The Military-Environmental Complex
Date | 01 August 2015 |
Author |
8-2015 NEWS & ANALYSIS 45 ELR 10763
A R T I C L E
The Military-Environmental
Complex
by Sarah E. Light
Sarah E. Light is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania.
Two competing theories vie for dominance regard-
ing the relationship bet ween the U.S. military and
the natural environment. On the one hand, because
legal rules permit the military to disregard environmental
laws when t hey con๎ict with the militar yโs national secu-
rity mission, one might be left with the impression that
the militaryโs mission con๎icts inexorably with environ-
mental protection. Yet, the military is currently engaged in
an extensive undertaking to improve its sustainable energy
use by reducing demand for fossil fuels and developing
renewable energy sources. ๎e mi litary is undertaking
such actions not only in response to congressional direc-
tives and presidential executive orders, but also voluntarily
in response to its operational and national security needs.
In some ca ses, the military is leveraging private ๎na ncing
rather than taxpayer funds to drive innovation. Such coop-
eration among the military, private ๎nanciers, and tech-
nology ๎rms has the potential to transform for the bet ter
not only our nationโs energy pro๎le, but also the military-
industrial complex. ๎is new Military-Environmental
Complex should become a factor in the debate over regula-
tory instruments to combat climate change. At the same
time, however, these relationships warrant some caution to
prevent rent-seeking.
I. Military Exceptionalism
Environmental law doctrine tells us that the militar y is
exceptional; when needs of national security and prepara-
tion for wa r con๎ict with environmental goals, environ-
mental goals must bend. Indeed, many federal statutes not
only acknowledge but support the view that the environ-
ment and national security are in con๎ ict.
Under virtually all federal environmental laws, the
President may grant time-limited, renewable waivers from
environmental obligations for speci๎c agency activities if
such waivers are โin the paramount interest of the United
Statesโ or in the interest of national security.1 In some cases,
the agency headโfor example, the Secretary of Defenseโ
rather than the President, may make that determination
without further executive review.2 In addition, in a time of
national emergency or after a declaration of war, Congress
has provided a blanket exemption for military construction
projects โnot otherwise authorized by law that are neces-
sary to support such use of the armed forces.โ3
In reality, however, the relationship between national
security and the environment is far more complex.
A. Exceptional Mission Alignment
Despite these exemptions, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) has demonstrated t hat national security
and the militar yโs mission are deeply intertwined with the
need to reduce energy u se and develop alternative, renew-
able fuel sources. In fact, the DoDโs exceptional energy
use cre ates a unique synerg y bet ween t he militaryโs mi s-
sion and the need for energ y sustainability.
๎e DoD is t he largest single c onsumer of energy in
the nation.4 ๎e militaryโs total energy costs in ๎scal
year 2013 were $18.9 billion, approximately $4.1 billion
of which were facilit y energy costs and $14.8 bil lion of
1. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Contr ol Act, 15 U.S.C. ยง2621 (201 2); Coastal
Zone Manage ment Act, 16 U.S.C. ยง1456(c )(1)(B) (2012) ; Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. ยง1323(a) (2 006 & Sup p. V); Sa fe Drinking Water Act,
42 U .S.C. ยง300h -7(h) (200 6 & Supp. V); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U. S.C. ยง6961(a) ; Clean Ai r Act, 42 U.S.C. ยง741 8(b)
(2006 & Supp. V); Co mprehensive Envi ronmental Respo nse, Compen-
sation, an d Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. ยง9620 (j) (2006 & Supp. V); see also
Federal Leaders hip in Environmental, Ene rgy, and E conomic Perfor-
mance, Exec. Ord er No. 13514, 3 C.F.R. 248 (2010) [he reinafter Execu-
tive Order on Sustainability].
2. See National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. ยง470h-2(j) (2012); Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. ยง1371(f)(1); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. ยง1536(j) (2012).
3. 10 U.S.C. ยง2808 (2012).
4. O๎๎๎๎๎ ๎๎ ๎
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R๎๎๎๎๎
:
F๎๎๎๎๎ Y๎๎๎ 2013, at 16 (2014), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/en-
ergy/energymgmt_report/FY%202013%20AEMR.pdf [hereinafter AEMR
FY 2013].
๎e full version of this Article was originally published as: Sarah
E. Light, ๎e Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. R๎๎.
879 (2014). It has been excerpted and updated with permission of
Boston College Law Review and Sarah E. Light. Please see the full
article for footnotes and sources.
Copyright ยฉ 2015 Environmental Law Instituteยฎ, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELRยฎ, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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