The logic of covert action.

• Author: Berkowitz, Bruce D.

Few U.S. government activities are as controversial as covert action. Americans may disagree about the specifics of trade policy or defense spending, but covert action is controversial to the core. Many covert operations, if carried out by different persons and under other circumstances, would be plainly and seriously criminal. The process for reviewing and approving such operations tests the limits of democracy. It is not surprising, therefore, that while some officials and pundits are firmly of the opinion that we need to maintain covert action as an option, others insist that the United States has no business carrying out such operations in any circumstances.

Because the United States and the Soviet Union are no longer competing in Third World proxy wars, the rationale for most traditional covert action has disappeared. However, new threats such as terrorism and proliferation may sometimes require the United States to consider going down that road. This is especially true in the Information Age. On the one hand, hostile parties will likely target our communications systems, computers, and data bases; and on the other, the United States will have the opportunity to enhance its security by using these technologies to its own advantage, possibly covertly.

Unfortunately, there are many indications that the United States is not adequately prepared to perform in this new context for covert action. Specifically:

* Most of the public, and many officials, apparently do not understand what covert action really is. As a result, they do not understand when it is effective, when it is not, and the costs that acting covertly imposes.

* Recent covert action failures suggest that as far as understanding the usefulness and limitations of covert action, ignorance extends to many U.S. officials.

* The effectiveness of U.S. intelligence oversight institutions within the legislative branch is questionable.

The Concept Defined

Should the United States be prepared to carry out covert action? Is it ever necessary, or can we dispense with it completely?

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy officials often turned to covert action as a "middle option." Diplomatic pressure against an uncooperative, hostile power such as the Soviet Union was deemed ineffective. Military action, especially when the Soviets had overwhelming forces in Europe and (after 1949) the atomic bomb, was too risky. By default, then, covert action emerged as a prudent alternative to doing nothing. In the early years of the Cold War, too, U.S. leaders tended to think about covert action in terms of their World War II experience. The CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, had run extensive commando raids and psychological operations during the war. While there were skeptics, many U.S. leaders thought that the OSS had been effective. As well as this precedent, after the war U.S. leaders became increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union's own covert operations, and most reasoned that the United States needed similar capabilities.

Unfortunately for the cause of conceptual clarity, "covert action" quickly became synonymous with the kinds of operations the United States carried out under this label during the Cold War - paramilitary operations, propaganda, political action, and the like. This has confused discussions about covert action ever since, because, essentially, covert action properly understood has less to do with the operations themselves than with how they are carried out.

Covert action is, plain and simple, any activity in which the United States conceals its responsibility. Because so many writers, pundits, and commentators fail to understand this, they never address the single most important question pertaining to the subject: When should an action be conducted covertly? Or to put it slightly differently, when and why should the United States act in a deniable fashion?

To underline this point, note that most of the operations that have been carried out as covert action in the past have also been carried out overtly in other situations. For example:

* Paramilitary operations. In the early 1960s the CIA covertly supported the anti-communist Hmong in Laos. In the 1980s the United States provided intermittent overt support to the Nicaraguan Contras.

* Propaganda. From their founding in the early 1950s through 1971, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were covertly funded by the CIA. Voice of America, which has a roughly similar function and has usually carried the same message, has always been overtly sponsored by the U.S. government.

* Exerting political and economic influence. In 1948 the CIA provided covert assistance to the Christian Democratic Party in the Italian national election. Today the National Endowment for Democracy provides overt U.S. assistance to pro-democracy organizations abroad.

* Assassination. The United States tried to kill Fidel Castro in the 1960s, with the CIA using mafia figures as surrogates. In 1986 the United States carried out an air strike against Libya in retaliation for a terrorist attack, specifically targeting the tent in which Muammar Qaddafi was known to sleep, and taking no great pains to hide the fact.

* Coups. In 1953 the CIA covertly fomented public demonstrations against the Mossadeq regime in Iran to assist the Shah to reclaim his throne. In 1986 the United States openly supported Corazon Aquino's "People Power" demonstrations against the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines.

In each of these examples the operations were similar, but some were conducted covertly and others not. The point is this: Americans may question whether the U.S. government should support coups, meddle in foreign elections, or kill foreign leaders, but the nature of these activities is a separate issue from whether the United States should carry them out covertly. Understanding that deniability is the single distinguishing feature of covert action is absolutely necessary if there is to be useful discussion of this topic. In its turn, deniability raises two crucial issues. First, when is covertness essential for the success of an operation? Second, what are the implications of deniable policies for a democratic government?

Why Deniability?

During the Cold War and even today, U.S. officials have often paid more attention to the advantages of covertness than to its costs. Covertness seems to add flexibility because officials do not need to explain their policy to the public or to allies. It also entails review by fewer members of Congress and thus seems more expedient.

There is, however, a price to be paid for such benefits. There is always a cost when other governments and the public ultimately find out that they have been left out of the loop. They may voice approval of an operation after the fact, but whether they admit it or not, those who were misled or not informed will trust the U.S. government less from then on. Sometimes the benefits outweigh the loss of trust, but no one should fool himself into thinking that this cost is zero. It never is.

There are other costs. Many of the benefits of the Information Revolution are a result of our ability to use fluid, networked, open organizations. Networks allow people to exchange ideas and information more easily. This increases creativity. Networks also improve the opportunity for scrutiny by outsiders, and...