The Member-Level Determinants and Consequences of Party Legislative Obstruction in the U.S. Senate
| Author | Joseph C. Zamadics,Carlos Algara |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532673X18812403 |
| Published date | 01 July 2019 |
| Date | 01 July 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
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Article
American Politics Research
2019, Vol. 47(4) 768 –802
The Member-Level
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X18812403
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Consequences of Party
Legislative Obstruction
in the U.S. Senate
Carlos Algara1 and Joseph C. Zamadics2
Abstract
Are Senators cross-pressured by party influence and constituent demands
on procedural votes? We present a theory positing that Senators are indeed
cross-pressured between these two demands and that electorally vulnerable
members use the increased salience of procedural votes to differentiate
themselves from their party. In an analysis of Senate procedural votes
since the 92nd Congress, we develop a new spatial measure of obstruction
preference and demonstrate our finding in three ways. First, obstruction
preferences have become more polarized as the Senate experiences more
intense legislative obstruction. Second, electorally vulnerable members are
most likely to break from their party on procedural votes. Third, we find
that voters electorally reward majority party Senators who break from their
party and behave like minority party obstructionists. Our findings suggest
that, unlike the House, Senate procedural votes are special opportunities for
lawmakers to separate themselves from their party.
Keywords
legislative gridlock, congressional polarization, minority party obstruction,
Senate elections, collective accountability
1University of California, Davis, CA, USA
2Department of Political Science, University of Colorado Boulder, Colorado, CO, USA
Corresponding Author:
Carlos Algara, Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, Kerr Hall,
Davis, CA 95616-8685, USA.
Email: calgara@ucdavis.edu
Algara and Zamadics
769
In their study of the House, Jessee and Theriault (2014) find that “not all roll-
call votes are the same.” Some votes are anchored in the ideological divide
between conservative and liberal policy positions while others are rooted in
legislative procedure. The latter have become a larger focus of recent studies
on Congress. Lee (2009) finds that many of today’s political battles, particu-
larly in the U.S. Senate, are fought on partisan rather than ideological terms
with respect to policy items. As a consequence, procedural votes are more
consequential and salient to the majority party’s ability to control the legisla-
tive agenda and overcome partisan gridlock (Den Hartog & Monroe, 2011;
Lee, 2009; Smith, Ostrander, & Pope, 2013). In this article, we ask if the
ramifications from partisan pressures of procedural votes are similar to the
repercussions from partisan pressures on final passage votes. To do this, we
turn to the contemporary Senate, where legislators garner far more proce-
dural power than their counterparts in the House and where procedural votes
are more salient to the legislative process.
We build on recent studies of the Senate by focusing on the individual-
level dynamics faced by Senators on procedural votes and the potential elec-
toral incentives they face in this realm of congressional voting. Using
comprehensive roll call data on Senator procedural votes and a unique data
set on Senate election outcomes, we assess the following two questions criti-
cal to understanding the determinants and consequences of legislative
obstruction in the contemporary Senate: (a) Do Senate procedural votes pro-
vide Senators an opportunity to differentiate themselves from their party? and
(b) Do Senators face punishment from voters for joining their party on proce-
dural votes? In this analysis, we explore these questions using new measures
of Senator preference for legislative obstruction. We theorize that vulnerable
Senators view procedural votes as an opportunity to separate themselves
from their party and reduce the electoral costs of partisan loyalty (Carson,
Koger, Lebo, & Young, 2010). For minority party Senators, procedural votes
provide an opportunity to break with their party and the negative associations
with legislative obstruction and gridlock (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995).
By contrast, procedural votes provide majority party Senators the opportu-
nity to differentiate their electoral brand from their national partisan brand.
