The Military Role in Filling the Security Gap After Armed Conflict

• Author: Peter Neuteboom,Joseph Soeters
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16667087
• Date: 01 October 2017
• Published date: 01 October 2017
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The Military Role in

Filling the Security Gap

After Armed Conflict:

Three Cases

Peter Neuteboom

1

and Joseph Soeters

1

Abstract

During stabilization operations, the host nation and the international community

are often confronted with a security gap, which could be a prelude to an explosive

growth of crime and public disorder. In the absence of a functioning local police, an

alternative is that the (international) military temporarily intervenes as interim

police. This article analyzes how the Netherlands’ military performed during

security gaps in three (post)conflict areas: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and

Iraq. It concludes that army units frequently were involved in interim policing and

de facto operated as hybrid organizations, without leaving the military paradigm

behind. Policing is generally not seen as a primary task of the military, however.

To adapt to the reality of security gaps and to increase the operational effec-

tiveness in the field of public security, the military would benefit from reflecting

on their current military paradigm and on what they could learn from current

policing practices.

Keywords

stabilization operations, security gap, public security, interim policing, policing by

the military

1

Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda, the Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Peter Neuteboom, Netherlands Defense Academy, De la Reyweg 120, 4818 BB, Breda, the Netherlands.

Email: pcj.neuteboom.01@mindef.nl

Armed Forces & Society

2017, Vol. 43(4) 711-733

ªThe Author(s) 2016

Reprints and permission:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16667087

journals.sagepub.com/home/afs

Contemporary stabilization operations involve a strong interdependency between

military action and the restoration of publi c security, that is, reestablishing and

preserving law and order. In case there are no (legitimate) local police in place to

maintain law and order, stabilization forces often have to deal with security gaps.

The most obvious solution to filling these gaps is to reform the local security sector,

including the police. However, there is a general understanding that police reform

programs are time consuming and can take up to 5 years or more to complete (Jones,

Wilson, Rathmell, & Riley, 2005, p. 22; Voorhoeve, 2007, p. 174).

A short-term alternative could be the deployment of an international police force.

The establishment of such a force regularly suffers from two major problems. The

first problem is often referred to as the deployment gap and occurs when the lead

time to deploy the international police exceeds that of the international military. The

second problem involves the enforcement gap, which may arise when international

or local police are unable to cover the full spectrum of policing, notably combating

large-scale public disorder and organized crime (Dziedzic, 1998).

The last option to prevent an escalation of civil disorder and lawlessness may then

be found in the use of the military as interim police. Military interim policing is not

an ideal solution, however. Although armed forces in a number of countries train

substantial numbers of their military as police or security forces, military personnel

in general are not police officers and are usually not selected, trained, and equipped

for the specificities of the policing task (e.g., Campbell & Campbell, 2010). Nev-

ertheless, inaction is not an option if civilian police alternatives fail.

The effects of a security vacuum can be substa ntial. Uncontrolled growth of

public disorder and criminality may threaten people’s safety in the host nations and

escalate into insurgency and te rrorism, the results of which ca n also be experi-

enced—even much later—in regions o utside the areas in conflict. Inter national,

external security and domestic, internal security (i.e., in Western nations) are

increasingly interconnected (Lutterbeck, 200 5). Crime and terrorism in conflict-

ridden areas may spawn security risks in the Western hemisphere, as there have

been several examples of that over the years. Failure to provide security may also

endanger the popular support for nation building programs and the overall success of

the mission.

In this article, we analyze how the Netherlands armed forces attempted to fill the

security gap that emerged, respectively, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–2004),

Kosovo (1999–2000), and Iraq (2003–2005). In all three cases, there was no local or

international police available to safeguard public order and internal security, includ-

ing the fight against large-scale crime. But the military was present in the area, as the

main element of the respective North Atlantic Tr eaty Organization (NATO)-led

stabilization missions Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR),

Kosovo Force (KFOR), and Stability Force Iraq (SFIR).

Our research question is a simple one: How did the military do the job of repla-

cing the police during a security gap of stabilization operation? Were they ‘‘minim-

alists’’ who thought military personnel did not have the professional skills to do the

712 Armed Forces & Society 43(4)