2000). Cognitive construc-

tion occurs through individuals’beliefs about their self (i.e., self-concepts and identities) on the basis of social

interactions that bring meaning to their experiences (Harter, 1999). When these socially and cognitively constructed

beliefs are based on morality, a person is understood as “having”a moral self.

The “doing”side of the moral self emerges when these moral beliefs invoke self-relevant cognitions, evaluations,

emotions, and regulatory processes that motivate moral action (Aquino & Freeman, 2009). The “doing”side unde r-

scores the executive agency of the self to take responsibility, make decisions, initiate actions, and exert control over

itself and the environment (Baumeister, 1998). Without this executive function, the moral self would be a “mere

helpless spectator of events, of minimal use or importance”(Baumeister, 1998, p. 680). Cognitive and affective

self-regulatory capacities are essential to agency, governing nearly all the self’s activities, especially those

concerning morality (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1996). As such,

the “doing”side of the moral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action

(e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998).

In sum, this “having”and “doing”conceptualization of the moral self implies that the moral self is not a stand-

alone construct or variable but is a complex amalgam of moral constructs and processes, wherein self-defining moral

beliefs, orientations, and dispositions implicate cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities essential to moral

action. This holistic understanding reflects an emerging trend in both moral psychology (Narvaez & Lapsley,

2009) and self psychology more generally (Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Consistent with these ideas,

THE MORAL SELF S105

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 36, S104–S168 (2015)

DOI: 10.1002/job

we define the moral self as a complex system of self-defining moral attributes involving moral beliefs, orientations,

dispositions, and cognitive and affective capacities that engage regulatory focus toward moral behavior.

Review of Empirical Research on the Moral Self

To be as comprehensive of the published empirical work as possible, we searched abstracts of published articles

appearing in EBSCO and ABI Inform databases, using search terms derived from our moral self definition and fur-

ther targeted studies referring to one of the terms “moral”or “ethic.”Our review of the empirical research reveals

five categories of moral self constructs (moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, self-conscious moral orienta-

tion, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength), which we depict in an emergent process model of the

moral self (Figure 1). Below, we describe the five categories of moral self constructs and then summarize empirical

work examining them. Our review describes research that empirically tested the specific constructs that fit within our

moral self definition and does not include results of correlates outside of these moral self variables.

Emergent moral self constructs

The five categories of moral self constructs are as follows: (i) moral centrality (the degree to which morality is piv-

otal to one’s self-understanding; e.g., moral identity and moral self-concept); (ii) moral judgment disposition (the

stable tendency to take a specific moral perspective in decisions and action; e.g., ethical ideology and ethical predis-

position); (iii) self-conscious moral orientation (an orientation to perceive and reflect on moral implications of one’s

experiences; e.g., moral attentiveness and moral sensitivity); (iv) self-conscious moral emotions (the degree to which

Figure 1. Synopsis of empirical work on the moral self

S106 P. L. JENNINGS ET AL.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 36, S104–S168 (2015)

DOI: 10.1002/job