Our analysis provides two principal pieces of evidence to support our theo-
retical framework. First, we find that minority party Senators break with their
party on procedural votes in the Congress preceding their reelection bid by
sporting more of an anti-obstruction legislative preference than their minority
party colleagues not facing a reelection bid. This differentiation is more
salient for minority party Senators representing electorally marginal states
and states with a partisan preference for the majority party. Second, majority
party Senators who fail to break with their party on procedural votes face
770
American Politics Research 47(4)
electoral consequences for their partisan loyalty on legislative procedure in
their subsequent reelection bid. This electoral implication is especially pro-
nounced by majority party Senators representing states with a clear partisan
preference for the minority party.
Our theoretical framework of the electoral dynamics of legislative
obstruction in the Senate builds on recent work positing that procedural bat-
tles are salient events that draw the attention of voters. Indeed, the 60-vote
threshold in the Senate to overcome the legislative filibuster is often cited as
the strongest veto point in the legislative process, with most legislation
requiring 60 votes de facto (Fong & Krehbiel, 2018). Scholars note that the
growth of legislative gridlock and partisan conflict, particularly in the Senate
(i.e., Binder, 2011; Binder, Lawrence, & Smith, 2002; Koger, 2010), not
only draws the attention of the mass public, but also informs their political
attitudes. To that point, the greater salience of obstruction in the contempo-
rary Senate coincides with lower congressional job approval assessments
(Flynn & Harbridge, 2015; Ramirez, 2009), lower trust in the national gov-
ernment (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001), and lower public confidence that
Congress can fulfill its policymaking constitutional prerogative (Jones,
2015; Keele, 2007). Moreover, recent work finds that voters, particularly
those who are politically sophisticated and strong partisans, base their views
of legislative procedure on their preference for the underlying policy subject
to procedural maneuvering (Doherty, 2015; Park & Smith, 2016; Smith &
Park, 2013). Taken together, recent work suggests that voters are not only
aware of growing obstruction, but are using these events to inform political
attitudes. As a consequence, Senate procedural votes act as the ideal oppor-
tunity for both vulnerable members to make a statement about their loyalties
or for voters to determine whether the lawmaker is beholden to her constitu-
ency or her party. Given that overcoming procedural obstruction requires a
super majority, this opportunity is evident for electorally vulnerable mem-
bers (e.g., a majority Senate Democrat in a Republican-leaning state) who
often end up as the key votes in Senate procedural votes that determine the
fate of legislation.
We move forward by introducing our theoretical framework and assessing
the relatively high cost of overcoming legislative obstruction in the U.S.
Senate compared with the U.S. House. Similar to previous scholars (e.g., Den
Hartog & Monroe, 2011; Smith et al., 2013), we argue that legislative organi-
zation in the Senate is predicated on almost complete unity in legislative
preference with operationally no room for individual majority party defection
given the greater challenge by the Senate majority party to control the legisla-
tive agenda (Campbell, Cox, & McCubbins, 2002). We then present our the-
ory arguing that this greater emphasis on unified legislative preference
Algara and Zamadics
771
provides Senators with a salient opportunity to differentiate themselves from
their party, with the hopes of reaping electoral benefits from a more distinct
personal brand. Next, we introduce our measure of Senator preference for
legislative procedure. Then, we use procedural voting preferences in two
steps. First as a dependent variable, and second as an independent variable in
a model of reelection vote-shares. The first model shows that Senators up for
reelection become less polarized in their procedure preferences. The second
set of models show that Senators who associate with their party on procedural
votes face negative electoral consequences. Finally, we consider our findings
in the context of models of legislative organization in the House.
Public Opinion and Senate Procedure
A majority of the work on American party organization has occurred in the
House. The prevailing argument is that members of a party are willing to
hand over power to party leaders to obtain group victories and thus improve
the party brand (Aldrich & Rohde, 2000; Cox & McCubbins, 2005, 2007).
However, individual lawmakers face a backlash from voters for choosing the
party over constituents (Carson et al., 2010; Lebo, McGlynn, & Koger, 2007;
Patty, 2008). This central tension, a collective action problem, sets up the
basis of party control in the House....
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