The Logic of Protest Action

• Author: Herman L. Boschken
• Published date: 01 March 1975
• Date: 01 March 1975
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591297502800104
• Published By: Sage Publications, Inc.
• Subject Matter: Articles

59

THE

LOGIC

OF PROTEST

ACTION

HERMAN

L.

BOSCHKEN

San

Diego

State

University

NE

of

the

interesting

phenomena

of

the

last

several

years

has

been

the

0

observable

growth

in

political

protest

involving

groups

of

widely

~~~

diverging

interests

and

characteristics.

The

implication

is

that

protest

in

this

modern

age

seems

to

have

transcended

the

traditional

Marxian

struggle

over

class

structure

and

private

property,

and

includes

a

much

broader

spectrum

of

shifting

interests

relating

to

diverse

pursuits

and

civil

rights.

This

has

led

to

a

greater

emphasis

on

political

action.

The

apparent

paradox,

however,

is

that

the

rising

incidence

of

diverse

interests

in

protest

comes

at

a

time

when

many

scholars

suggest

we

have

achieved

an

affluent

society

where

all

interests

have

been

advanced.’

This

paper

attempts

to

resolve

this

paradox

by

contending

that

most

forms

of

protest

are

a

function

of

the

degree

of

separation

between

(a)

the

values

and

goals

of

those

controlling

collective

decision

processes

and

(b)

the

diversity

of

interests

and

aspirations

in

segmented

society

at

large.

It

makes

no

call

for

altruistic

behavior

on

the

part

of

political

representatives

or

collectives

of

private

interest.

Instead,

given

the

processes

of

massification

toward

a

&dquo;one-

dimensional&dquo;

existence,’

it

argues

that

the

incidence

of

protest

action

is

the

logical

result

when

rational

individuals

attempt,

within

the

limits

of

imperfect

information

and

differential

resources,

to

control

their

daily

lives

and

minimize

the

impersonal

impact

of

institutions.

Moreover,

those

engaging

in

protest

action

are

usually

underrepresented

interests

seeking

access

to

a

collective

decision

pro-

cess

that

affects

their

daily

existence.

Through

protest,

these

groups

impose

&dquo;external&dquo;

costs

on

&dquo;establishment&dquo;

elements

that

lead

to

alteration

of

the

terms

of

political

competition.

The

analysis

draws

its

logic

from

the

theory

of

Public

Choice,

emerging

along

the

fringes

of

political

economy.3

One

of

the

central

contentions

in

this

analytical

field

is

that

&dquo;politics&dquo;

and

the

administration

of

the

&dquo;public

interest&dquo;

cannot

be

separated

as

assumed

under

traditional

reform

theory.

That

is,

the

performance

measures

for

output

in

a

collective

decision

process

are

relative

to

the

values

and

aspirations

of

those

feeling

the

impact

of

the

decision

outcome.

Thematically,

this

paper

conceptualizes,

in

economic

terms,

various

political

factors

expressed

in

protest

action

and

relates

these

to

the

assumptions

commonly

held

by

those

controlling

the

collective

decision

processes

(i.e.,

Establishment

groups ) .

As

such,

the

resultant

model

more

realistically

approximates

the

motives

1

Daniel

Bell,

The

End

of

Ideology

(New

York:

The

Free

Press,

1961).

2

Herbert

Marcuse,

One-Dimensional

Man

(Boston:

Beacon

Press,

1964).

3

A

review

of

the

literature

in

this

field

is

Vincent

and

Elinor

Ostrom,

"Public

Choice:

A

Different

Approach

to

the

Study

of

Public

Administration,"

Public

Administration

Review,

31

(1971),

203-16.

See

also

James

Buchanan

and

Gordon

Tullock,

The

Cal-

culus

of

Consent

(Ann

Arbor :

Ann

Arbor

Paperbacks,

1962).